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IDENTITY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN A MATURE FIELD:  
THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE SWISS WATCHMAKING INDUSTRY,  
1970-2008  
  
  
ABSTRACT  
This dissertation examines the decline and re-emergence of the Swiss mechanical watch  
industry from 1970-2008, exploring how, when, and why market demand for legacy technologies  
resurrect and reshape a mature field.  Extending existing research on technology emergence and  
death, I reveal the dynamics of technology and field re-emergence. I focus on the mechanisms of  
identity and institutional change associated with re-emergence, as well as how institutional  
leaders and guardians serve as agents of change who simultaneously preserve and reframe the  
values and product conceptions associated with a legacy technology.  Additionally, I advance the  
notion of identity ambidexterity by examining how organizations explore and exploit multiple  
elements of their identity simultaneously during such periods of instability.  Using qualitative  
and quantitative methods, I analyze a wide range of interview, archival, historical, and  
observational data at the levels of the industry and the organization.  More broadly, I seek to  
demonstrate how the reclamation of legacy identities reshapes the institutional environment of a  
mature field, and how incumbent firms re-define their organizational identities after a  
technological innovation threatens to destroy their dominant market position.    
  
Keywords: re-emergence, institutions, identity, fields, organizational ambidexterity  
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'CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
MOTIVATION   
1983: “Now we bid farewell to the [Swiss] master craftsmen who have brought us these  
wonders of the mechanical arts. Their time has come and probably gone.” (Landes, 1983:  
359)  
  
2008: “The watch industry is today, as it was yesterday, one of the brightest stars in the  
Swiss economic firmament. Better still, during the last five or six years, it has taken the  
leading position amongst the country s most successful industries.” (Federation of the  
Swiss Watch Industry 2008 Annual Report)  
  
Is it possible for technologies within a field or industry to re-emerge? Schumpeter (1942)  
argued that the forces of creative destruction overturn existing market structures and force the  
dismantling of those technologies, as well as their applications in products, process, and practices  
(Abernathy, 1976).  Tushman and colleagues have shown how industry evolution is linked to  
technology cycles (Anderson  & Tushman, 1990; Tushman  & Rosenkopf, 1992) whereby a  
dominant technology is displaced by a new technology that, in turn, initiates a new cycle.  The  
effect is a clarion call of sorts: “The (old) technology is dead!  Long live the (new) technology!”    
The prevailing theorization emphasizes technological displacement, assuming that old  
technologies disappear when newer ones arrive.   And yet, as the opening quotes illustrate, this  
may not always be the case, as market demand for old technologies may wane only to emerge  
again at a later point in time.  This seems to be the case for products like fountain pens,  
streetcars, organic winemaking, and vinyl records, which have recently rematerialized to claim  
significant market interest.  I seek to examine a possibility that has largely been overlooked in  
the literature, that displaced technologies may not die away (Adner  & Snow, 2010), but persist in  
some generative form that can permit “re-invention” (Rogers, 1995: 107): “The dying  
technology provides the compost, which allows its own seeds, its own variants, to grow and  
thrive” (Tushman & Anderson, 1997:12).  I seek to understand the underlying dynamics of re- 
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emergence and, especially, the mechanisms whereby technologies re-emerge in mature fields.  I 
 
ask, how, when, and why does market demand for a legacy technology re-emerge?   
My research setting is the Swiss watchmaking industry from 1970 to 2008, an opportune  
context because it was considered to be the premier symbol of technological supremacy and  
innovation for several centuries (Glasmeier, 2000; Sobel, 1996).  Swiss watchmakers dominated  
the industry and the mechanical watch movement for nearly two centuries (Donze, 2011),  
beginning in the mid-18th century.  Their rein abruptly ended in the mid-1970s, at the onset of the  
“Quartz Revolution” (or “Quartz Crisis”), and with the expectation that the quartz movement  
would displace the mechanical.  The Swiss dropped from holding 55% of the world’s export  
market (in monetary value) to roughly 30% a decade later; in export volume, the decline was  
also staggering, decreasing from 45% to 10% of watches produced globally (Glasmeier, 1991:  
477).  By 1983, two-thirds of all watch industry jobs in Switzerland were gone (Perret, 2008a).    
Quartz technology seemingly shifted watch production and caused “the Swiss to [pay]  
dearly for their slowness to adopt the new technology” (Landes, 1983: 353).  In 1983, scholars  
and industry analysts predicted that mechanical watches, along with the Swiss communities of  
watchmakers who built them, would disappear (Donze, 2011; Landes, 1983).  Quite  
unexpectedly, however, Swiss watchmaking, led by the production of mechanical watches,  
resurged and by 2008, re-emerged as the world’s leading exporter of watches and reclaimed 55%  
of the total export value in the global watch industry.   The unexpected return of market demand  
for a displaced technology is the motivation for this dissertation.    
My research joins recent inquiries into processes of field emergence (e.g., Navis    
Glynn, 2010; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2013; Tripsas, 2009) and extends this line of work to reveal that  
field re-emergence is not only possible, but importantly linked to identity, institutions, and  
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ambidexterity.  Institutional theory speaks to the persistence and durability of field level 
 
elements, such as technologies, structures, and meanings that can illuminate the dynamics of  
institutional legacies and their re-emergence.  Organizational identity speaks to the essence and  
attributes of entities of multiple types, including products, firms, collectives, and fields, and how  
they are framed and understood.  Organizational ambidexterity speaks to the ways in which  
organizations simultaneously aim to explore and exploit paradoxically different capabilities in  
the wake of technological and field-level change.  As such, this dissertation serves as an in-depth  
case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2008) that offers theoretical and empirical evidence for the  
salience of re-emergence.   
Below, I introduce my core research questions and offer an overview of the dissertation,  
including a brief summary of my three empirical studies.  I then move to a description of my  
research methods, the empirical setting, research design, and data collection.  Finally, I offer an  
overview of the research relevant to technology cycles, legacy technologies, and industry  
change; this overview is meant to serve as a theoretical bridge to the following empirical  
chapters, wherein I provide reviews of additional literatures that are specific to each study.    
CORE RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This dissertation seeks to address the overarching research question, “How, when, and  
why does market demand for a legacy technology re-emerge?”  More specifically, I consider  
several related questions, associated with the role that identity, institutions, and ambidexterity  
play in processes of field re-emergence.  These include: With the re-emergence of a legacy  
technology in an institutional field, how do the couplings among product, community and  
organization identities affect formation and re-formation?; Which identities become more tightly  
(or loosely) coupled?; What are the mechanisms that drive these changes?; and finally, How do  
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organizational actors initiate, manage, and respond to changes associated with re-emergence? 
 
These questions guide the empirical studies within my dissertation.   
In addition to the questions listed above, within each of my three empirical studies, I  
introduce a sensitizing research question that pertains to the specific goals, data, and analysis in  
that study. Study 1 asks, “What factors influence the re-emergence of market demand for a  
legacy technology in a mature institutional field?”  Study 2 posits, “How are mechanisms of  
identity change associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology?”  
And finally, Study 3 asks “How do incumbent organizations manage change when faced with  
the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology?”  Below, I provide a broad  
overview of the organization of the dissertation which I used to address these research questions.     
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation is composed of six chapters.  In Chapter II, I provide an analytical  
narrative of my research setting, detailing the underlying antecedents and dynamics of the Swiss  
watchmaking industry’s emergence, decline, and eventual re-emergence.  Next, I organize the  
dissertation into three inter-related empirical studies.  Taken together, these three studies offer a  
comprehensive picture of field re-emergence that takes into account the macro-mechanisms  
affecting change and the micro-mechanisms deployed by the field and by firms in order to adapt.   
The studies examine: 1) technology re-emergence in an institutional field (Chapter III);  2) the  
dynamics of field level identity change (Chapter IV); and, 3) the strategic responses of  
organizations as a result of technology re-emergence and field change (Chapter V).  I describe  
each study in more detail below.   
 The first study focuses on re-emergence in an institutionalized field.  This inductive  
study seeks to establish the phenomenon of re-emergence and introduces its core theoretical  
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components.  It focuses primarily on introducing a theory of field re-emergence by extending 
 
previous notions of institutional change, institutional entreprenurship, and institutional  
guardianship.  I uncover the role of various individuals who served as institutional entrepreneurs  
(e.g., CEOs, Swiss watchmakers) who evoked field-level changes by introducing new product  
and process innovations.  I also examine the guardianship role that watch collectors played in  
signaling to watch companies and the market that the legacy mechanical technology still held  
significant value (both symbolic and material) after it had been eclipsed by quartz technology.   
Additionally, this study also considers several macroeconomic and industry-level indicators (e.g.,  
inflation rates, currency valuations, technology changes, consumer buying patterns, industry  
consolidation) that may influence re-emergence.  The theoretical model advanced in this study is  
foundational for the two subsequent studies that investigate the field-level and organizational- 
level mechanisms underlying re-emergence.    
The second study examines the mechanisms (Davis & Marquis, 2005) associated with  
how and why re-emergence occurs.  The primary goal of this mixed methods deductive study is  
to explore how processes of coupling and decoupling among product (mechanical watch),  
organization (watch firms), and community (Swiss) identity facilitated the re-emergence of  
market demand for a legacy technology, focusing more specifically on conceptions of value and  
valuation within the Swiss field of watchmaking after the quartz crisis.  Using data from watch  
advertisements and semi-structured interviews, I map identity shifts over time to show how  
identity change precipitated a reconceptualization of mechanical watchmaking.  My findings  
highlight that three mechanisms – identity claims, leadership, and framing (i.e., temporal,  
linguistic, and value framing) – are core to explaining field re-emergence.    
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The third study moves beyond the field as the primary level of analysis and focuses on 
 
the organization.  It examines the strategic activities, decisions, and responses of select firms.   
By conducting a comparative case analysis of eight exemplar firms, I explore how they managed  
identity preservation and change, focusing on their management of technology uncertainty,  
instability, embedded competencies, entrenched cultures, and routinized processes.  Building on  
recent work by Tushman and O’Reilly (e.g., O' Reilly  & Tushman, 2004; O’Reilly  & Tushman,  
2008; Tushman  & O’Reilly, 2006) that explores ambidexterity as a dynamic capability for  
sustained performance, I extend this line of research to the processes of managing organizational  
identity change.  I introduce the notion of identity ambidexterity, i.e., an organization’s ability to  
exploit past and present identities while simultaneously integrating elements of a new  
organizational identity, by delving into the strategic positioning and re-positioning of firms in the  
face of technology and institutional change.     
Finally, Chapter VI reviews the results of my dissertation, provides observations across  
the three empirical studies, summarizes the theoretical and managerial implications, and closes  
with some concluding comments and reflections.  
DATA AND METHODS OVERVIEW  
Empirical Setting  
Swiss watchmaking provides a unique setting to examine the ways in which, if any,  
identity and institutional change facilitate a legacy technology’s ability to re-emerge.  Using a  
mechanisms-based approach (Davis  & Marquis, 2005), I examine how an entire community and  
its constituent firms accomplished this extraordinary feat after most experts had predicted its  
demise (e.g., Landes, 1983).    
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This study spans the years 1970 to 2008.  The year 1970 was selected as the starting point 
 
for three reasons.  First, 1970 marked the year after the first quartz timepiece was introduced on  
the market, providing a baseline to examine how quartz technology impacted the field of  
watchmaking from its inception.  Second, 1970 represents the height of the Swiss watchmaking  
industry’s dominance over world markets (in units sold and value) prior to the introduction of  
quartz technology.  Finally, starting in 1970 allowed me to track over a decade of performance  
data, events, critical decisions, and identity claims that occurred before the Swiss watchmaking  
industry reached its lowest performing years in the early 1980s after quartz technology became  
the dominant design.  It was not until 1983 that Swatch introduced its first line of quartz watches  
and, with it, a dramatic shift in watchmaking; thus, this functions as a potentially important  
inflection point in the evolution of the field and affords a window on identity and institutional  
shifts associated with the field’s re-emergence.  The year 2008 was chosen as the ending point of  
the study because it marked the beginning of a global financial system downturn, which many  
watch industry experts have now dubbed a “crisis” that affected previous growth patterns.  Thus,  
changes in industry performance trends and firm activities in response to the 2008 crisis suggest  
that several exogenous macroeconomic factors began to impact the industry in 2009 in ways that  
extend beyond the scope of this study.    
Data Sources & Analyses   
I collected data from multiple sources, following what Creswell (2003) termed a  
concurrent triangulation strategy, whereby multiple methods, data sources, and units of analysis  
are used to evaluate a set of theorized relationships within a single study (e.g., Navis and Glynn,  
2010).   I did this with two purposes: first, to construct a narrative history of the focal period to  
observe the trends and, second, to suggest potential markers for the variables that I used to  
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empirically examine my propositions.  I use a variety of primary data sources (e.g., semi- 
structured interviews, participant observation) that are accompanied by a significant body of  
secondary sources (e.g., archival historical reports, macroeconomic indicators, firm history  
books, company advertisements, firm and industry production and performance measures).  The  
data sources are described in Table 1, which lists each of my data sources with a description of  
the data, quantity, type, and a notation of the chapter where it is used.   
This dissertation includes both qualitative and quantitative analyses.  Qualitative analyses  
of interview and archival data are used to inductively expose the factors and mechanisms salient  
to field re-emergence over time.  Quantitative analyses of archival data illustrate the changes in  
in industry and firm level behaviors between temporal periods. Together, these findings serve as  
evidence to illustrate the phenomenon of re-emergence of the Swiss mechanical watch.    
To reveal how such changes occurred, I employ a mixed methods approach to examine  
field and organizational processes associated with re-emergence.  First, I drew from previous  
research that has utilized content analysis of archival data to measure the variance within a field  
(e.g., Navis  & Glynn, 2010).  Second, semi-structured interviews helped clarify inflection points  
and changes found within my quantitative analysis.  Combined, both quantitative and qualitative  
analyses provided multiple avenues to examine the factors and processes associated with re- 
emergence.  Finally, in order to extend my analysis beyond the field level of analysis, I  
conducted a multi-case analysis on a subset of organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989: 25).  This  
qualitative method, which aimed to expose the heterogeneous behaviors and strategies employed  
by a subset of various firms, is cited as “one of the best (if not the best)” methods for creating a  
bridge “from rich qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research” (Eisenhardt    
Graebner, 2007: 25).  
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Table 1: Overview of Data Sources  
Dissertation  Description of Data  Quantity  Type  Chapter  
Primary Data Sources  
       
Semi-Structured Interviews   122 individuals,   Qualitative  -  Chapter III  
-  CEOs, senior executives, watchmakers, retailers government officials,  101 hours  -  Chapter IV  
trade associations, horological academies, horological societies, company  (ave: 1.51 hours per  -  Chapter V   
historians, academics, collectors, auction house executives, journalists.  interview)  
  
        
Focus Groups  
-  La Chaux-de-Fonds watchmaking academy    
4 focus groups   
  
Qualitative  
  
-  Chapter III  
-  Chapter IV  
-  NAWCC horological school, Columbia, PA.  (42 people total)    
-  American Watchmakers Clockmakers Institute  
-  Vintage watch collector associations    
  
  
        
Participant Observation    Qualitative  -  Chapter III  
-  Attended BaselWorld, the industry’s largest field-configuring event with  8 days, 10 hours/day  -  Chapter IV  
over 104,000 visitors, 1815 exhibitors from 45 countries, 3,300 journalists.      
-  Toured multiple watchmaking factories in Switzerland   4 tours  
-  Attended watch and clockmaking classes at NAWCC horological school,  1 day  
Columbia, PA.   
  
  
        
Industry Museums and Archives  4 museums   Qualitative   -  Chapter III  
-  Toured watch museums in Le Locle and La Chaux-de-Fonds,    
Switzerland.      
-  Toured Swiss National History Museum, Zurich.     
-  Tour of National Watch  & Clock Collectors Museum, Columbia, PA.     
-  Research in horological archives in Switzerland and United States  3 archives  
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Description of Data  Quantity  Type  Dissertation  Chapter  
Secondary Data Sources  
        
Print Advertisements  845 advertisements  Qualitative  -  Chapter IV   
-  Journal of Swiss Horology (1970-2000, final issue)    & Quantitative  
-  Chronos (1996-2008)  (Hand-scanned from  
-  International Watch (1996-2008)  archives in the United  
States and Switzerland).  
  
  
Archival Interviews  
- & Interviews with Swiss watch CEOs recounting the quartz crisis.  
Conducted by Dr. Lucien Trueb (leading Swiss watch industry journalist  
and scientific reporter). Published in 2008, in German.   
- & TimeZone (leading industry news website) interviews with CEOs and  
senior executives about industry trends and company happenings.  
Published between 1998 and 2012, in English.  
  
      
  Qualitative  -  Chapter III  
145 CEOs    -  Chapter IV  
  -  Chapter V  
  
27 CEOs   
  
        
Swiss Watch Production  & Watch Companies  1949-2011  Quantitative  -  Chapter III  
-  # Swiss watches produced (mechanical, electric), every 5 years     -  Chapter IV  
-  # Swiss employees, management in Switzerland # of watch companies,  -  Chapter V  
annual  
  
        
Global Trade  & Competition Data  1970-2011  Quantitative  -  Chapter III  
-  Export value of Swiss watches, overall  -  Chapter IV  
-  Export value of Swiss watches, by country     
-  Non-Swiss watch production, pieces  
-  Non-Swiss watch production, export values   
-  # watches produced globally (mechanical, electric)  
  
          
Industry Certifications     1974-2010   Quantitative  -  Chapter III  
-  # of Swiss COSC chronometers certified, annual     (hand scanned from  -  Chapter V   
-  # certifications by each company, annual   archives in Switzerland)   
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Dissertation  Description of Data  Quantity  Type  Chapter  
         
  1971, 1995, 2007   Qualitative  -  Chapter III  “Swiss Made” Government Regulations   
-  Government materials on “Swissness” legislation    -  Chapter IV  
-  Press releases     
  
       
Auction House Vintage Watch Prices  & Item Descriptions  Sotheby’s,   Quantitative    -  Chapter I  
-  Sotheby’s auction catalogue price variance figures  Antiquorum   Qualitative  -  Chapter III  
-  Antiquorum auction catalogue price variance figures    
    
  
Macroeconomic Indicators  
-  Consumer Price Index   
-  Currency exchange  rates  
-  Interest rates   
-  GDP (actual, per capita, growth rate, index)  
-  Per capita GDP  
-  GDP growth rates  
-  Consumption (all, household, government)  
-  Gross capital formation   
-  Exports of goods  & services   
-  Imports of goods  & services   
-  Changes in inventories (all goods)  
-  Main exports of Switzerland, by product, (1840-1999, nine periods)  
-  Geographical distribution of Swiss trade (1990-1999,  seven periods)  
  
     
Annual (1970-2008)  Quantitative  -  Chapter III  
  -  Chapter IV  
(for Switzerland and all    
major watch export  
countries)  
        
Archival Documents (company specific)  67 books  Qualitative   -  Chapter V  
-  Company specific historical books written by company historians   
-  Company specific historical books written by outside collector groups and  
watch enthusiasts   
-  Archival documents, press releases, and annual reports found in  
company archives collected in Switzerland, Germany, France, and United  
States.  
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CONTRIBUTIONS   
This dissertation makes several contributions to the extant literature.  First, because I  
examine how fields can be reconstituted through technology, I complement and extend existing  
research on the dynamics of field birth and death.  My research reveals that technology cycles  
may be more expansive than previously modeled, lengthening beyond birth (technology  
emergence) and death (technology displacement) to re-birth and re-emergence.  Thus, I  
contribute to research on innovation and innovation cycles (Tushman  & Rosenkopf, 1992),  
highlighting how legacy technologies (i.e., old technologies that endure after the rise of a  
dominant substitute) (Adner  & Snow, 2010) embedded within institutionalized fields can,  
counterintuitively, survive periods of ferment and the threat of displacement to reconfigure a  
field, as well as its key products and actors.    
Second, I highlight how the processes that underlie field-level changes are predicated not  
only on technology shifts, but also on mechanisms related to identity, institutionalization, and  
ambidexterity.  My work offers explanations for how and why field changes occur, a relatively  
understudied – but important – arena of research.  Third, I answer calls for integrative research  
that encompasses micro- and macro-level processes of change, innovation (Drazin, Glynn,    
Kazanjian, 1999) and institutionalization (Powell  & Colyvas, 2008), by exploring how the  
reclamation of legacy identities (Walsh  & Glynn, 2008) in products, organizations, and  
communities reshape fields.    
Before turning to the three empirical studies that provide evidence for these  
contributions, next I provide a brief theoretical grounding of the core constructs that served as  
the foundation for my dissertation’s research questions.    
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THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
 
The focus of my dissertation is on the conditions and processes that explain how market  
demand for a legacy technology re-emerges within a mature or institutionalized field.  My  
theorization examines the conditions, mechanisms, and outcomes that underlie the phenomena of  
re-emergence, which I see as profoundly interwoven with the re-emergence of corresponding  
technologies, fields, communities, and organizations.  In this chapter I provide of overview of the  
literature related to: 1) institutional fields and 2) technology cycles.  Both will serve as a  
backdrop for the three subsequent empirical studies.  Within each of the three empirical studies I  
provide a more specific review of the literature on institutions, identity, and ambidexterity,  
respectively, as they relate to technology cycles, market change, and re-emergence.    
Defining an Institutional Field2   
The notion of the “field” is a cornerstone of institutional theory and arguably one of its  
most significant contributions (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002; Davis & Marquis, 2005;  
DiMaggio  & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008; Scott  & Meyer, 1983; Scott, Ruef, Mendel,  & Caronna,  
2000).  Definitions of institutions abound.  One of the more robust definitions was offered by  
Hughes (1936: 180) nearly seventy-five years ago:  "The only idea common to all usages of the  
term ' institution' is that of some sort of establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social  
sort."  Institutions, according to Friedland and Alford (1991: 232), are “supraorganizational  
patterns of activity by which individuals and organizations produce and reproduce their material  
subsistence and organize time and space….[and include] symbolic systems, ways of ordering  
reality, thereby rendering experience of time and space meaningful.”  Leveraging Scott’s (2001)  
theorization of three constitutive pillars, Greenwood and colleagues (2008:4) define an  
                                                  
2 Components of this section are adapted from the working paper, Raffaelli, R; Glynn, MA, and Strandgaard  
Pedersen, J. “Towards a General Theory of the Institutional Field.”  
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institution as “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by 
 
normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus  
enable self-reproducing social order.”  Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997: 412) offer a touchstone for  
incorporating these various perspectives in arguing that “Cognitive structuring is only part of the  
story; purposive action fleshes out an institutional explanation.”  Integrating across these  
perspectives, I define institutions as social structures that order human activity, imbue it with  
meaning, and are consensually understood within a field as typical and appropriate.  
Within neo-institutional theory, theorizing “fields” moved discourse from the level of the  
individual firm to that of collectives of firms or professions and revealed how forces at this  
collective level, arising in the “environment,” shaped the cognitive, normative and regulative  
aspects of organizational functioning (Scott, 2008: 182; Scott, 1995).  DiMaggio and Powell’s  
classic work (1983) ignited scholarly interest in studying fields; over time, however, an array of  
labels and definitions have come to be associated with the construct, including “societal sectors”  
(Scott  & Meyer, 1983), “industry systems” (Hirsch, 1985), “industry categories” or SIC  
classifications (Glynn & Abzug, 2002), to cite a few examples.  The French social scientist  
Pierre Bourdieu is most often considered the father of the field concept, originally coining the  
term “field” (champ) in a series of seminars held at the École Normale Supérieure and École  
Practique des Hautes Études during the 1960s.   
More recent conceptions argue that fields cohere via coordinating mechanisms that  
facilitate interaction among actors, with regard to: market exchanges (DiMaggio  & Powell,  
1983); collective cognition (Scott, 2008); issue interpretation (Hoffman, 1999); and geographic  
co-location (Marquis, Lounsbury,  & Greenwood, 2011b). Taken together, these field  
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coordinating mechanisms provide a valuable perspective for analyzing interactions among actors 
 
during field level change and re-emergence, as described below.    
Mechanisms of Market Exchange  
In their seminal work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 143) argue that fields cohere around  
coordinating mechanisms associated with organizations that share “a recognized area of  
institutional life,” defined broadly by a common industry, product, service, or technology. They  
focus on the various actors constituting the recognized organizational field, placing an explicit  
focus on the mechanism of market exchange that facilitates action among various actors within  
the field.  A core assumption is that a field’s boundary is established amongst those actors who  
share a common product or market category.  Boundaries may also depend on whether the actor  
is cognitively salient to others within the field (Porac, Thomas,  & Baden Fuller, 1989). The field  
maintains stability via actors’ attempts to obtain legitimacy (i.e., “a generalized perception or  
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially  
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574)), and which  
are typically influenced by isomorphic forces (i.e., coercive, mimetic, normative) (DiMaggio and  
Powell, 1983).      
Mechanisms of Collective Cognition   
Scott (2008) suggests relational and cultural- cognitive mechanisms coordinate field-level  
activities and action.  He states: “The notion of field connotes the existence of a community of  
organizations that partakes in a common meaning system and whose participants interact more  
frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott, 1994: 207- 
208, emphasis added).  Scott (2008) also focuses on the activities of a “community of  
organizations” that interact frequently.  Thus, processes of creating and enforcing “meaning  
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systems” are central mechanisms for field interaction and coherence.  Likewise, the organizing 
 
principles of the field are rooted in common sensemaking, whereas boundary conditions are  
established via the structuration that occurs from the frequency of market actor interactions.    
Mechanisms of Issue Interpretation and Negotiation   
Institutional research has also emphasized coordinating mechanisms that emerge through  
the conflictive interplay between actors and power relations that underlie the institutional field.   
This research builds on Bourdieu’s work (1992) that focused on relations, positions, and  
dominance.  Hoffman (1999:351) suggests that fields coordinate around mechanisms of issue  
interpretation where actors negotiate for their “competing interests.”  As such, fields are  
structured by a composition of interests.  Social movement research has utilized this construct  
variant of the field, examining how actors have coalesced around civil rights (Andrews, 2001;  
McAdam, 1983), equal employment opportunities and human resources practices (Baron,  
Dobbin, & Jennings, 1986), recycling (Lounsbury, 2001), microfinance (Battilana  & Dorado,  
2010), and open-source IT standards (O' Mahony & Bechky, 2008).  Because member interaction  
is coordinated via mechanisms of issue interpretation and negotiation, issue-based fields  
typically engage a broad array of actors from multiple sectors, industries, and markets, but they  
also have a more singular focus on an issue.    
Mechanisms of Geographic Co-Location  
Finally, a fourth body of recent research focuses on the mechanisms of field interaction  
based on actors’ co-location in geographic communities.  These contributions base their  
conceptualization on geographic location and physical proximity (Marquis & Battilana, 2009;  
Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2011a; Marquis, Glynn,  & Davis, 2007; Marquis et al., 2011b).  As  
such, geographic communities organize and set boundaries in relation to spatial proximity and  
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coordination occurs via community building activities.  While co-location may preserve the 
 
community and serve as a stability mechanism, re-districting or (trans)migration are mechanisms  
of change.   
This overview of the four different field coordination mechanisms highlights how  
institutional fields facilitate interaction among actors: market transactions, shared meaning  
making and frequency of interaction, issue interpretation and negotiation, and geographic co- 
location.  They set boundary conditions that demarcate actors’ interaction (i.e., which actors  
participate in the interactions), and the substance of their interaction (e.g., coordination, conflict,  
resource exchange).    
All four coordinating mechanisms are evident in my research setting, the Swiss watch  
industry.  The mechanism of market exchange highlights the role of macroeconomic factors,  
including worldwide currencies, product pricing, bases of watch valuation, global competition,  
and the definition of key players.  The mechanism of collective cognition highlights how  
prevailing mindsets or beliefs, focused on mechanical watchmaking as a valued product,  
professional craft, and organizational activity, coordinate activities and persist in an active field,  
even after the emergence of quartz watch technology that helped to catalyze technological re- 
emergence.  The mechanism of issue interpretation highlights how multiple actors often come  
together to negotiate for government regulations that serve the interests of the Swiss watch  
industry (e.g., policies against foreign counterfeiting, trade protection policies, branding  
standards for Swiss watch firms).  Finally, the mechanism of geographic co-location highlights  
the connection to the country and regions of Switzerland, including how pockets of industry  
concentration, particularly in the Jura mountain region and in the city of Geneva, affected re- 
emergence.  In this dissertation, I explore how these various components, under conditions of  
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field and organizational change, interact and explain processes of re-emergence.  I complement 
 
these theories by examining how they are related to technology cycles, innovation, and market  
change.   
Technology Cycles and Market Change  
The relationship between technology and market change has been a dominant fixture of  
the economic, sociological, and organizational literatures for some time.  Economists, most  
notably Schumpeter (1942: 82), argue that change in technologies and markets is “an  
evolutionary process.” As a critical response to neoclassical economists, Schumpeter (1947)  
posited that market creation and organizational development are driven by a process of  
“industrial mutation… incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one”  
(Schumpeter, 1942: 83).  His theory of creative destruction, emphasizing the necessary  
destruction of old technologies in the advent of the new, has become a core concept in the  
management literature and has remained largely uncontested (Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005).  Yet,  
evolutional theories of creative destruction have paid little attention to the alternative paths of  
displaced technologies, like the Swiss mechanical watch, that may have the capability to re- 
emerge and re-configure a field.    
Over the last forty years, several theories of technological change and market evolution  
have extended Schumpeter’s original theorizing. Early supporters of technology evolution  
theories, however, often found themselves at odds with mainstream neoclassical models of firm  
behavior (Dosi, 1982).  For example, economists Nelson and Winter (1982:4) argued for an  
evolutionary theory of economics that was analogous to natural selection, posing a direct  
challenge to mainstream economic models based on profit maximization and market equilibrium.  
Similarly, Freeman (1974) explored international and government policy implications of  
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technology change, suggesting that neoclassical economic theories were limited in their ability to  
address challenges related to technology transfer and globalization.  These and other economic  
theories emphasized what Schumpeter termed the “adaptive response” (1947: 153) of managers,  
highlighting the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm (e.g., Porter, 1985) and emphasizing  
how firms create and sustain competitive advantage (Wiggins  & Ruefli, 2005:888).    
In addition to business economists, management and organization scholars have also  
dedicated significant attention to technology change and market evolution, concentrating on  
technological evolution as a cyclical process.  Scholars have used several terms to describe  
patterns of technological evolution, including “technology trajectories” and “technology  
paradigms” (Dosi, 1982), “design hierarchies” (Clark, 1985), and “punctuated equilibrium”  
(Romanelli  & Tushman, 1994).  Similarly, Kuhn’s (1970:viii) work on scientific paradigms is  
characterized by a cyclical model of revolutionary breakthroughs and then a return to  
incremental change (Suarez, 2004).    
These processes of technology change and evolution can be defined by a technology life  
cycle (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).   
Technology life cycles consist of four main components (Tushman  & Rosenkopf, 1992):  
technological discontinuities, eras of ferment, dominant designs, and eras of incremental change.   
First, the cycle begins with a technological discontinuity, defined as a technology that “departs  
dramatically from the norm of continuous incremental innovation that characterizes product  
classes” and affects either processes or products (Anderson  & Tushman, 1990: 606).  Such  
discontinuities can be competency destroying or competency enhancing for firms (Tushman    
Anderson, 1986).  Competency destroying technologies require different technological  
knowledge or capabilities than what the firm already possesses. For example, in the watch  
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industry, the electronics required to support tuning fork and quartz oscillating components were 
 
competency destroying for the mechanical watchmaking firms that had manufactured mostly  
hand-made alloy balance wheel oscillating components for several centuries and had little  
previous know-how or interest in electronic circuitry (Landes, 1983).  Conversely, competency  
enhancing technologies build on the existing knowledge and skills already housed within the  
organization. Accordingly, quartz oscillating movements were a competency enhancing  
technology for many of the Japanese firms that utilized existing know-how in electronics to  
manufacture this new type of watch (Glasmeier, 1991).    
Second, discontinuous technologies marshal in an era of ferment, marked by increased  
uncertainty and competition among several technological variants vying for dominance.  For  
example, Rao (1994) highlights the role that car races played during the era of ferment when  
steam, electric, and combustion engines battled for technological supremacy in the inchoate  
automobile industry.  In addition to competition between rival conceptions of the new  
technology, periods of ferment also force incumbent firms (or communities of firms) to defend  
the legacy technology against the new technical variants (Foster, 1986).  Such battles prolong  
uncertainty about whether the new technology will replace the old (Anderson  & Tushman,  
1990).  In the watch industry, for instance, the Swiss Observatory in Neuchatel held annual  
contests for over a century to determine which watch manufacturers could produce the most  
precise timepieces; the contests were abruptly cancelled, however, in 1968 after a quartz  
timepiece was able to claim the title from a mechanical watch. According to Landes (1983:345- 
346), “the old combat lost meaning… the very competitions that had consecrated the supremacy  
of the Swiss in the matter of horological precision might now serve as a vehicle for their  
overthrow.”    
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Third, uncertainty will continue within the industry until a new technological order is  
ushered in by a dominant design (Abernathy  & Clark, 1985; Sahal, 1981; Suárez  & Utterback,  
1995; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), often indicated by one variant accounting for 50% or more  
of new product sales or process installations for three straight years (Anderson, 1988; Anderson  
& Tushman, 1990).  Utterback and Abernathy (1975) claim that variation will continue until  
users begin to develop loyalties and preferences for one variant; firms will also begin to move  
towards standardization (e.g., components, marketing, distribution, maintenance, and  
advertising) in order to reap efficiency gains and network effect benefits (Abrahamson    
Rosenkopf, 1997).      
Some scholars have argued, however, that technologically superior products or processes  
will not always become the dominant design, offering a counter-explanation to technological  
determinist predictions (Anderson  & Tushman, 1990).  For example, VHS format in VCRs,  
QWERTY keyboards, and the Apple II personal computer were not considered the “best”  
technological variants of their time, but were generally accepted by their respective industries  
because of sociopolitical and institutional factors (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008; Scott, 2008;  
Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992).  Such examples illustrate that the selection of a dominant design  
is not always based solely on technological determinism, and that other non-technical factors  
also play an important role in shaping the historical evolution of an industry (Smith  & Marx,  
1994).      
Fourth, once a dominant design is selected, an era of incremental change transpires.   
During this period, progress is measured in both process and product innovations related to the  
new technology.  Communities and social structures form to “reinforce this period of  
incremental, order-creating, technical change;” they support puzzle-solving and technical  
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progress within the new technical paradigm, but can also “stunt openness to technical approaches 
 
outside the paradigm” (Tushman  & Rosenkopf, 1992: 323, 318). Thus, periods of incremental  
change continue until the introduction of a new discontinuous technology, spurring the  
technology cycle once again.    
Over the past several decades, management scholars have worked with great fervor to test  
the technology life cycle model, providing significant empirical evidence to support its validity.   
Quantitative and qualitative examples from multiple industries abound, including disk drives,  
typesetting, cameras, telecommunications, video games, VCRs, sailing ships, turbo jets, cement,  
glass, and microcomputers  (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Christensen  
& Bower, 1996; Constant, 1980; Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992; Foster, 1986;  
Gallagher  & Park, 2002; Suárez  & Utterback, 1995; Tripsas, 1997).    
Legacy Technologies and the Technology Life Cycle   
Generally, research on technology evolution has examined  “highly path dependent  
processes”  (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008: 790) by which technology cycles repeat themselves.  Little  
attention, however, has been given to legacy technologies beyond the technology life cycle.  In  
short, we know very little about what happens to legacy technologies after their displacement by  
new technologies.  One potential explanation for the lack of scholarly attention paid to legacy  
technologies might be the dominance of the Schumpeterian paradigm; with its diffusion there has  
been limited questioning of its core assumptions.  Another can be attributed to a pro-innovation  
bias held by management scholars (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997; Kimberly, 1981).   
Rogers (1995: 107) warns that such biases have lead researchers to underemphasize the rejection  
of discontinuous innovations and to overlook re-invention.     
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Inferred within technology life cycle research is that legacy technology orders will  
eventually reach a natural limit (Fleming, 2001), but will not disappear without fierce  
competition against the new technological variants (Anderson  & Tushman, 1990).  Once a new  
dominant design gains coherence and acceptance, the legacy technology will either disappear or  
move into a niche market (Adner  & Snow, 2010; Porter, 1985).  Broadly, long term  
prognostications for displaced technologies have been less than favorable. Foster’s (1986: 160)  
popular-based account of  technology displacement colorfully demonstrates this sentiment:    
Things will continue to deteriorate for the [legacy technology firm(s)].  Eventually, it will  
leave the market and may even go bankrupt.  In most cases, though, there is some  
residual market for the old technology.  The market served by the old technology will be  
small, have no growth, but may be highly profitable for the two or three producers left in.   
But as the industry as a whole experiences a shakeout, prices will collapse, and only a  
few firms will be economically strong enough to weather the storm… It is possible to put  
this cycle of market penetration into a time frame. It usually takes between five and  
fifteen years for a new technology to supplant an old one.    
  
Nonetheless, a few studies have explored the trajectory of old technologies that do not  
immediately succumb to the path of displacement.  For example, Henderson’s (1995) research on  
the optical lithography industry reveals how a legacy technology was able to extend its  
dominance beyond its performance limits because of social and institutional factors.  Ansari and  
Garud (2009) show how the life of 2G telephony technology was extended due to modular  
innovations in packet-switching technology.  Snow (2008) and Harley (1971) illustrate how  
legacy technologies such as carburetors and sailing ships extended their lifespan by adopting  
components from electronic fuel injectors and steam ships, respectively.  Finally, Adner and  
Snow (2010: 1655) offer a theoretical explanation for the life extension of old technologies,  
arguing that the emergence of a new technology can “reveal significant underlying heterogeneity  
in the old technology’s broader demand environment,” explicating how several old technologies  
have avoided extinction by exploiting “racing” strategies (i.e., extending the performance of the  
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old technology) or “retreat” strategies (i.e., moving into a niche within the technology’s home 
 
market or relocating the old technology in to a new market application).    
Cognitive Dimensions of the Technology Cycle   
More recently, scholars have extended the technology life cycle model, arguing that the  
management technology literature has largely neglected cognitive factors that are “essential to  
understanding the dynamics of technology evolution” (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008: 791).  Weick  
(1990: 1) posits a view of technologies as equivoque, i.e., “something that admits of several  
possible or plausible interpretations and therefore can be esoteric, subject to misunderstandings,  
uncertain, complex, and recondite” and, thus, require sensemaking if they are to be managed.   
Orlikowski and Gash (1994: 199) draw on the organizational and sociological literature to  
introduce the concept of technological frames: “the core set of assumptions, expectations, and  
knowledge of technology collectively held by a group or community.” They aver that individuals  
and organizations have to make sense of nascent technologies and that during this process of  
sensemaking they develop “shared cognitive structures ” (Orlikowski  & Gash, 1994: 199). These  
structures, they argue, are composed of collective taken-for-granted norms and assumptions  
about the technology that serve to shape subsequent actions towards it.    
Kaplan and Tripsas (2008) extend the concept of technological frames and propose a  
multi-level model that highlights how cognitive factors influence each stage of the technology  
life cycle.  They posit that dominant designs represent not just technical convergence, but also  
cognitive convergence.  Benner and Tripsas (2012) illustrate this concept of cognitive  
convergence empirically using digital cameras. They examine the development of shared beliefs  
about the functionality and features incorporated in the category’s dominant design, and not just  
what technologies became dominant.  Thus, examining the cognitive factors associated with a  
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technology life cycle supposes that technological change not only impacts the technology itself 
 
(Kaplan, 2008), but also the frames, understandings, and community identities that attend to it.      
In sum, technology cycles are initiated by the introduction of a discontinuous technology,  
which is accompanied by an era of ferment until the industry coalesces around a new dominant  
design; an era of incremental change exists until the next discontinuous technology appears.   
This model of technological change has remained largely unchallenged in the literature, in spite  
of theoretical perspectives that offer some alternative, or at least expanded, ways of thinking  
about the processes.  It seems that scholars have placed a disproportionate amount of attention on  
the technical aspects of technological change (e.g., product and component design, utility, price),  
with less attention paid to the understandings, and cognitive framing, that accompanies such  
changes.    
Moreover, there seems to be a pro-innovation bias within the academic community that  
has resulted in little attention devoted to the possibility of the endurance of legacy technologies  
beyond the life cycle model.  Only recently have scholars begun to examine the cognitive factors  
that affect technological life cycles (e.g., social, political, institutional) (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008;  
Tripsas, 2009:442).  As a result, we know little about the micro-processes and mechanisms that  
undergird the communities and organizations that attempt to preserve legacy technologies, nor   
the cognitive factors that may potentially affect the trajectory of a legacy technology beyond the  
limits of its “ultimate performance” (Henderson, 1995: 631). This dissertation focuses explicitly  
on following the alternative path of the Swiss mechanical watch – a displaced technology that re- 
emerged –and the cognitive factors (e.g., identity, institutions, ambidexterity) that enabled both  
the preservation and transformation of the Swiss watchmaking industry.   
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In the subsequent empirical chapters, I examine how each of these theoretical lenses  
informs my understanding of how market demand for legacy technologies re-emerges, and I 
 
provide evidence to support how legacy technologies re-establish themselves in a mature field.
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CHAPTER II.  HISTORY OF THE SWISS WATCHMAKING INDUSTRY 
 
INTRODUCTION   
This chapter offers an analytical narrative of the Swiss watchmaking industry.  It is meant  
to serve as a sensitizing backdrop for the empirical studies that follow.  The first section  
highlights the critical factors that contributed to the emergence of the Swiss on the global watch  
market in the 16th and 17th centuries and their dominance for over two centuries.  It also provides  
an overview of the invention of the quartz watch, a technology that nearly destroyed the Swiss  
watchmaking industry during in the 1970s and early 1980s.  The second section describes several  
responses various Swiss actors took from 1983 to 1989, in response to the “quartz crisis,”  
including the mass consolidation of production systems and the introduction of the watches as  
fashion accessories.  The third section describes the re-emergence of market demand for Swiss  
mechanical watches between 1990 and 2008, particularly as the Swiss turned toward establishing  
their products more firmly in the luxury market.  Figure 1 provides a timeline that summarizes  
the major events within the Swiss watch industry since its inception.    
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Figure 1: Timeline of Critical Events in Swiss Watchmaking 
 
  
  
NARRATIVE HISTORY  
Emergence and Near Collapse: 1560-1983  
Nearly 400 years ago, the quest to develop an accurate timekeeping mechanism was  
considered the greatest scientific challenge of the time (Sobel, 1996); for several centuries,  
watchmaking was the premier symbol of technological supremacy (Glasmeier, 2000: 156).   
Geneva was the first Swiss city to enter the watchmaking trade in the mid-16th century when  
John Calvin, the Protestant reformer who came from France and made Geneva his base,  
outlawed local goldsmiths from making crucifixes and jewelry.  Instead, these tradesmen took up  
making jeweled watches and clocks (Trueb, 2005).  A century later, the city’s watch industry  
received an infusion of talent when King Louis XIV expelled the Huguenots living in France; his  
actions led many of the country’s best watchmakers to resettle in Geneva, making it the new hub  
of the high-end watch trade.  As the Swiss watch industry grew, Geneva watchmakers searched  
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for new sources of labor, particularly in other parts of their country; the first was the Vellee de  
Joux (known for its highly complicated watches), who eventually became competitors.  
The Swiss rise on the world stage, however, was due largely to the emergence of  
watchmaking in the Jura mountain region.  This snow-capped mountainous territory of  
Switzerland sits along a trade route between Germany, France and Italy, and was populated by  
peasant cow farmers who were convinced to use their idle time during the long and cold winters  
to build watches.  Individuals living in the Jura region were introduced to the craft by Geneva  
industrialists and French Huguenots.  Although Parisian watchmakers were always considered  
the leaders in watch innovation through the 19th century, they relied on the craftsmanship of  
watchmakers in Switzerland to produce their most intricate and complicated timepieces.  Towns  
in the Jura, such as La Chaux-de-Fonds (now considered the capital of the Swiss watchmaking  
industry), were also home to iron and brass tradesmen who were well positioned to diversify into  
the craft of watchmaking.  The region focused on precision timepieces at reasonable prices.  
Landes (1983: 261,263) notes, “The first [Jura] watches were not elegant – that was left to  
Geneva…The entrance of the [Jura] mountain Swiss was based on the production of cheaper  
models designed to sell to a wider market.”  The strategy paid off.  By the late early 19th century,  
Swiss watchmakers had become a serious threat to their French and British rivals.      
Supported by the Swiss government, the region continued to grow, sponsoring  
competitions to motivate watchmakers to design new innovations that would promote the  
development of even more accurate timepieces.  Concurrently, they established institutions that  
created professional standards, educational settings, and standardized training centers to  
encourage the dissemination of watchmaking skills within the region (Glasmeier, 2000:100).  As  
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a result of these efforts, by 1910 the “Swiss mechanical watch dominated the world watch 
 
industry (Knickerbocker, 1974 in Glasmeier, 2000: 105).     
Swiss dominance continued through the 1960s, with a continued focus on building more  
accurate and precise mechanical watches.  In 1962, the Swiss introduced a prototype for a watch  
that used quartz technology, which was unmatched in its ability to maintain accurate time and to  
use significantly fewer parts than its mechanical counterpart.  Although expensive to produce at  
first, prices fell by a factor of 100 in the 1970s (Trueb, 2005), leading the quartz watch to  
become the new dominant design for the industry.  Quartz watch technology, a “competency  
destroying” (Tushman  & Anderson, 1986) innovation for the Jura mechanical watchmakers, no  
longer required the highly skilled mechanical craftsmanship of the Jura watchmaking community  
to produce.  Although the Swiss invented the first quartz watch, they had little interest in re- 
tooling their production system to accommodate their mass production (Perret, 2008a).   
Additionally, the community of Swiss mechanical watchmakers did not see the quartz watch as  
an extension of their craft, “remaining largely skeptical… of technology designed by specialists  
in electronics rather than horologists” 3 (Perret, 2008a: 324).  
However, due to large investments in building their consumer electronic industry post  
World War II, the Japanese were able to quickly adapt and produce digital and quartz watches  
much cheaper and faster than their Swiss competitors.  Historians commented, “Swiss  
performance [had] been weakest precisely in the area of most rapid growth: quartz complicated”  
(Landes, 1983).  Industry analysts coined the term “quartz crisis” to describe the Swiss market  
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, citing a 60% loss of watchmaking companies in the region  
during this period and a two-thirds loss of employees (Perret, 2008a).  These issues were further  
exacerbated by currency fluctuations between the Swiss and their primary export country, the  
                                                  
3 A “horologist” is a member of the profession of horology, the science of timekeeping.    
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United States.  In comparison to the Japanese yen, Swiss watches became comparatively more 
 
expensive.  While the field continued to focus on precision and accuracy, the Swiss mechanical  
craftsmen could no longer compete with Japanese prices or their superior quartz mass production  
systems.    
Response & Adaptation: 1983-1989  
Although quartz technology was superior in terms of accuracy, consumers found the  
lower priced Japanese watches to be aesthetically unpleasing.  Additionally, many traditional  
Swiss manufacturers and watchmakers had no interest in them.  A watchmaker working during  
this period summarizes the general sentiment: “In the early 1980s, watchmakers thought that  
quartz electronic watches were ‘beneath them’ and ‘inferior.’ Many times, the watchmakers  
would say they wouldn’t work on quartz watches because they weren’t true watches” [Interview:  
watchmaker, 2011).    
Several scholars and industry analysts have argued that Nicolas Hayek, a former  
management consultant, saved Swiss watchmaking by purchasing and consolidating many of the  
industry’s failing production companies and watch brands (Donze, 2011; Glasmeier, 2000).   
Hayek’s vision was to implement a revolutionary new business strategy where production  
efficiencies that could be spread across multiple watch brands within one common “group”  
which acted like a holding company that could coordinate activities across multiple watch  
brands.  Simultaneously, Ernst Tompke, the CEO of one of the watch production companies  
purchased by Hayek, had a vision to develop a new low cost quartz design: the Swatch watch.   
The Swatch watch treated the exterior case of the watch, once a peripheral system, as a core  
subsystem (Tushman  & Murmann, 2002: 332).  To compete with the Japanese, Hayek and  
Thomke agreed the Swatch could potentially shift the identity of Swiss watchmaking away from  
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precision and towards fashion.  Launched in 1983, Swatches aimed to combine quartz 
 
technology with “fantasy” and “fashion” (Moon, 2004; Taylor, 1993).  Hayek stated, “Fashion is  
about image. Emotional products are about a message – a strong, exciting, distinct, authentic  
message that tells people who you are and why you do what you do” (Taylor, 1993: 103).   Thus,  
Swatches were infused with bright colors and modern designs inspired by popular art and  
culture. The new product was meant to connect on a more personal level with the consumer.   
They took the market by storm.    
Due to the success of the Swatch brand, the entire Swiss watchmaking industry benefitted  
from renewed consumer demand for Swiss-made quartz watches (Taylor, 1993).  The Swiss  
industry retooled its production and distribution systems to meet the high demand for large  
quantities of quartz timepieces (Pasquier, 2008).  The fashion period fostered unprecedented  
levels of growth in the low end Swiss market and convinced other Swiss watchmakers that they  
could produce watches at multiple price points.  By the late 1980s, the field of Swiss  
watchmaking had successfully shifted its identity from one of just precision craftsmanship  
towards a newly expanded identity that also focused on fashion; in doing so they laid  
groundwork for the re-emergence of the mechanical watch:  “In just a few years Swiss horology  
switched from the production of fairly standard products to that of products closely linked to  
fashion and prestige” (Perret, 2008a: 305).    
Re-Emergence: 1990-2008  
With renewed confidence, new production and distribution systems, and increased  
liquidity, the Swiss watch industry began to reinvest in mechanical watchmaking. During the  
period between 1990 and 2008, Swiss mechanical watchmaking focused heavily on marketing its  
products as luxury goods (Reardon, 2008).  Precision arguments “were completely abandoned,  
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since the use of quartz allowed for constant regularity” (Pasquier, 2008: 313).  Rather, 
 
mechanical timepieces became “objects of luxury consumption and social distinction” (Pasquier,  
2008: 314).  For example, Patek Philippe, one of the most successful high-end watchmakers in  
the world, launched its “generations” ad campaign with the tagline: “You never actually own a  
Patek Philippe, you merely look after it for the next generation.”  Other high-end mechanical  
watchmakers like Rolex introduced campaigns with slogans such as “Class is forever.”  The  
successful shift in the broader field level identity toward luxury led the Swiss watchmaking  
industry to re-claim the leading position (in market value) for highest value of exports.  
Nonetheless, according to a Swiss leading watch expert and historian who experienced  
the crisis first hand, very few individuals could have predicted how important the shift toward  
luxury would be for the future of the Swiss industry (Trueb, 2005: 11):   
Hardly anybody had expected what happened next: as the price of quartz movements  
declined by a factor of 100, beautifully crafted, exquisite mechanical movements came  
back in favor – and they had to be made in Switzerland.  They were something rare and  
very special: high-tech machinery, almost artistic skills and tremendous experience were  
required to make, assemble and service them. Damn the wonderfully accurate but mass- 
produced timepieces: intricate micromechanics are something exclusive and deeply  
emotional, and only very limited quantities of such timepieces can be produced.    
  
The Swiss watch industry’s shift toward the luxury segment was abetted by several broader  
macroeconomic factors, most notably a worldwide increase in household discretionary incomes.   
See Figure 5.  Also, scholars point to the fact that the 1990’s was witness to a boom in luxury  
goods (Frank, 2001); the Swiss brands were eager to welcome many of the freshly minted  
dot.com millionaires and Wall Street bankers as new clientele for their high end watches.   
Although the Swiss were never able to reclaim dominance in units sold (a title claimed by  
Japan and then relinquished to Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively), the Swiss  
mechanical watch industry moved further into the luxury niche market (Pasquier, 2008; Trueb,  
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2005) where steady increases in the average price of the mechanical watch facilitated their  
dramatic re-emergence (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, 2009).  See Figure 2.  Appendix  
I provides supplemental production figures.    
Figure 2: Export Value of Swiss Watches, 1973-2008  
(millions; real values, reported in 2008 francs) 
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Source: Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry; World Economic Outlook data, IMF; analysis by author.    
  
In 2008 the Swiss had firmly re-secured their place atop the world watch market  
(Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, 2008).  Nearly forty years after the introduction of  
quartz watch technology, 2008 marked the 19th consecutive quarter of growth for Swiss watch  
exports, of which 70% of the total value came from mechanical watches.  The Swiss watch  
industry had reported 67% growth over the previous five years, saw numerous new watch  
companies open in the region, and claimed record sales of $15.8 billion Swiss Francs (its closest  
competitor, Hong Kong, reported 7.1 billion) (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, 2009).  In  
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terms of total units produced, world watch production was estimated at around 1.2 billion  
timepieces in 2008.    
The Swiss led the high-end segment of the market, producing 26.1 million pieces (of  
which, approximately 4.3 million (16.5%) were mechanical) and reporting an average export  
price of a Swiss watch at approximately $563 USD (the average price was $211 for quartz and  
$2612 for mechanical).  See Figure 3 for the average Swiss price per unit value over time. 4   
Comparatively, by 2008 the low-end segment, dominated almost entirely by quartz watches, was  
firmly anchored in Asia, where China and Hong Kong produced 550.3 million and 425.8 million  
watches, respectively.  The average per unit price, however, was $2 in China and $11 in Hong  
Kong.    
Figure 3: Average Per Unit Value of Swiss Watches, 1973-2008  
(real values, reported in 2008 Swiss Francs) 
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Source: Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry; World Economic Outlook data, IMF; analysis by author.  
                                                  
4 Global watch production figures and exports values do not exist for the watch industry as a whole since 1995. The  
industry can only estimate approximate global sales and production based on intermittent reports issued by some of  
the main export countries.  An economic official at the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry explained: “Missing  
data, rough estimates from certain producing countries, changes in product mix and the list of producing countries”  
prevent them from reporting reliable global data (personal communication, 10/17/2011).    
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Although mechanical watches only accounted for 16.5% of the total number of timepieces (see  
Figure 4), they generated more than 70% of the total value for Swiss watchmakers (Federation of  
the Swiss Watch Industry, 2009).    
  
Figure 4: Swiss Watch Production (units), 1973-2008  
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Source: Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry, analysis by author 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, Trueb (2005:163-164; personal interview, 2012) colorfully describes the unanticipated re- 
emergence of demand for the Swiss mechanical watch:  
[Nobody] had the guts to predict that the mechanical watch would find a long-term niche  
in the high end.  Why would a sane person spend thousands of dollars for a technically  
obsolete product that is also expensive to maintain? Yet, this is what millions of people  
are doing.  A choice of this kind is irrational, but we have learned that emotions govern  
the purchase of a luxury item: the consumer is ready to bleed and suffer for it.   
  
As household disposable income growth rates increased in countries outside the  
traditional US and European export markets, so too did the global appetite for Swiss luxury  
watches.  Such growth in worldwide demand offered increased stability to the Swiss watch  
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industry in the early 2000s, especially as disposable incomes in the United States and Europe had  
begun to stagnate (see Figure 5).  By 2008, the Federation reported:   
The Asian continent absorbed more than 46% of Swiss watch exports. By comparison  
Europe consumed almost a third, with the Old World recording a more modest increase  
(+4.4%) corresponding to a value of 5.2 billion francs. Hit harder than most by the  
downturn, the American continent ended the year 2008 with a slightly negative result. Its  
value of 3.0 billion francs represented a decline of 1.9% compared to 2007. America  
therefore lost some market share, eventually accounting for 19.0% of Swiss export sales.  
  
Figure 5: Household Disposable Income Annual % Change, 2000-2005  
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Source: ProQuest Statistical Datasets. (2013). OECD Factbook 2011-2012: Economic, Environmental and Social  
Statistics: Production and Income - Household Disposable Income, 1971 - 2012 [Data file]. Retrieved from  
https://web.lexis-nexis.com/statuniv, analysis by author.   
  
In its annual report, the Federation (2008) summarized the success of the market, “Good  
results were attributable mainly to luxury [mechanical watch] products.”  Demand for Swiss  
mechanical watches was at an all-time high, painting quite a different picture for a technology  
that, thirty years early, had been slated for extinction.    
  
37  
  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The field of Swiss watchmaking, in the years between 1970 and 2008, provides fertile  
ground to explore the mechanisms that influence the re-emergence of market demand for a  
legacy technology.  Previously, several scholars have documented the decline of the Swiss watch  
industry after the introduction of quartz technology (e.g., Donze, 2011; Glasmeier, 1991; Landes,  
1983; Moon, 2004; Tushman & Murmann, 2002); in fact, the watch industry has almost become  
a de facto example of technological displacement and the impact of a competency destroying  
innovation (Glasmeier, 1991; Lecoq, Maillat, Nemeti,  & Pfister, 1995; Tushman  & Anderson,  
1997). However, few organization and management scholars have extended this line of research  
to examine how the Swiss repositioned themselves in the decades that followed the quartz crisis  
(for one notable exception, see Tushman & Radov, 2000).  This dissertation builds on previous  
work, but explores the conditions, actors, and mechanisms that led to this surprising revival of  
the Swiss watchmaking community that had been “devalued overnight by the quartz revolution”  
(Landes, 1983: 358).  
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CHAPTER III.  THE RE-EMERGENCE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FIELD 
 
ABSTRACT  
This study introduces the setting and context of my dissertation (i.e., the field of Swiss  
watchmaking), asking “What factors influence the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy  
technology in a mature institutional field?” It serves two purposes.  First, it offers data and  
analysis to illustrate that re-emergence is a viable empirical phenomenon. Second, it extends  
previous work related to field emergence and institutions (e.g., Hargadon  & Douglas, 2001;  
Holm, 1995; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991), offering support for a theoretical model  
of field re-emergence. To do so, I present various institutionalization processes, inflection points,  
and focal constructs in the evolution and re-emergence of the field of Swiss watchmaking.  I find  
that field re-emergence requires components that, paradoxically, facilitate both field  
transformation and field preservation.  Although these processes appear to be at odds with one  
another, during a period of re-emergence they serve as necessary counterweights, encouraging  
the preservation of some valued elements of the old institutional order and new elements that  
allow for change and survival. The findings from this chapter are foundational for the two  
subsequent studies that analyze the mechanisms contributing to the re-emergence of the Swiss  
mechanical watch industry.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“I don't know how it happened. I don’t think anybody really knows. But suddenly, these  
mechanical things were back.”  
– Interview with the CEO of a Swiss watch company   
  
  
A common feature across field emergence studies is a concern for describing patterns of  
diffusion within a focal area and explaining the adoption and spread of specific organizational  
forms or practice variants among organizations within a particular industry or sector (Ansari,  
Fiss, & Zajac, 2010).  Empirical studies related to the emergence of nascent innovation-based  
fields have examined the role of organizational boundaries in the emergence of the computing,  
electronics, and telecom industries (Santos  & Eisenhardt, 2005), the impact of social movements  
on the introduction of the wind energy sector (Sine & Lee, 2009), the sociocognitive dynamics  
during the launch of the minivan automobile product category (Rosa, Porac, Runser-Spanjol,    
Saxon, 1999), and the salience of CEO attention in the burgeoning fiber-optics market (Eggers,  
2012).  Work has extended into the emergence of fields associated with non-technical  
innovations, including TQM practice adoption in hospitals (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), the global  
diffusion of ISO 9000 ISO quality certifications (Guler, Guillén, & Macpherson, 2002), the  
adoption of downsizing programs (Burdros, 1997), the diffusion of early 20th century American  
fire insurance programs (Schneiberg, 2002), and the evolution of modern personnel  
administration in United States (Baron et al., 1986).  These and related studies highlight the  
relevance of legitimacy and isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the role of labels in  
shaping early stage conceptions of new organizational forms (Grodal, Granqvist,  & Woolley,  
Forthcoming), and the function of identity claiming and granting actions by internal (Navis    
Glynn, 2010) and external (Zuckerman, 1999) actors within a new field or market category.    
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While there has been a significant amount of work conducted on the factors that influence 
 
field emergence, the concept re-emergence has been largely unaccounted for in organization  
studies.  Scott (2008) argues that scholars have historically privileged studies of emergence,  
issuing a call for work that more fully uncovers the processes of de-structuration and re- 
structuration.  To date there is little some evidence to suggest that the conditions that influence  
field emergence processes will also apply to field re-emergence.  It is ironic that a theory so  
concerned with persistence, permanence, and durability, has not fully recognized the possibility  
of such change, particularly as it might re-emerge from the residues of previous institutional  
orders.  And yet, given its presence within fields, perhaps it is not surprising that it can emerge as  
a trigger of change, as field members rediscover the value of the past.    
The efficacy of exploring re-emergence, particularly from a phenomenological  
perspective, is also important.  Whether it be mechanical watches, sailing ships, steam  
locomotives, piston aircraft engines, or fountain pens, as technology life cycles evolve, the  
institutional field that houses the old technological order may not completely dissipate (Adner &  
Snow, 2010).  Empirically, one could imagine, for example, that the factors inducing an  
emerging field to adopt a nascent technology might be quite different for a field that is re- 
emerging, especially if the actors in the re-emerging field still carry the residue of standards and  
norms that were once considered acceptable but may no longer be appropriate under a new  
technological order.  Thus, in this chapter I ask “What factors influence the re-emergence of  
market demand for a legacy technology in a mature institutional field?  
Researchers have shown that the institutional environment can play a significant role in  
preserving or extending the life of a legacy technology (Henderson, 1995; Kaplan & Tripsas,  
2008) because technological orders can leave behind institutional residues (Burt, 1995; Kaghan  
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& Lounsbury, 2006).  However, these claims have not been fully considered either theoretically 
 
or empirically in the context of a field or technology’s re-emergence.   
I explore the possible differences between field emergence and re-emergence, anchoring  
this examination in the field of Swiss watchmaking from 1970-2008.  I extend previous work  
related to field emergence and institutions (e.g., Hargadon  & Douglas, 2001; Holm, 1995;  
Leblebici et al., 1991), offering empirical evidence to advance a theoretical model of field re- 
emergence. The findings from this chapter are foundational for the two subsequent studies in my  
dissertation that analyze the mechanisms contributing to the re-emergence of the Swiss  
mechanical watch.    
I begin with an overview of the literature related to institutional fields, field emergence  
and change.   Next, I outline the data sources and qualitative methods I used.  I then present my  
findings, highlighting how shifts in various institutional processes, changes in structural  
configurations, and the actions of important focal actors surfaced as key factors related to the re- 
emergence of the Swiss watchmaking industry.  Finally, I move from a description of the Swiss  
watchmaking industry toward a discussion of a more general model of field re-emergence. I  
conclude with contributions, limitations, and areas for future research.   
FIELD EMERGENCE, PRESERVATION, AND TRANSFORMATION  
Processes of field emergence and institutionalization are critical aspects of institutional  
theory (Scott  & Meyer, 1994; Zucker, 1977).  The very definition of an institution is tied to the  
notion of persistence, preservation and stability (Hughes, 1936).  Yet, the notion of field re- 
emergence infers some amount of change and transformation.  The tension between preservation  
and transformation is a topic widely addressed by scholars of institutional change and field  
emergence (Dacin et al., 2002; Greenwood  & Hinings, 1996; Greenwood, Suddaby,  & Hinings,  
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2002; Leblebici et al., 1991), however, little attention has been given to understanding whether 
 
these processes hold within the context of re-emergence, and especially for a field that attempts  
to preserve displaced technologies.  Here, I provide a brief review of the extant literature.    
One of the early critiques of institutional theory was that it did not adequately address  
how changes at the level of the field, or the organizations within a field, emerged and unfolded  
over time (Davis  & Marquis, 2005; Greenwood et al., 2002; Seo  & Creed, 2002).  As a result,  
researchers responded with a number of investigations into field level change.  For example,  
Powell (1991: 197) points out that field change is “neither frequent nor routine because it is  
costly and difficult…it is likely to be episodic, highlighted by a brief period of crisis or critical  
intervention, and followed by longer periods of stability or path-dependent development.”  He  
identifies several factors enhancing field change, including: changes at the periphery of a field,  
such as innovations coming from marginal organizations in the network; “the ineffectiveness –  
or the effectiveness only in the short run – of isomorphic pressures” to shape organizational  
choices; and “the re-arrangement of field boundaries” due to deep political or legal upheavals,  
especially as fields are recomposed and either split into sub-fields or merge with other field.  The  
notion of re-emergence – from legacy technologies, for instance – is not inconsistent with  
Powell’s (1991) definition but it is not explicitly acknowledged, either.    
Models of field change tend to depict it as occurring in two critical stages, following  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983): the first stage is that of field “youth,” in which changes driven by  
economic and competitive forces are likely to be implemented, while in the second stage, field  
“maturity,” institutional isomorphism paves the way to field stability.  Zucker conceptualized  
this second stage of institutionalization as both a process and property variable that can be used  
to describe field level structuration and change.  She states: “[institutionalization] is the process  
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by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same time, at any 
 
point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less a taken-for-granted part  
of this social reality.”  Following this work, Tolbert and Zucker (1996) provide a model for how  
the introduction of a new innovation can change a field.  First, the innovation is introduced into  
the environment, examined by other similar organizations, and either disappears because it is  
deemed unsatisfactory or becomes viable and more broadly accepted (i.e., habituated).  In the  
next stage, objectification, the innovation garners social consensus and cognitive and normative  
legitimacy. During the final stage, sedimentation, the innovation spreads across the entire  
population and becomes ingrained in the social structure of the field.    
Fields and organizations mediate the relationship between societal institutions and  
organizational behaviors, creating an interdependence between social structures and activities  
(Giddens, 1979).  These dynamics have been shown to be salient in a broad range of markets and  
industries.  Examples include the analyses of early railroad entrepreneurs and industrial policy  
formation in the United States, Britain, and France (Dobbin, 1997), the emergence of the wind  
energy sector (Sine  & Lee, 2009), the growth of the early American film industry (Mezias    
Boyle, 2005), the impact of regulatory policy on the introduction of independent power  
production (Russo, 2001), and the social construction of the biotechnology (Powell, 2008) and  
nanotechnology fields (Wry, Greenwood, Jennings, & Lounsbury, 2010).  Others have examined  
the rise and development of the modern corporation and corporate practices, including the spread  
of the multi-divisional form (Fligstein, 1985; 1991), the decline and fall of the conglomerate firm  
in the 1980s (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994), and the development of the modern state and  
corporation (Strandgaard Pedersen  & Dobbin, 1997).   
44  
  
  
Subsequently, scholars have identified multiple factors, processes, and mechanisms  
associated with field level change.  For example, in their study of the healthcare industry, Scott  
and colleagues (2000:24-25) identify processes resulting from alterations in relations among  
existing organizations, changes in boundaries of existing organizations, the emergence of new  
populations, transformations in field boundaries, and shifts in governance structures.  Fligstein  
(1991) hypothesizes that “external shocks” – provided by macroeconomic conditions, the state,  
or other organizations – may provoke change in an otherwise stable field. In such cases, field  
dynamics among the actors and institutionalization forces following from the shocks will shape  
the direction of change.  Others have shown that field change is often precipitated by actions  
from peripheral actors or innovations, ineffective isomorphic pressures, field boundary re- 
composition (e.g., Leblebici et al., 1991), unstable power relations or power shifts (e.g., Russo,  
2001), or shifting field logics that facilitate the introduction of new political processes or the  
environmental selection of firms within the field (e.g., Fligstein, 1990; Thornton & Ocasio,  
1999).  
While researchers have devoted a great deal of effort to exploring the factors that  
influence the early stages of field emergence, there have been recent calls for greater attention on  
how fields de-institutionalize, or possibly re-institutionalize (e.g., Scott, 2008).  Institutional  
scholars have suggested that institutional and field change models have relied too heavily on  
“arational mimicry and stability” and should be amended to include a “new emphases on  
institutional rationality and ongoing struggle and change” (Lounsbury, 2008: 349).  Such models  
place greater weight on the micro-level activities that impact the field, focusing on identifying  
links between action and institution (Barley  & Tolbert, 1997).  For example, Johnson, Smith and  
Codling (2000) examine the interplay of behavioral scripts and institutional templates on  
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institutional change within the context of privatization.   Scott argues (2008: 195-196), using 
 
Gidden’s language, “institutionalists have focused attention on structuration processes, but have  
neglected processes leading to destructuration and restructuration.”  Similarly, DiMaggio and  
Powell (1991:30) contend that “little attention has been focused on how incumbents maintain  
their dominant positions or respond to threats during periods of crisis or instability.”    
This study attempts to address these calls by considering the factors that lead institutional  
fields to re-emerge by exploring the trajectory of a displaced technology (i.e., the Swiss  
mechanical watch), which I conceptualize as part of the residue lingering from earlier phases of  
field evolution. One critical aspect that I examine is that of agency and leadership (DiMaggio,  
1988), a factor that institutionalists have associated with field-level change.  
 Institutional Leadership  & Guardianship  
The link connecting leaders to field level change has been supported by a number of  
different researchers working in different fields (e.g., Glynn & Navis, 2010; Kraatz  & Zajac,  
1996; Oliver, 1991; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999; Zajac & Westphal, 2004).  As  
institutional theory has matured (Scott, 2008), scholars have exhibited a renewed interest in  
leadership (e.g.,Kraatz, 2009; Washington, Boal, & Davis, 2008), reclaiming the work of early  
institutionalists and particularly that of Selznick.  Selznick (1957: 27) theorized that the leader is  
critical to processes of institutionalization, as “an agent…offering a guiding hand to a process  
that would otherwise occur more haphazardly.”  He viewed leadership, organizations, and  
institutions so intertwined that “a theory of leadership is dependent on a theory of social  
organization” (Selznick, 1957: 23).  Selznick’s view of leadership addressed an important role  
that leaders play in shaping an organization’s values during periods of institutional change and  
emergence.    
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More recently, scholars have extended Selznick’s work and examined how leaders  
influence institutional change within an organization or across an industry.  Building on  
DiMaggio’s (1988) early work, Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009: 66) explicate that such  
leaders become institutional entrepreneurs, i.e., “actors who initiate changes that contribute to  
transforming existing, or creating new, institutions.” Similarly, Washington, Boal, and Davis  
(2008) theorize that leaders play many roles in the institutionalization process, including:  
orchestrating the internal consistency of the organization, developing supporting mechanisms  
that legitimate the organization, and engaging in actions to overcome external enemies.  Such  
characterizations of leaders focus on the important role they play in shaping new processes or  
managing change within organizations or groups of organizations (Fligstein, 1997).  
Guardianship.  Conceptions of leadership, however, need not be associated only with  
radical field-level change.  Leaders also actively promote stability and maintenance in  
organizations and shape the social order that constitutes and contextualizes broader institutions  
(Fligstein, 1997).  While attention to institutional leadership has burgeoned over the past decade  
(Glynn & Raffaelli, 2010), few studies have explored how actors preserve (or guard) an  
established institutional field (for exceptions see DeJordy, 2010; Walsh  & Bartunek, 2011;  
Walsh & Glynn, 2008).  Scott (2008: 129) claims that scholars have devoted “little attention to  
the issue of institutional persistence.”  A leadership role as institutional guardian (DeJordy, 2010;  
Fligstein, 1997) or legacy custodian (Walsh  & Glynn, 2008) seems critical if legacy  
technologies, and the associated organizational values and character, are to re-emerge.    
In this vein, DeJordy (2010: 6) posits that “some embedded actors may believe change to  
the institutional arrangements is undesirable and, when perceiving potential change, may actively  
work to inhibit or prevent such change.”  In a study of Securities Exchange Commission in 1934,  
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he offers a definition of institutional guardianship, i.e., an action “intentionally and consciously 
 
engaging the institutional environment in an effort to preserve it in the face of perceived  
potential change.”  As important as this work is, however, it stops short of detailing the role of  
organizational leaders in field-level change.    
In this study, I seek to explore the role of agentic leadership in field re-emergence  
because it presents a theoretical puzzle, pitting the work of institutional entreprenurship  
(concerned with changing the institutional order) against that of institutional guardianship  
(protecting and preserving the legacy institutional order).  I explore the tension between the  
leadership roles of institutional entrepreneur and guardian, as actors attempting to simultaneously  
change and preserve technological and institutional orders, whereby enabling field re-emergence.   
I examine how both types of actors serve as important social actors in organizations and  
communities, involved in meaning-making (Pfeffer, 1977: 110) and the social construction of  
organizational reality (Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985:78) that serve as the basis for  
establishing, maintaining, and perhaps re-establishing legacy values and organizational attributes  
in a re-emerging field.    
In summary, institutional theory has been an important construct for examining the  
nature, conditions, and mechanisms related to field-level emergence and change.  Moreover, it  
hints at the implications of field-level change for organizations and their leadership by  
explicating the role of context; such context becomes particularly important when the past is  
reclaimed and legacy technologies re-emerge to redefine a field.    
METHODS  
The field of Swiss watchmaking from 1970 to 2008 provides fertile ground to explore the  
phenomenon and theoretical underpinnings of field re-emergence.  This study aims for  
48  
  
 
 
“theoretical extension,” a term used to describe qualitative studies focused on “broadening the  
relevance of a particular concept or theoretical system to a range of empirical contexts other than  
those in which they were first developed or intended to be used” (Snow, Morrill,  & Anderson,  
2003: 187).  Given that there is little scholarly empirical research on the theoretical tenets  
associated with field re-emergence (Scott, 2008), I conducted a qualitative case study of a  
specific community of actors within an industry (Yin, 2008), a method proven to be well suited  
for elaborating on existing theories of field, institutional, and technology change (e.g.,  
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Navis & Glynn, 2010; Tripsas &  
Gavetti, 2000). Although constraining my focus to one community within a global industry (i.e.,  
Swiss watchmaking) limited the generalizability of my findings, it allowed me to develop much  
richer insights into the market conditions, processes, structural components, and actors within  
my empirical setting.  My primary goal is not replicability, but to demonstrate the plausibility of  
field re-emergence and its related constructs.    
Data   
The primary data source for this study was 122 semi-structured interviews conducted  
with Swiss watch executives and industry experts from 2011 to 2013.  The purpose of these  
interviews was to gather information from actors in different positions about the perceived field  
evolution.  Given that this study is a historical review of a field over time, my goal was to sample  
respondents based on their involvement in the industry at different stages of its evolution.  My  
interview protocol focused on what they perceived was occurring in the field of Swiss  
watchmaking from their vantage point (see Appendix II).    
I developed my sample of interviewees by relying on a theoretical sampling technique,  
continually narrowing my sample of various actors in the field based on the theoretical trends  
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that I saw emerging from my data.  I began by visiting the National Association of Watch and 
 
Clock Collectors (NAWCC), one of the largest horological archives in the world, and contacting  
the Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry to ask for a list of influential people and companies  
during the 38-year timeframe of my study.  The Federation, dating back to 1876, is a private,  
professional, and non-profit association, with over 500 members representing more than 90% of  
all Swiss watch manufacturers.  Representatives from the NAWCC and the Federation provided  
me with lists of the companies and individuals whom they believed were most salient to my  
research questions.    
In general, privacy and secrecy shrouds the Swiss watch industry.  As one senior  
executive commented:  “It is a small and very private community.” [Interview: Swiss watch  
company senior executive, 2011].  To overcome such access challenges, I followed a snowball  
approach, asking respondents to suggest other individuals or company representatives I should  
speak to whom they believed were influential.  I found individuals were more willing to  
participate in my study if they knew that others had also agreed to do so, thereby making the  
snowball approach the most appropriate way to gain access to this closed community.  My final  
sample included interviews with representatives of companies representing approximately three- 
fourths of all Swiss watch export sales from 1970 to 2008.    
In addition to watch company executives, I interviewed industry representatives,  
watchmakers, union representatives, company historians, retailers, archivists, museum curators,  
fashion and luxury brand executives, auction house representatives, heads of vintage collector  
associations, and Swiss government officials who experienced the “quartz crisis” and the years  
that followed.  To validate some of the general trends that emerged in my interviews, I also  
gained access to archival interviews conducted by other sources, including a series of 27 printed  
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interviews with Swiss watch CEOs conducted by TimeZone, a leading industry news source, as 
 
well as 145 interview transcripts of CEOs who experienced the quartz crisis, conducted by the  
industry’s leading watch reporter.    
Finally, I relied on archival data to triangulate (Creswell, 2003) and to search for  
commonalities and differences in my findings across sources.  These included Swiss watch  
production and employment figures, government regulatory documents on “Swissness”  
trademark protection policies, industry certification standards issued each year, auction house  
vintage watch prices, and influential historical accounts of the Swiss watchmaking industry (e.g.,  
Donze, 2011; Glasmeier, 2000; Landes, 1983; Pasquier, 2008; Trueb, 2005).  To account for  
some of the key exogenous factors that several respondents thought may have influenced the  
Swiss watch industry’s historical evolution, I obtained macroeconomic data on currency  
valuations, global household discretionary spending patterns, as well as several other important  
economic indicators.  Each data source was used to examine how the Swiss responded in the  
years immediately following the near demise of mechanical watches (Donze, 2011) after the  
introduction of quartz technology (Landes, 1983; Tushman  & O’Reilly, 2006). 5    
Analysis   
The analytic approach I used can be described as analytic abduction (Peirce, 1955),  
which iterates between empirical data and preexisting theoretical constructs (Weber, Heinze,    
DeSoucey, 2008: 537) with the purpose of facilitating “dialogue across fields and methods…to  
connote the dynamic processes by which theories emerge, change, and grow” (Snow et al., 2003:  
185).  The process I followed to analyze data consisted of two separate steps.  First, I began by  
familiarizing myself with the constructs and mechanisms most commonly associated with  
theories of field emergence and institutionalization.  My pilot codebook included several  
                                                  
5 See Table 1 in Chapter I for a more detailed description of my data sources.    
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components that Scott (2008: , 121-147) identified in his seminal overview of the literature on 
 
field structuration and the processes and mechanisms related to institutionalization and  
deinstitutionalization. These included, but were not limited to, structuration processes that  
involve the interchange of top-down and bottom-up processes (Scott, 2008: 191), such as:   
constitutive activities, diffusion, translation, socialization, imposition, authorization,  
inducement, and imprinting (Scott, 1987) – allow high level (more encompassing)  
structures to shape, both constrain and empower, the structure and actions of lower level  
actors.  Simultaneously, counter processes are at work by which lower level actors and  
structures shape – reproduce and change—the contexts within which they operate.  These  
bottom-up processes include, variously: selective attention, interpretation and  
sensemaking, identity construction, error, invention, conformity, and reproduction of  
patterns, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation (see Oliver, 1991).   
  
Second, in addition to identifying these pre-established codes, I searched for other  
constructs that emerged from the data that I believed would inform a theory of field re- 
emergence.  Using a content analysis software package (NVivo 10) to organize and examine my  
archival data and field interview transcripts, I analyzed data in an iterative process of going back  
and forth between conducting interviews in the field, analyzing data, and searching for emerging  
themes (Locke, 2001; Miles  & Huberman, 1994; Strauss  & Corbin).  The goal of the data  
analysis process was to create a “chain of evidence” that linked descriptive codes found within  
the data with more abstract and theoretical constructs.  This process is described in detail below.    
To begin, I used a constant comparative method to create codes and compare data  
(Locke, 2001).  During the first review, I assigned first-order descriptive codes to help sort the  
data that did not appear to fall into one of the preexisting codes in my codebook.  I then assigned  
inferential codes to identify my interpretations of the data.    
Next, I organized my provisional first order codes into broader emerging themes.  During  
this step I evaluated which categories came together to form theoretical categories.  By  
developing theoretical categories, I identified and refined the variables of interest.  I revisited the  
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data to see whether the categories fit or not (Becker, 1970; Glaser  & Strauss; Locke, 2001) in a  
process best described as moving from open to axial coding (Locke, 2001).  In tandem with this  
process, I compared my descriptive evidence with the pre-determined conceptual categories  
previously identified in the literature by Scott (2008: 190) related to field emergence and  
institutionalization processes.  At the end of this stage, I re-evaluated my preliminary codebook  
that had helped me keep track of the possible potential associations that had begun to emerge as  
potential theoretical constructs.  See Table 2 for my pilot codebook with initial sensitizing codes.   
I also designed several preliminary conceptual frameworks to help identify potential  
relationships and began to explore more specific boundary conditions for the study.  These  
conceptual frameworks served as a useful tool to help evaluate “what variables [were] the most  
important, and which relationships [were] likely to be most meaningful” (Miles  & Huberman,  
1994:18).    
Finally, I moved from analyzing specific data to developing more abstract and theoretical  
concepts.  The goal of this step was to settle on the theoretical concepts, variables, and  
relationships that advanced a model of field re-emergence.  In this stage, I decided on which  
themes related to each other and were most germane to my conceptual framework.  I finalized  
which codes were used and reexamined the data’s fit with my codebook and emerging theoretical  
framework.  Figure 6 summarizes the process that I followed, which shows my first-order codes,  
theoretical categories, and aggregate theoretical dimensions.  
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Table 2: Pilot Codebook with Preliminary Sensitizing Codes  
Article  Code  Theoretical Explanation  Description 
Identifier   ID  Explanation   Coding Guidelines  
Field Emergence  
Processes  
  
  
  
-  Compromise   
-  Defiance   
-  Diffusion   
-  Identity construction   
-  Conformity   
-  Reproduction of patterns  
-  Imprinting   
-  Innovation   
-  Interpretation and  
sensemaking   
-  Socialization  
-  Translation  
  
Field emergence and change processes allow high level  
(more encompassing) structures to shape, constrain and  
empower the structure and actions of lower level  
actors. Counter processes allow lower level actors and  
structures to shape, reproduce and change, the contexts  
within which they operate. (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2008)  
0= does not make reference to the specified process   
  
1= makes reference to the specified process  
  
  
Changes in  
Institutional  
Processes  
-  Functional Processes  
-  Political Processes  
-  Social Processes   
  
Institutional change will induce changes in: regulatory  
systems, norms, obligatory expectations, cultural  
beliefs.  It encourages increased questioning of what is  
taken for granted. (Scott, 2008)  
0= does not make reference to specified process  
  
1=Functional: Changes in in performance levels associated  
with institutionalized practices; Changing consumer  
preferences   
  
2= Political: Shifts in interests; Shifts in underlying power  
distributions  
  
3= Social: Differentiation of groups; increased  
fragmentation of normative consensus; diverging beliefs or  
practices; presence of multiple competing and overlapping  
institutional frameworks undermines the stability of each;  
outright abandonment of an institutionalized practice  
  
Agency   -  Institutional Leadership   Leaders who define purpose, values, and enduring  
meanings. “To infuse with value beyond the technical  
requirements of the task at hand.” (Selznick, 1957)  
  
0= does not make reference to institutional leadership tasks   
  
1= makes reference to institutional leadership tasks: the  
definition of institutional mission and role; the institutional  
embodiment of purpose; the sense of institutional integrity;  
the ordering of conflict (Selznick, 1957: 62)    
  
  
Note: this codebook is meant to serve as an illustration of the preliminary sensitizing codes that I used to begin my initial analysis.  Over time, as I iterated  
between theory and data, several more codes emerged.  
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Figure 6: Overview of Data Structure  
  
First Order Codes 
• Statements about the early founding conditions of  
the field of Swiss watchmaking. 
• Mentions of historical watchmaking traditions.  
• Statements about coordination, control and  
enforcement among actors within the field (e.g.,  
price and production controls, cartels).  
Theoretical 
 
Categories
 
Imprinting 
Conformity  
Innovation  
• Descriptions of novel practices, processes,  
structures, or technologies.  
Defiance  
Aggregate Theoretical 
 
Dimensions
 
Field  
Preservation 
Processes 
Field  
Transformation 
Processes 
Field  
Re-Emergence  
Mechanisms 
Reproduction  
of Patterns   
Identity  
Construction  
Interpretation  
and Translation  
• Statements or decisions that explicitly break the  
rules of watchmaking standards or assumptions.  
• Descriptions or violations of existing norms.   
• Statements or actions that encourage the  
habituation of new or old structures, strategies, or  
behaviors. 
• Statements of “who we are”   “what we do.”  
• Descriptions of product, organization, or  
community identity.   
• Statements or narratives that attempt to explain  
novel or taken-for-granted realities.  
• Statements of clarification or rationalization. 
• Statements about the diffusion of new values. 
• Definitions of mission or purpose based on a new  
institutional order.  
• Statements about the diffusion of old values.  
• Definitions of the mission or  purpose based on an  
old institutional order 
Institutional  
Leadership 
Institutional  
Entreprenurship  
Institutional  
Guardianship 
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FINDINGS  
My study revealed several factors influencing the re-emergence of the Swiss  
watchmaking industry.  By definition, field re-emergence is proceeded by a period of field  
emergence (i.e., institutionalization) and a period of dissipation (i.e., de-institutionalization).   
Here, these initial periods can be described as 1) the emergence and near collapse of the Swiss  
mechanical watchmaking industry (1560-1983) and, 2) the dissipation and replacement of its  
taken-for-granted mechanical watchmaking traditions (1983-1989).  However, within each of the  
first two periods, I identify specific elements that did not fully dissipate and later influenced 3)  
the re-emergence (i.e., re-institutionalization) of Swiss mechanical watchmaking (1990-2008).   
In each of the following subsections, I offer a detailed account of the field’s emergence,  
dissipation, and re-emergence; more specifically, I identify and analyze the institutional  
processes, structural patterns, and the role of agency germane to each period.  Figure 7 outlines  
each period.   
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Figure 7: Overview of Field-Level Changes in Swiss Watchmaking Industry 
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numerous family-owned  consolidation of most  firms purchased and  
firms family-owned firms.  resurrected under the  
•& Establishment of  • New production systems  “group” model. 
 
schools, museums,  focused on automation • Groups composed of 
 
horological libraries • Consolidation of  multiple watch brands.
 
•& Annual competitions and  mechanical watch  • Reinvestment in 
 
time trials for  movement suppliers training, societies, 
 
mechanical watch  • Promotion of quartz  archives. 
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support and control  luxury. 
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accuracy and durability. 
   
  
Emergence and Near Collapse: 1560-1983  
Focal Institutionalization Processes - Imprinting and Conformity  
Watchmaking first became popular in 16th century Geneva, but Switzerland did not  
become a global leader in watch production until a century later.  Daniel JeanRichard, the son of  
a Swiss farmer and a self-taught watchmaker, was the first to introduce the craft to other peasant  
farmers in the Jura mountain region looking to fill their idle hands with a secondary source of  
income during the cold winters.  Given their location along important trading routes, a lack of  
adherence to the inefficient production guidelines maintained by the exclusive watch guilds in  
other countries, and having access to expert training from the expelled French Huguenots who  
had migrated to the area, the Swiss Jura workforce proved to be well positioned.  They posed a  
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serious threat to the dominant watchmaking regimes in Britain and France, eventually claiming 
 
the largest share of global mechanical watch production in the 18th century, a title they held for  
nearly two hundred years.    
During this period of emergence, the Swiss engaged in several activities to formally  
institutionalize the craft of mechanical watchmaking in the region.  They established horological  
libraries, museums, scientific societies, standardized tests, annual exhibitions, and their own  
watchmaking schools.  Each year the societies hosted competitions and offered rewards for new  
designs, innovative new functions, and most importantly, for greater accuracy (c.f., Rao, 1994).   
“Beginning in 1907 Swiss watches took 1st prize in the pocket watch category every year. [The  
Swiss producers] were rich enough and ready to pay for the finest talent and the latest and best in  
testing equipment, quick to turn each prize into an advertisement” (Landes, 1983: 299).  The  
community that emerged was tied together by an intricate system of small family-owned  
businesses that all benefitted from participation in the Swiss schools and society events that  
reinforced and perpetuated a distinct culture of Swiss watch production and innovation.   
Early institutionalization of the Swiss watch industry was reinforced by a strong sense of  
organizational imprinting.  Several core principles, norms, and watchmaking techniques that still  
exist in the 21st century Swiss watch community can be traced back to these early years when the  
industry was founded.  For example, in an interview with a prominent Swiss watch CEO, the  
salience of imprinting is illustrated:   
You have two separate entries into the market; first you have the originals. If we take our  
company, we’ve been doing business since the 1800s. You can add the big brother' s, like  
Patek. We all represent the originals. Being an ‘original’ means you have been in this  
business since the beginning, the origins.  And then you have the ‘newcomers.’  
[Interview: Swiss watch CEO: March, 2012].  
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This CEO’s quote draws a clear distinction between those firms that he believes were part of the  
early days of the Swiss watchmaking tradition: the “originals” and the “newcomers.”   
Additionally, his use of the term “big brother” alludes to the difference between his company, a  
Jura-based company founded in 1832, and the Geneva-based Patek Philippe, founded in 1851.   
While his company is older, he calls Patek “big brother,” tipping his hat to the tradition of  
Geneva-based watchmaking (and the continued importance of Patek Philippe in today’s market),  
and acknowledging the centuries-old tradition that first took hold outside the Jura mountain  
region.  While the distinction is subtle, the gap between them is far less than the one that exists  
between the ‘originals’ and ‘newcomers.’  The newcomers did not become salient until the next  
period (1983-1989), when fashion oriented brands such a Gucci and Hermes actively started  
promoting watches under a very different set of core principles than the “originals” (e.g., a  
primary focus on brand marketing over mechanical watchmaking competence).  Thus, founding  
date, a critical component of organizational imprinting (Stinchcombe, 1965), became an  
important way for companies to legitimize and preserve their link to a certain standard of  
watchmaking rooted in a centuries-old tradition.    
Structure: A System of Family-Owned Enterprises   
The structure of the Swiss watch industry from 1934 to 1971 can be defined by two  
distinct characteristics.  First, prior to World War I, the industry was made up of hundreds of  
family-owned enterprises, each independently engaged in one aspect of production. While this  
model, based on Adam Smith’s division of labor theory, served them well in the 18th century  
(Blanchard, 2008), it had made them increasingly vulnerable to the American watch industry a  
century later.  The Americans were able to capture significant market share from the Swiss  
because of their early adoption of manufacturing practices rooted in industrialization.  However,  
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while the rest of the globe, including the United States, turned its focus to fighting World War I, 
 
the Swiss used this period to retool and invest in larger production facilities, effectively  
responding to the U.S. manufacturing challenge (Glasmeier, 2000) and recapturing the global  
market.     
The Great Depression that followed led to a 48 % decrease in demand for watches, which  
facilitated unprecedented price wars and opportunism among the Swiss system of family-owned  
manufacturers.  “Now that the industry was awfully subdivided, there were hundreds of little  
companies that were fighting toe and nail against each other and bringing down prices to the  
point where everybody was broke” [Interview: industry journalist and technical historian, 2012].   
In response, the Swiss watch industry in the early 20th century introduced a government cartel.   
The cartel was established to preserve the intricate system of small and medium sized family- 
owned firms (Pasquier, 2008), and given the watch industry’s substantial share of national GDP,  
the government stepped in and forced greater coordination of one of its most profitable  
industries.  The government bought a majority share of all the major producers of Swiss watch  
movements and their component parts, instituting a statute that supported a watch cartel carrying  
the authority of law.  The cartel forced prices be set by industry-wide agreement, all exports  
required official permits, and “no changes in the composition operations without prior approval  
of a federal commission composed largely of other watchmakers” (Landes, 1983: 328).    
Conformity was another critical factor that promoted the preservation of the field during  
this period of emergence.  For several decades, the cartel, composed of nearly 400 companies,  
was considered one of the strongest and most efficient in modern economic history (Glasmeier,  
2000; Landes, 1983; Trueb, 2005).  Its structure required strict conformity to cartel policies,  
making it impossible for new companies to enter the Swiss market.  As the CEO of a watch  
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company recalled, “The government had absorbed all the manufacturers in order to maintain the 
 
industry.  It would not have survived. However, my father had to buy a very small company  
which had a license just so he could gain access to the market.” [Interview: Swiss watch CEO,  
2012]. While the system established by the government was highly successful at re-establishing  
the Swiss as global leaders in watch production, it stifled innovation; all Swiss watchmaking  
companies had to gain permission to introduce new products.  Nonetheless, the years that  
followed World War II were some of the most successful and profitable for the Swiss, especially  
as many companies turned their attention to fulfilling an unprecedented global demand for lower  
priced watches (Donze, 2011).     
Technological change and near collapse (1962-1982).  The system of control and  
conformity that made the cartel so effective and profitable had later left its members extremely  
vulnerable to outside competition.  The late 1960s and 1970s ushered in a discontinuous  
technology that fundamentally changed the global watch industry: the quartz timepiece  
(Tushman & Anderson, 1997).   Ironically, the Swiss were the first to introduce the new  
technology.  With some support from the cartel system, a centralized R D center, the CEH  
(Centre Electronique Horloger) was formed in 1962 to encourage the development of electronic  
timekeeping devices for the industry (although several companies such as Omega, Heuer,  
Longines, and Girard-Perregaux also began to explore possibilities for the new technology  
independently).  In 1968, the Swiss introduced their first quartz timepiece, a watch that was  
nearly twenty times more accurate than the most sophisticated mechanical chronometer  
movement.  The problem, however, was that the early quartz watches “cost as much as a  
compact car” [Interview: Swiss industry expert, 2012] and more importantly, the Swiss  
craftsmen “were not interested” (Landes, 1983: 346) in pursuing an electronic device that they  
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believed had little to do with their centuries-long tradition of precision watchmaking and  
craftsmanship.  The Swiss also failed to foresee that the Japanese, capitalizing on a burgeoning  
knowledge in electronics, would be able to cut the average cost of a quartz timepiece by a factor  
of 100 (Trueb, 2005), thereby making the quartz watch both cheaper and far more precise than  
the mechanical watch.  These issues were further exasperated by a weakening of the US dollar  
compared to the Swiss Franc during the 1970s.  Since the value of the Japanese yen closely  
followed the US dollar, Swiss watches were comparatively even more expensive in the United  
States, the Swiss’ largest export market.    
The Swiss’ inability to compete with lower-cost Japanese quartz timepieces was so  
disastrous that the period is still referred to as the “watch crisis” (crise horlogere) or “quartz  
crisis” in Switzerland (Donze, 2011).6  Nearly 60,000 jobs were lost in a decade, accounting for  
almost one-half of those employed by the sector; two-thirds of all Swiss watch companies  
disappeared.  See Figure 8 and Figure 9.   
Figure 8: Number of Swiss Watch Companies, 1970-2008  
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Source: La Convention patronale de l'industrie horlogère Suisse  
                                                  
6 The managerial factors that contributed to the “Quartz Crisis” within the Swiss watch industry has been well  
documented.   See Donze, 2011; Glasmeier, 2000; Trueb, 2005; Tushman and Anderson, 1997.   
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Figure 9: Employees in Swiss Watch Industry, 1970-2008  
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Source: La Convention patronale de l'industrie horlogère Suisse  
  
A senior executive who worked in several leading Swiss watch companies and served as  
a foreign trade liaison for the industry during this period explained the impact:   
We saw ourselves on a pedestal for so long. When you said watches, everyone knew you  
meant Swiss, nothing else. No other country had really challenged us.  Basically, watches  
meant Switzerland.  The crisis was really difficult.  We didn' t see it coming and we were  
so shocked by what happened.  The fact that we had to lay off thousands of people, we  
were 90,000 and then we were 33,000, it was enormous.  There was no future. [Interview:  
Swiss watch senior executive, 2012].  
  
The institutionalized practices, routines, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions that  
had held for over two centuries had become a serious threat and potential vulnerability for the  
Swiss.  The low cost and highly accurate Japanese quartz technology had disproved a  
fundamental assumption about traditional mechanical watchmaking: increased accuracy = higher  
cost.  In short, “Swiss companies had failed to understand that the rules of the game had  
changed” (Brieding, 2013: 43).  The old institutional order associated with traditional mechanical  
watchmaking would have to be dismantled if the field was going to survive.    
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In sum, I found two institutionalization processes were salient during this period of field 
 
emergence: imprinting (based on founding date) and conformity (based on a field structure that  
imposed highly coordinated production and distribution systems).  The conditions associated  
with the founding of the Swiss industry, both in Geneva and the Jura, impacted several cultural  
and normative expectations watchmakers held about their profession nearly 200 years later.   
Additionally, after years of cartel management, the role of conformity revealed itself as an  
important structural characteristic of the field during this period.  Both factors served as  
institutionalization processes that promoted field preservation and stasis.    
Response and Adaptation: 1983-1989  
Focal De-Institutionalization Processes - Innovation and Defiance  
The period between 1983 and 1989 marked an unprecedented break from the traditions  
and methods previously employed by the Swiss watch industry.  During this period, the field’s  
norms, values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about watchmaking were reassessed and  
altered, resulting in a period of de-institutionalization (Dacin  & Dacin, 2008; Davis et al., 1994).   
Two important processes emerged from my data that appear to have catalyzed these changes.   
First, several product and process innovations were introduced during this period.  Second,  
underlying these changes was an element of institutional change Scott (2008) labels as defiance.   
The emergent role of both innovation and defiance effectively brought an end to the old  
mechanical watchmaking institutional order and paved the way for a set of new norms and  
practices, described below.    
By the early 1980’s, the quartz crisis in Switzerland had reached its pinnacle.  Nicolas G.  
Hayek, a Lebanese-born CEO of a management consultancy in Zurich, was hired by a several  
Swiss bankers to examine several failing watch companies that had become insolvent; at the  
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time, the market for mechanical watches had become so dire that many companies were 
 
requesting more bank loans to pay their employee salaries and annual bonuses.  Hayek issued a  
report with a recommendation for massive industry consolidation, restructuring, and new senior  
leadership.  He suggested merging two of the industry’s largest watchmaking holding companies,  
ASUAG and SSIH, which owned several well-known Swiss brands (e.g., Omega, Tissot,  
Longines, RADO) and accounted for approximately one-half of all Swiss watch employment.   
After having funded nearly a decade of bailout loans to watch companies, the banks had no  
interest in overseeing a lengthy restructuring effort.  They wanted out.  However, Hayek  
recognized the industry’s growth potential and sensed the banks were ripe to cut a deal.    
Defying the advice of most financial analysts at the time, Hayek entered into several  
negotiations with the banks to purchase the dying holding companies himself (Breiding, 2013).   
After orchestrating negotiations with over different 30 banks, the parties all agreed to sell Hayek  
a majority share of ASUAG and SSIH, forgoing some of their owed debt in exchange for shares  
in the new company.  Hayek invested much of his own personal capital in the deal  
(approximately SFr20m, USD$11m) and proved to be adept at raising additional funds from  
outside investors.  He formed a new board of directors, composed of individuals whom he knew  
trusted his vision, and named the new holding company Société de Microélectronique et  
d'Horlogerie (SMH, which he later renamed “The Swatch Group” in 1998).  Hayek appointed  
Dr. Ernst Thomke the first CEO of SMH, a well-known executive in the industry who had  
previously served as chief executive for two of the watch movement manufacturing companies  
(ETA and Ebauches SA) that were part of the ASUAG and SSIH purchase.  Between 1983 and  
1989, Hayek and Thomke led a massive restructuring effort that introduced several product and  
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process innovations to the field of Swiss watchmaking, as well as implementing many painful 
 
cost-cutting measures, which I discuss next.    
Structure: Consolidation of Production Systems  
Under Hayek’s vision for the Swiss watch industry, the production facilities, operations,  
and management of ASUAG and SSIH were merged under SMH to achieve greater economies  
of scale.  He also made significant capital investments to update badly needed production  
systems that he hoped would eventually produce quartz watches on 24 hour cycles.  The new  
production lines would eventually be able to develop watch movements that other companies  
could buy from SMH and then assemble under their own brand names, providing yet another  
source of revenue.  The changes Hayek had proposed were intended to impact the entire  
industry, not just SMH, and thus he worked to gain support from many of the struggling brands.   
One prominent industry representative noted how Hayek attempted to convince the other CEOs  
of his vision: “Mr. Hayek at some point brought together many of the watch makers in a series of  
meetings where he said, ‘Look we have to band together and change some of the rules if we' re  
going to survive.’" [Interview: Swiss watch industry representative: 2011]  
In addition to the consolidation processes, Hayek and Thomke believed SMH and the  
Swiss watch industry needed a new strategy to reclaim a portion of the mid and low end  
segments of the market that the Swiss had forfeited to the Japanese.  The changes Hayek was  
proposing would transform the nature of Swiss watchmaking by making it possible to effectively  
produce quartz watches for the low to mid segment while still preserving brands targeted at the  
high-end consumer.  He was adamant that the strategy could prove successful; regardless of  
numerous naysayers (inside and outside Switzerland) who disagreed with his goal to produce  
watches at multiple price points.  Shortly after Hayek formed SMH, he recalled a meeting: “One  
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day the president of a Japanese watch company in America said to me: ‘You cannot manufacture  
watches. Switzerland can make cheese but not watches. Why don’t you sell us Omega for 400  
million francs?’ I told him ‘Only after I’m dead!’” (Clerizo, 2010).  Other higher-end brands that  
had traditionally been associated with status (e.g., Rolex and Patek Philippe) held firm in their  
belief that they could survive by producing mechanical watches.  As one reporter noted, “A  
number of factors kept the upper end of the mechanical market alive. One was stubbornness”  
(Passell, 1995).    
Nonetheless, in order to preserve some of the near bankrupt brands in SMH such as  
Omega, Hayek and Thomke were convinced the Swiss had to rebuild the “base” of the industry,  
making low price Swiss watches available to the masses.  As one CEO explained, “If you don' t  
have a base, you cannot have a top. A pyramid has a base.  The larger its base, the higher you  
can build the top.”  [Interview: Swiss watch CEO, 2012]. An answer to this dilemma eventually  
came in the form of the Swatch watch.    
The Swatch Revolution.  The Swatch required several innovations that ultimately  
transformed the entire Swiss watch industry.  First, several new technologies that deviated from  
the norms of traditional mechanical watchmaking had to be developed.  In the late 1970s,  
Thomke had overseen the development of a watch called the “Delirium,” which was aimed at  
fulfilling market demand for thinner quartz watches.  While the Delirium was plagued with  
design challenges (e.g., its metal body was so thin it often bent when strapped on a wrist), the  
basic architecture laid the groundwork for the Swatch.  Thomke appointed two young engineers,  
Jacque Muller and Elmar Mock to develop something similar, but encased in an innovative  
plastic body that would be sturdier and offer more design options to compete with the ascetically  
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unpleasing Japanese quartz models.  Swatch production costs were 80% less and used 55% fewer 
 
parts than the typical mechanical watch.    
Beyond the technology, the second form of innovation was introduced through the artistic  
design and marketing of the Swatch.  Swiss watch historian, Donze (2011: 133) posits:   
[SMH] had the opportunity to carry out an innovative industrial policy which largely  
contributed to the rebirth of the Swiss watch industry.  The principle of the new policy  
was the primacy of marketing over production: as the quartz revolution made it possible  
for anyone to manufacture watches, the issue was no longer how to make them, but how  
to sell them.    
  
A novel marketing strategy to sell the Swatch to consumers would be critical.  Thomke enlisted  
the assistance of independent Swiss designer Jean Robert, who had previously transformed the  
woman’s underwear manufacturer Fogal into a designer of “elegant and sexy lingerie…whose  
pantyhose came in a mind-boggling array of designs and colors and sold at massive margins  
because women were willing to pay high prices to look like the stylish mannequins appearing in  
show windows” (Breiding, 2013: 66).  Jean Robert brought the same design and retail marketing  
sensibilities to the Swatch watch.  He and Thomke determined that the Swatch would be sold in  
higher-end retail boutiques, like Bloomingdales, and the styles should change every season.    
After several years of prototyping new designs and methods, the first Swatches were sold  
in a Texas department store in 1982 and then formally rolled out across Europe and the United  
States in 1983.  Driven by quartz technology, Swatches sold at prices low enough so that  
consumers were encouraged to treat them as fashion accessories.  Swatch was first advertised to  
convey the idea that consumers could buy a watch for every outfit or activity: “Swatch = second  
watch.”   The colorful Swatch plastic case designs shifted the focus of the Swiss watchmaking  
industry away from accuracy and towards fashion.  SMH invested approximately 25% of its  
budget on marketing the Swatch, a percentage unheard of in the watch industry prior to that  
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point.  The distribution network and market positioning were quite different than those employed  
by the Japanese, who continued to market their quartz watches as affordable timepieces that kept  
extremely accurate time and sold in drug stores and discount department stores.    
By 1988, 50 million Swatches had been produced and sold.  The product provided  
evidence that Swiss watchmakers could still compete on the global market; Swatch’s popularity  
had injected significant liquidity, and more importantly, confidence (e.g., Kanter, 2006) back  
into the Swiss watch industry.  Other brands quickly followed Swatch’s lead, releasing other  
fashion-oriented products such as Tissot’s “Rock Watch.”  One senior executive recalled the  
atmosphere in Switzerland late 1980s: “These watches were cheap, they were fun, and they were  
precise.  There was a lot of dust on the Swiss watch industry.  The Swatch ‘revolution’ shook all  
that dust away.” [Interview: former watch executive, 2012].  In 2013, Hayek’s son, who replaced  
his father as CEO of Swatch Group, recounted the strategy in a press conference celebrating the  
30th anniversary of Swatch:   
And then came Swatch.  It was an incredible strategy to regain the lower market share.   
To attack there.  [It allowed us] to be able to maintain the creativity and innovation of the  
upper market segment.  To give the possibility to all these other wonderful [Swiss]  
brands, that you see are full of innovation, that to continue to develop and be successful.   
This is what Swatch has done. So thanks to Swatch, all these brands exist.  [Press  
Conference: Swiss watch CEO: 2013].  
  
In her book, Glasmeier (2000: 25) highlights the importance of Swatch to the re-emergence of  
the Swiss watchmaking industry: “Swatch was a Swiss savior in terms of the Swiss industry’s  
return to the low-priced end of the industry and in terms of industry image and morale.  Its  
importance was as much in saving face as in saving the industry itself.”  Hayek’s defiance of  
industry norms and traditions had been scoffed at by other watchmaking executives, but it  
seemed to be paying off.    
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Although the success of Swatch provided renewed hope to the Swiss watch industry, it  
also exposed vulnerabilities that were embedded in the region’s traditional mechanical watch  
production methods.  The inefficient methods of mass producing mechanical watches by hand  
through a complex system of multiple family-owned businesses was no longer a viable business  
model and had to be disbanded.  In fact, the Swatch had proven successful because it could be  
produced by a single company on an automated factory line, without the need for any human  
assembly. Thus, this period brought an end to many of the traditional mechanical watchmaking  
practices and structures that had defined the Swiss watch industry for nearly 200 years: the old  
cartel system had been dismantled, banks had sold off most of their remaining interests in the  
industry, and many of the family-owned mechanical watchmaking businesses had either  
collapsed, had been acquired by outsiders, or were still struggling to adapt to quartz technology.    
However, entrepreneurs such as Hayek and Thomke were willing to defy centuries of  
institutionalized norms so they could introduce several innovative structural, cultural,  
technological, and organizational changes to the field of Swiss watchmaking.  The quartz crisis  
eventually prompted an industry-wide restructuring, led by Hayek and SMH, that de- 
institutionalized many of the old mechanical watchmaking production systems and norms.  
Ironically, these actions laid the groundwork for the next period (Donze, 2011): an unexpected  
re-emergence of Swiss mechanical watch industry.   
Re-emergence: 1990-2008  
Focal Re-Institutionalization Processes - Identity Construction, Interpretation and  
Translation, and the Reproduction of Patterns  
  
By 1990, the Swiss watch industry was beginning to reclaim low-end market share and  
the industry was exuding a newfound confidence for the first time since the early 1970s.  One  
industry expert noted: “Things started to look up in Switzerland.  It was absolutely amazing.  The  
70  
  
' 
 
Swatch did an enormous amount of good for the rest of Swiss watch industry, putting it back on 
 
the map.” [Interview with former industry representative, 2012].  In the early 1990s, Swiss  
producers also noticed that mechanical watches were beginning to attract attention, particularly  
from collectors and high-end consumers looking to purchase these watches again.  Here I focus  
on three elements that emerged from my interviews and data that were salient to this period of  
re-emergence: identity construction, interpretation and translation, and the reproduction of  
patterns.    
The introduction of the Swatch watch as a fashion accessory convinced the Swiss that  
they no longer needed to compete with the Japanese solely on dimensions related to precision  
and accuracy.  The Swatch had proved to be effective because it was marketed as an “emotional”  
product (i.e., an extension of the consumer’s unique personality); in short, Swiss quartz watches  
could also be identity markers (Pratt  & Rafaeli, 1997).  But a question remained: could the same  
strategy apply to more expensive watches, particularly the mechanical watch?  Several factors  
signaled that the future of mechanical watch technology would be tied to reconstructing the  
identity of the Swiss watch industry and translating this message to the consumer.   
An early sign that mechanical watches still held value came from an unexpected source:  
the watch collector community.  In the late-1980s a small group of collectors of mechanical  
watches started purchasing timepieces at auction because they were concerned the technology  
would vanish in the wake of quartz technology.  According to one auction house executive, these  
collectors were a referred to as, “the ‘purebreds.’ They' re in it because they can take apart a  
movement and to them it' s a heaven on earth. It s as good as it gets.” [Interview: auction house  
executive, 2013].  For them, the identity of the watch was far more than a precise timekeeper, but  
a symbol of craftsmanship.   
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Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new type of collector was enticed to enter the 
 
vintage market.  An Italian entrepreneur by the name of the Osvaldo Patrizzi started auctioning  
mechanical watches and antique clocks to a growing base of people interested in mechanical  
watch technology.  His auction house, Antiquorum, published full-color catalogues with in-depth  
technical descriptions, historical backgrounds, and documented provenances similar to those  
found in the high-end art market.  Auction prices for their vintage pieces continued to rise,7  
sending a signal to the Swiss watch producers that there might still be value associated with the  
dying technology.  And many brands began to take notice.  A notable collector recalled the  
unexpected rise of value of a vintage mechanical Patek Philippe he had bought as frugal young  
man and later sold at auction:   
You cannot collect quartz watches. The heartbeat of a mechanical watch is the heartbeat  
of human culture. I bought my first [mechanical] Patek in the early 1980s with one  
paycheck, but I sold it in 1989 for $430,000.  Managers in every watch company noticed  
this trend and couldn’t believe people still wanted mechanical watches.  [Interview:  
Watch Industry Historian, Author, and Collector, 2012]   
  
When asked what made the vintage marketplace grow so quickly, one auction executive stated:   
The vintage market depends to a large extent on the power of persuasion of the  
auctioneer and the one who writes the descriptions.8 The persuasions can be done in three  
ways: 1) to expose to the fullest the rarity and rare features of the watch; 2) privately  
assure a high-end client that the watch is a ‘sleeper’ and/or worth an investment; and 3) to  
use high flying adjectives. But one feature had become universal, however you word it, it  
comes down to one thing. It' s got to be expensive.  [Personal Correspondence: Senior  
executive at a watch auction house, 2013]  
  
Heading into the 1990s and 2000s, the vintage market continued to attract new buyers,  
and many brands such as Patek, Rolex, Breguet, and Omega partnered with Antiquorum,  
                                                  
7 For example, Patek Philippe wristwatch Ref. 2499, No.  868747, chronograph with perpetual calendar sold three  
times between 1992 and 2006. Current version is Ref. 5270:  1) Antiquorum Hong Kong 5/25/1992 lot 208 sold for  
HK$420,000; 2) Antiquorum Geneva 11/16/2002 lot 362 sold for 641,500CHF; 3) Christie’s Geneva 11/13/2006 lot  
45, sold for 832,000CHF.   
8  Example of an auction catalogue description:  “To so many long time aficionados of vintage and contemporary  
wristwatches, it is the legendary reference 2499 by Patek Philippe which displays the most perfect combination of  
mechanical complexity, dial design and case proportions. And the one and only ever released example in platinum is  
the holy grail per se to a large community of collectors.” Source: Christie’s November 12, 2012 note to lot 151.    
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Sotheby’s, and Christie’s to sponsor special auctions for their pieces. Several brands also began 
 
re-issuing versions of the vintage pieces sold at auction; in fact, the high prices of the vintage  
pieces often justified the increased prices they could charge for the re-issued models.  In contrast  
to the “purebread” collector-buyers described above, another auctioneer described the influx of  
new buyers as “‘Armani suit’ people. Not only did they have an interest in the watches, but they  
had the money to buy them.”  [Interview: auction house executive, 2013].  For this group of  
collectors, the identity of the watch was a symbol of status, prestige, and exclusivity.  (It was  
also an identity that the brands were simultaneously attempting to spread beyond the vintage  
market to the retail market, discussed below).    
The role of the collector continued to expand. Companies invited expert collectors to sit  
in on focus groups, asking for advice about whether they thought their new designs adhered to  
the brand’s historical heritage.  Beginning in the late 1990s, many companies hired notable  
collectors to write historical biographies on the history of their brands, hoping these individuals  
might be able to recover some of the information that was lost when many companies had  
thrown out their archival records during the quartz crisis.  In short, the collectors served as  
guardians of mechanical watchmaking because their interest helped bring attention back to the  
technology.    
While the vintage mechanical watch market may have been an initial indicator that  
mechanical watches still held value, the vast majority of work that led to the re-emergence of the  
mechanical watch was done by the brands themselves.  Several watch manufacturers, such as  
Omega and Tag Heuer, believed that they could reposition the identity of the watch as a luxury  
good.  To do so, extensive marketing efforts were launched to re-interpret and translate the value  
of owning a Swiss mechanical watch for the consumer.  Several brands turned to marketing  
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strategies used in the early days of Geneva watchmaking, when watches were seen primarily as 
 
status symbols, jewelry, and luxury goods for the elites who could afford them.  By essentially  
ignoring the fact that the mechanical watches were not as accurate as quartz timepieces, the  
brands aimed to shift the identity of Swiss watchmaking toward luxury, beauty, and  
craftsmanship.    
Several “dormant” watch brands (i.e., old watch brands that had gone bankrupt during the  
quartz crisis) were re-launched during this period.  One notable example was Blancpain.  Its  
CEO, Jean Claude-Biver, was a former Omega executive who bought the rights to the Blancpain  
name for SFr16,000 (USD$9000) in the 1980s (Breiding, 2013).  The project was based  
primarily on changing the identity of the watch, and linking it to the craft of watchmaking.  Biver  
re-launched the brand, stating that it was Switzerland’s oldest watch company and offered an  
ironic advertising slogan that captured the zeitgeist of the period: “Since 1735 there has never  
been a Blancpain quartz watch, and never will be."  The reproduction of the old watchmaking  
patterns was meant to be celebrated rather than disregarded.  In interviews, Biver explained the  
importance of identity construction, translation, and interpretation that he employed to  
reintroduce the mechanical watch to the consumer:   
We re-invented the culture of a watch, the art of a watch, the soul of a watch.  Your  
watch lives with you and so don' t look for accuracy. You look for the soul, the beauty,  
the art.  You look to the watch as a communicating instrument of your personality. Your  
watch is part of you. The watch belongs to you. The watch is you.  [Interview: CEO of  
Swiss watch company, 2012]  
  
This is why we may consider Blancpain today as the ‘guardian,’ the curator of the most  
marvelous culture, a true Swiss patrimony: the Art of traditional watchmaking. We want  
to give life to the fabulous heritage of the art of traditional watchmaking, to  
enlarge it thanks to the possibility of today and of tomorrow. [Archival interview: CEO  
of Swiss watch company, 1999] (Friedberg, 1999)  
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Both were strong statements of identity, alluding that the watch could serve as extension of a 
 
buyer’s personality (c.f., Belk, 1987).  The strategy worked.  In 2000, Biver sold Blancpain to  
Hayek and the Swatch group for SFr50million (USD$30m).    
  
Structure: The Introduction of the “Group”  
The success of the Swatch watch in the mid to late 1980s provided the liquidity Hayek  
needed to carry out his broader vision.  During the 1990s, he used the revenues from Swatch  
sales to acquire several more Swiss brands, bringing them under the roof of one single “Group”  
(i.e., SMH/Swatch Group).  Under the “Group” model, each brand would represent a specific  
price point to vertically segment the market. Brand CEOs reported directly to Hayek, who served  
as Chairman and CEO of the Group and coordinated the production figures, budgets, and  
revenue targets for all the brands.  Seeing the success of this strategy, the 1990s and 2000s led to  
creation of several more groups across the industry (Donze, 2011).  For instance, several foreign  
investment groups in the luxury industry capitalized on the shift toward luxury and began to  
acquire Swiss watch brands.  They believed they were well positioned to use their marketing  
expertise to reposition the brands for the high-end consumer (e.g., LVMH, the French  
multinational luxury goods conglomerate known for its Louis Vuitton handbags and several  
other prestigious brands, purchased the Tag Heuer and Zenith watch brands).    
The introduction of groups into the Swiss watch industry also brought different  
expectations about profit margins.  One former CEO stated that after his company was purchased  
by a luxury group, they quickly raised prices and re-invested a significant amount of cash into  
marketing.  Their goal, he said “was getting the company out of the mass market margins and  
into luxury market margins” [Interview: former CEO of Swiss watch company, 2012].  
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The shifting structure of the industry was also influenced by the supply of watch  
movements, which are the mechanical or quartz components inside a watch responsible for  
keeping time.  Since the largest independent movement manufactures had been dissolved or  
acquired by SMH in the 1980s, its movement factory (known as ETA) supplied 80% to 85% of  
all watch movements to other brands during this period.  Companies would purchase the  
movement from ETA, add new features (i.e., ‘complications’ such as annual calendar functions,  
chronograph timing functions), assemble the watches, and sell them independently.  Finally, a  
remaining subset of companies continued to make their own movements, most notably Rolex and  
Patek Philippe.  A prominent collector, author, and watch brand historian explained the shift in  
industry structure that occurred in the late 1990s and 2000s, particularly as many of the  
traditional mechanical brands no longer made the mechanical movements that were back in  
demand:   
From that time, the scenery divided. You had companies on the one hand who developed  
their own movements, and on the other hand you had companies that used ETA  
movements and building complications on the ETA movements. [Interview: Watch  
historian and author, 2012].  
  
Thus, the advantage of the “group” structure was that several watch brands could benefit  
from several aspects of group membership, including: stronger negotiating power with suppliers  
and distributors; capital investments that came from overall group profits; diffusion of new  
technical and business methods from other brands in the same group that facilitated  
organizational learning; and, revenues from other products in the group (e.g., liquors, clothing,  
handbags) could sustain the watch brands if demand decreased or currency shifts effected Swiss  
watchmaking.  Since most groups owed more than one watch brand, a core principle of the group  
structure was to avoid encroaching on the price segment of their other brands.  The CEO of a  
mid-range brand situated within a group quipped about the importance of selling watches at a  
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specific price point: “I always want to stay in my league.  Never forget.  I try to preach this 
 
message the whole damn day to my executives – stay in your [expletive] league!”  [Interview:  
CEO Swiss watch company, 2012]. The purpose of the group was to coordinate how the brands  
would translate the unique values of their watches to a diverse market of consumers at multiple  
price points.  In addition, the groups facilitated a reproduction of patterns, practices, and  
institutional norms by centralizing many decisions related to production and distribution.    
By 2008, the Swiss watch industry had recorded 19 quarters of consecutive growth,  
achieving 67% growth over the previous five years.  The export value of Swiss watches was  
approximately US$15.8 billion, estimated to comprise 55% to 60% of the global watch industry.   
The group model appeared to be a successful means of rescuing numerous almost defunct  
brands, including the 18 brands that sat under Hayek’s Swatch Group and made up 40% of all  
the Swiss watch export value.  When Hayek had produced his initial recommendations for banks  
in the early 1980s, he estimated the SMH/Swatch Group was valued at SFr328 million  
(USD$180m) – thirty years later his group reported revenues of SFr6.44 billion (USD$6.22), 70  
times the original investment (Breiding, 2013: 43).  
However, by 2008 the Swiss watch industry was now one primarily anchored in the  
luxury segment of the global watch market.  Enthusiasm for the Swatch watch had subsided in  
the 1990s, and Swiss production numbers for quartz technology never came near the 1 trillion  
quartz watches produced annually in Hong Kong and China.  The Swiss could no longer compete  
on overall production units (Glasmeier, 2000); in 2008, they produced 26.1 million watches, of  
which only 4.3 million were mechanical. The average price of the Swiss watch was US$563,  
compared to the average price of a Chinese quartz watch at US$2 (Federation of the Swiss  
Watch Industry, 2009).  Nonetheless, a re-emergence of the Swiss field of watchmaking had  
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been achieved: the industry was seeing unprecedented growth rates, mechanical watchmaking 
 
schools in Switzerland were again flourishing, and many old brands were being re-launched  
every year.  Refer again to Figure 8 and Figure 9. As a company historian employed by a Swiss  
watch company iterated:  “We have to communicate that [Swiss watchmaking] is not about  
precision anymore, it' s about a dream, it' s about heritage, it' s about the past.  In fact, it is not  
rational at all, this re-emergence.”  [Interview: Swiss watch company historian, 2012].   
The re-emergence of the field Swiss watch industry suggests a complementary, but  
somewhat nuanced, perspective on the role of legitimacy during periods of market re-formation.   
During this period of re-emergence (1990-2008), Swiss watch companies had to cross multiple  
legitimacy thresholds (Navis  & Glynn, 2010) simultaneously.  The first was associated with re- 
legitimating themselves as traditional Swiss watchmakers with roots in early days of mechanical  
watch craftsmanship; as a result, numerous companies hired full-time company historians with  
PhDs in history to search for archives, patents, and other sources that could validate the  
companies’ claims to the past.  Alternatively, during this period many brands also joined  
“groups” which enforced many of the strict guidelines related to budgeting, operations, and  
profitability that had initially been introduced into the field during the prior period (1983-1989);  
as a result, these companies were now held accountable to outside financial analysts who  
legitimized their claims for profitability to the broader investor community.   In this case, the two  
legitimacy hurdles were associated with practices and patterns that had been instituted in the  
past, but were also important for their future.    
To summarize, I find that identity construction, interpretation and translation, and the  
production of patterns characterized this period of re-institutionalization.  As the industry moved  
toward selling mechanical watches as luxury goods, these factors shifted market demand and  
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consumer buying patterns.  Concurrently, the period also gave rise to the institutional guardian:  
actors who served to preserve the old technology, signaling market demand for the old  
technology still existed, and also acting as historians and “truth-tellers” (Stinchcombe, 2002) for  
the field.  In the following section, I discuss how each of the salient factors that emerged across  
the three periods contributed to a general model of field re-emergence.    
TOWARDS A MODEL OF FIELD RE-EMERGENCE  
In this section, I advance a model of field re-emergence that summarizes and generalizes  
my findings.  Figure 10 illustrates how institutional processes of field transformation and  
preservation serve as complementary forces that enable field re-emergence.  The Figure also  
highlights how actors representing change (i.e., institutional entrepreneurs) and stability (i.e.,  
institutional guardians) counterbalance each other during periods of re-emergence.  Together,  
these processes and actors create a unique set of conditions that simultaneously facilitate  
transformation and preservation.   
The arrows on the left and right sides of the Figure illustrate how re-emergence occurs  
through a complex balance of field transformation and field preservation, represented by the top  
and bottom boxes. The middle box represents the mechanisms that facilitate this balance (e.g.,  
identity construction, interpretation and translation, and the preproduction of patterns); and, as  
illustrated, re-emergence consists of elements associated with both field transformation and  
change.  This process is managed through the actions and behaviors of institutional entrepreneurs  
and guardians, represented by the two opposing circles, who employ the mechanisms of re- 
emergence to infuse both the old and the new values into the institutional field.  Next, I describe  
each of the constructs in the Figure in more detail.    
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Figure 10: Towards a Model of Field Re-emergence  
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Institutionalization Processes  
 
Elements associated with a field’s emergence (i.e., institutionalization: pre-1983) and  
dissipation (i.e., de-institutionalization: 1983-1989) do not completely dissipate, and  
consequently remain salient during periods of field re-emergence (e.g., 1990-2008).  As Kaghan  
and Lounsbury (2006) show in their study of technology transfer, “institutional residue” from an  
old technological order is often left behind and can manifest itself later in artifacts, professional  
norms, standards, and communities of practice.  Likewise, the mechanical watchmaking schools,  
industry associations, accuracy competitions, certification boards, and the mechanical  
watchmaking machinery and tools all became forms of institutional residue that were left behind  
in the late 1970s, but they eventually became important again in the 1990s.    
For instance, during the 1990s and 2000s most Swiss companies were focused on  
validating to the consumer that they were founded during the early days of watchmaking, which  
they believed would help legitimize their claim to the origins of Swiss mechanical watchmaking.   
Additionally, during the re-emergence period several CEOs reported that their companies agreed  
to industry-wide standards set by the Swatch Group largely because they had been successful  
under highly coordinated supply systems before, a mentality that harkened back to the days when  
the industry production was coordinated by a cartel.  Thus, processes of imprinting and  
conformity – which served to solidify field-level norms, habitual patterns, and values during the  
field’s emergence – laid dormant for several years, but later came back during the period of the  
re-emergence.    
Conversely, elements that forced field level change can also linger and influence actors  
during a subsequent period of re-emergence.  For instance, many of the process and product  
innovations that were introduced during a period of transformation (1983-1989) (e.g., the Swatch  
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watch, automated production systems, fashion marketing) defied the accepted practices, norms, 
 
and logics associated with the early days of Swiss mechanical watchmaking.  One could argue  
that this period introduced a market logic (i.e., focused on the accumulation and  
commodification of wealth) to a field that that traditionally been one based primarily on a family  
logic (i.e., focused on reciprocity and unconditional loyalty) (Friedland  & Alford, 1991;  
Thornton, Ocasio,  & Lounsbury, 2012).  Yet, during the same period, when firms were re- 
embracing the old mechanical watch technology (1990-2007), they continued to employ  
strategies that led to stricter and more disciplined business practices (e.g., tighter financial  
controls, automated production systems, and greater accountability measures) that were  
introduced during the 1990s.  I found that the innovations grounded in a market logic that Hayek  
and others introduced in the 1980s were also reconstituted and became a form of institutional  
residue that provided the seeds for change that subsequently occurred during the years marked by  
re-emergence.    
  Finally, the Figure depicts how re-institutionalization and re-emergence is facilitated via  
mechanisms (Davis & Marquis, 2005) of identity construction, interpretation and translation, and  
the reproduction of patterns.  For instance, during the re-emergence period, many of the CEOs I  
interviewed argued that they actively attempted to redefine their company’s identities, the  
identity of the watch, and more broadly, the identity of the community of Swiss watchmaking  
(i.e., “who we are” and “what we do” (Navis  & Glynn, 2011)).  To do so, patterns associated  
with the previous two periods were reproduced (e.g., elements of handmade mechanical  
watchmaking were combined with automated production systems).  Such norms and practices  
were re-institutionalized via the group structure, the re-establishment of schools, festivals and  
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fairs devoted exclusively to Swiss luxury watches, and chronometer certifications (see Appendix 
 
III) that measured accuracy differently for mechanical watches than quartz timepieces.    
Institutional Entrepreneurship and Guardianship   
Processes of re-emergence are enacted by two types of leadership: institutional  
entrepreneurs and institutional guardians.9  Selznick (1957) explicitly defined institutional  
leaders as carriers of values who could infuse those values in organizations so as to develop the  
organization’s character and identity, transforming them from a tool of efficiency to a value  
proposition.  As he (1957: 17) famously intoned:  “To institutionalize is to infuse with value  
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand.”  By value, Selznick (1957: 57) did not  
refer to “any object of interest” but rather, the denotation of “something which in the given  
organization is taken as an end in itself.”  Because they reflect the beliefs of the collective about  
what is right and appropriate, he argued that values create social order, govern competing or  
political interests by offering a transcendent ideology or mission, and thus serve as a form of  
social integration.  Moreover, social values can fix and codify meanings associated with the  
institution and enable its endurance over time.  Thus, the values infused by leadership can  
establish “relative permanence of a distinctly social sort" that is the hallmark of an institution  
(Hughes, 1936:180).    
Figure 10 illustrates how, during periods of re-emergence, institutional entrepreneurs  
(Battilana et al., 2009; DiMaggio, 1988) diffuse values that aim to transform the field, while  
institutional guardians (DeJordy, 2010; Fligstein, 1997) diffuse values that aim to preserve  
elements of the field associated with the old institutional order.  Yet, I find both are necessary for  
re-emergence.  If the institutional entrepreneur pushes the field too far askance by introducing  
                                                  
9 I do not limit the notions of institutional entreprenurship or guardianship strictly to individuals, but also suggest  
that organizations, professional associations, events, or individual actions can promote the infusion of values.    
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innovations that defy all acceptable norms, guardians will react and argue the practices are no 
 
longer legitimate.  Alternatively, if institutional guardians refuse to adapt to any changes  
proposed by the institutional entrepreneur, the entrepreneur will highlight that some level of  
change is necessary in order for the field to survive.  Thus, the inherent tension between these  
two types of actors shapes the conditions for re-emergence.    
For example, after the quartz crisis in the Swiss watch industry, many experts credited  
Hayek with introducing the consolidation strategy that influenced sweeping changes in the watch  
production systems across the region, transforming the Swiss watch industry by making it more  
competitive with other nations (Donze, 2011).  Simultaneously, during this same period when the  
Swiss struggled to define themselves in the years following the quartz crisis, Hayek and other  
CEOs were surprised to find that collectors were purchasing vintage mechanical watches at  
auction for record prices, publishing books about mechanical watches and the Swiss companies  
that produced them, and forming local and online communities devoted to the preservation of the  
craft of fine mechanical watchmaking.  In a sense, these collectors were acting as guardians of  
the tradition of Swiss mechanical watchmaking.  Quickly, CEOs such as Hayek realized that the  
collectors were influential actors in the industry, and played an important role in signaling  
consumer demand for handmade watch components that could only be manufactured by expert  
craftsmen and women in the old tradition.  The example suggests that institutional entrepreneurs  
were able to introduce new innovations that facilitated necessary field level change, while  
guardians actively protected the organization and institution’s historical heritage (Walsh    
Glynn, 2008), particularly when under threat of change (DeJordy, 2010).  In re-emergence, the  
collectors played an important role by making visible the value of mechanical watches, providing  
an impetus for a return of mechanical watchmaking.    
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Overall, I find that processes of re-emergence draw on the institutional residues of the  
past, but also connect them to the present.  Just as the old technology is not fully displaced by the  
new, the then-new technology (e.g., quartz) is not fully displaced by the return of the old  
technology (e.g., mechanical).  Thus, the elements of old and new technological orders exist and  
sit side by side, providing richness and complexity to the field.   
DISCUSSION   
This study demonstrates several key factors that contribute to, and influence, the re- 
emergence of market demand for a legacy technology in a mature institutional field, answering  
calls by organization scholars for further research related to field-level persistence (Scott, 2008)  
and change (Davis & Marquis, 2005).  I advance a model of field re-emergence, which combines  
multiple processes associated with institutionalization and de-institutionalization.  By examining  
the field of Swiss mechanical watchmaking, I find that field re-emergence requires the  
recombination of elements left behind from a prior technological order, but also requires novel  
elements to be introduced.  Thus, field re-emergence requires components that facilitate field  
transformation and, likewise, also elements that facilitate field preservation.  And while these  
dual-processes appear to be at odds with one another, during a period of re-emergence they serve  
as necessary counterweights, encouraging the preservation of some elements associated with the  
old institution field, while also allowing new elements to enter the field that allow it to change  
and survive.  Finally, I expose how these dual processes are supported by actors serving as  
institutional entrepreneurs (promoting change and transformation) and institutional guardians  
(promoting stasis and preservation).     
This study has several theoretical implications.  First, it offers new insights relevant to  
research on fields, and institutional and technology change.  For example, institutional scholars  
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have long been interested in the role of legitimacy during these the early stages of field and 
 
market category creation.  Navis and Glynn (2010: 462) show that the emergence of satellite  
radio was predicated on achieving a legitimacy threshold, “marking the onset of  
institutionalization and the taken-for-grantedness of the new market category.”  Dacin,  
Goodstein, and Scott  (2002: 47) posit that legitimacy is an important force in  
institutionalization, as “The creation, transformation, and diffusion of institutions require  
legitimacy, a condition whereby other alternatives are seen as less appropriate, desirable, or  
viable.”  I find that during periods of re-emergence, the field requires legitimation of its past  
practices and traditions, but also needs legitimation of its current practices under the new  
institutional order.  This balance was often achieved through the actions of individuals who  
served as “carriers” of values, ideas, routines, and artifacts over time (Scott, 2003), especially  
institutional entrepreneurs and guardians.   
Second, I expose an unlikely relationship between the institutional leader and guardian.   
Where prior studies have largely focused on the role of the institutional entrepreneur as an agent  
for field level change (Garud, Jain,  & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Hardy  & Maguire, 2008; Maguire,  
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Rao & Giorgi, 2006), I find equal importance for the institutional  
guardian (DeJordy, 2010; DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997).  In the case of the Swiss watch  
industry, both serve as counterbalances to the other; institutional entrepreneurs (e.g., Hayek)  
introduced innovations that ultimately drove field-level changes necessary for survival, but  
alternatively, institutional guardians (e.g., collectors) ensured that companies preserved the  
norms and values associated with mechanical watchmaking.  Thus, this study may provide new  
applications for Selznick’s view of institutional leadership: the notion of “value infusion”  
appears to be just as important for entrepreneurs as it is for guardians.  Interestingly, during a  
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period of re-emergence, both sets of actors infuse values that push and pull the field until it 
 
achieves a hybrid-like value system that provides equilibrium.  Unpacking this relationship more  
fully holds promise for future researchers.   
Finally, I identify several mechanisms that are critical processes for field re-emergence,  
including the role of identity construction, interpretation and translation, and the reproduction of  
patterns.  While institutionalists have devoted significant energy to exposing the cognitive  
factors that impact field level change, (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Scott, 2008), such factors  
remain relatively unexplored in the literature on technology change (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008).   
Not only do these cognitive factors appear to be important for understanding changes in the  
technology of the watch, they may also lend greater insight into the identity changes that the  
organizations underwent, as well as the broader community of Swiss watchmaking.  Further  
exploration on how these mechanisms effect field-level change would be a welcome extension of  
this study.    
To conclude, I find that re-emergence is not only a “real” phenomenon, but one that  
serves as an important extension of research previously conducted on field emergence and  
institutionalization.  As is the nature of any inductive study, however, it is not without its  
limitations.  A single case does not make a theory, but does provide promise for future research  
that explores the mechanisms underlying field level change, and in this case, re-emergence.    
  
    
87  
  
 
 
CHAPTER IV.  MECHANISMS OF TECHNOLOGY RE-EMERGENCE 
 
AND IDENTITY CHANGE IN A MATURE FIELD  
ABSTRACT  
I examine the processes and mechanisms whereby market demand for a “dying”  
technology re-emerges at a later date.  In 1983, fourteen years after the introduction of the first  
quartz watch,  mechanical watches, along with the Swiss Jura community of watchmakers who  
built them, were thought to be “dead” (Landes, 1983).  Unexpectedly, however, by 2008 the  
Swiss mechanical watchmaking industry had re-emerged as the world’s leading exporter (in  
monetary value) of watches.  Using qualitative and quantitative analysis, this deductive study  
offers support for hypotheses that test how re-emergence is associated with: 1) product identity  
redefinition ; 2) historical organizational identity reclamation ; 3) changes in community identity  
that reshape systems of meaning ; and 4) mechanisms related to temporal framing, linguistic  
framing, and symbolic framing.   Thus, although new or discontinuous technologies tend to  
displace older ones, legacy technologies that are seemingly “dead” can re-emerge, thrive, and  
even co-exist with newer technologies.  Building on these results, I draw out theoretical and  
empirical implications that focus on the interface between technological shifts and identity  
change at multiple levels.    
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This study focuses on the mechanisms (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Hedstrom & Swedberg,  
1998) associated with field level identity change and re-emergence.  I examine a period of re- 
emergence in the field of Swiss mechanical watchmaking, and how technology precipitated  
changes not only in Swiss watchmaking, but also in the product identity of the watch, the  
organizational identity of the watchmaking firms, and the community identity of those craftsmen  
who designed and valued them.  I show how the product identity of the watch moved through  
phases that emphasized different identity attributes: from precision craftsmanship, to fashion  
accessory, and finally to luxury good. Concurrently, I examine how the identity of the Swiss  
watchmaking community also experienced significant change, as master craftsmen were forced  
to evaluate their centuries-old profession in light of the electronic quartz watches that had  
claimed a significant portion of their industry.    
Like Tripsas (2009: 442), I observe that “technology change has implications beyond the  
technology itself.”  The overall effect of the Quartz Revolution was to loosen the identity  
coupling – between product (mechanical watch), organization (watchmaking companies), and  
community (Swiss) – paving the way for a plethora of innovative watches that were produced by  
new and different communities of watchmakers, including the Japanese and Chinese.  That  
technological shifts ushered in identity and field-level change is perhaps not a surprise (Barley,  
1986); what is a surprise, however, was the potent re-emergence of the “dying technology” of  
mechanical watch movements along with the re-coupling of watch and (Swiss) community.     
This paper is poised to make several contributions.  First, because I examine how fields  
can be reconstituted through technology, I complement and extend existing research on the  
dynamics of field birth and death.  My research reveals that technology cycles may be more  
89  
  
 
 
expansive than previously modeled, lengthening beyond birth (technology emergence) and death 
 
(technology displacement) to re-emerge.  Thus, I contribute to research on innovation and  
innovation cycles (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992), highlighting how legacy technologies (i.e., old  
technologies that endure after the rise of a dominant substitute (Adner  & Snow, 2010))  
embedded within mature fields can, counterintuitively, survive periods of ferment and the threat  
of displacement to reconfigure the field, as well as its key products and actors.   
Second, I highlight how the processes that underlie field-level changes are predicated not  
only on technology shifts, but also upon mechanisms related to identity.  My archival analyses  
reveal that such mechanisms use temporal references, metaphorical language, and symbolic  
claims in public and marketing communications to re-define legacy identities.  I show how  
industries and fields can be reconstituted such that technologies – and associated product,  
organization, and community identities – can re-emerge as influential and powerful collectives.    
Third, I answer calls for integrative research that encompasses micro- and macro-level  
processes of change, innovation (Drazin et al., 1999) and institutionalization (Powell  & Colyvas,  
2008), by exploring how the reclamation of legacy identities (Walsh & Glynn, 2008) in products,  
organizations, and communities reshapes fields.    
I begin with an overview of the relevant literature theorizing product, organizational, and  
community identities within the context of technological re-emergence.  Next, I present research  
that uses archival analysis and field interviews to reveal the mechanisms of technological re- 
emergence of Swiss watchmaking during the period of 1970-2008.  Finally, I extract theoretical  
and managerial implications, and suggest potential directions for future research.    
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TECHNOLOGICAL RE-EMERGENCE AND FIELD LEVEL IDENTITY CHANGE 
 
Scholars have modeled technological evolution as a cyclical process, i.e., a technology  
life cycle, that is initiated by the introduction of a new and discontinuous technology, ushering in  
an era of ferment that persists until the industry coalesces around a new technology (Tushman    
Rosenkopf, 1992).  The cycle repeats itself over time as a “highly path dependent process”  
(Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008: 790).  The apparent pro-innovation bias (Rogers, 1995) seems to have  
deterred attention to the possibility that legacy technologies may endure beyond the life cycle  
model. The underlying assumption is that technologies eventually reach a natural limit (Fleming,  
2001), leading to their demise (Klepper, 1996). Foster argues (1986: 160), “The market served  
by the old technology will be small, have no growth… and only a few firms will be economically  
strong enough to weather the storm.”    
Nonetheless, there is some evidence to challenge the assumption that old technologies  
inevitably die when they are displaced by newer ones.  Adner and Snow (2010: 1655) theorize  
that old technologies may avoid extinction by exploiting “racing” strategies (i.e., extending their  
performance) or “retreat” strategies (i.e., moving into a niche or relocating into a new market  
application).  Henderson’s (1995) research on the optical lithography industry reveals how a  
legacy technology was able to extend its dominance beyond its performance limits because of  
social and institutional factors.  Ansari and Garud (2009) show how the life of 2G telephony  
technology was extended due to modular innovations in packet-switching technology.  Snow  
(2008) and Harley (1971) illustrate how legacy technologies such as carburetors and sailing ships  
extended their lifespan by adopting components from electronic fuel injectors and steam ships,  
respectively.  Finally, Adner and Snow (2010: 1655) offer a theoretical explanation for the life  
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extension of old technologies, arguing that the emergence of a new technology can “reveal 
 
significant underlying heterogeneity in the old technology’s broader demand environment.”   
However, we know little about the micro-processes and mechanisms that undergird the  
communities and organizations that attempt to preserve legacy technologies, nor has significant  
attention been given to cognitive factors (Kaplan  & Tripsas, 2008) that may potentially affect the  
trajectory and market demand for a legacy technology beyond the limits of the its “ultimate  
performance” (Henderson, 1995: 631).    
To address these gaps in the technology literature, I turn to the identity literature, which  
scholars (e.g., Tripsas, 2009) suggest holds promise for unpacking some of the cognitive  
elements associated with technology change.  Identity focuses on the attributes of entities of  
multiple types, including products, firms, communities, and fields, and how they are framed and  
understood.  I discuss how such factors inform our understanding of how legacy technologies re- 
emerge and re-establish themselves in a mature field.       
Identity Change in Products, Organizations and Communities within a Field  
Identities, at the levels of the organization or field, consist of elements that collectively  
define “who we are” and “what we do” (Navis & Glynn, 2011: 479).  In the process of  
technology emergence, these identities, as well as those of marketplace products, are intertwined  
and mutually constituted.  Over time, however, the initial coupling between them tends to loosen,  
with technical elements defining “what we do” potentially separating from institutionalized  
meanings of “who we are.”  As Scott (1987: 499) explains: “Institutional elements of  
environments begin to be defined in contrast to technical elements, and this definition becomes  
more explicit and pronounced over time.”  Thus, it is the “common meaning system” that Scott  
(1994) attributes to fields that gives them their collective character, beyond their mere technical  
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features.  Meanings, which are socially constructed (Berger  & Luckmann, 1967; Kennedy, 2008; 
 
Rosa et al., 1999), shape the collective identity of the field.  They serve as a touchstone that firms  
use to claim field membership and that audiences use to understand, categorize, and legitimate  
the field (Navis  & Glynn, 2010; Weber et al., 2008; Zuckerman, 1999).   Below I describe how  
the identity of product, organization, and community change with regard to technology re- 
emergence.  
Product Identity  
Product identity is defined as the unique attributes of a product’s architecture, design, and  
function (Ulrich, 1995).  Features of product identity are based on the arrangement of the  
product’s functional elements, the link between its functional elements and physical components,  
and, finally, the interfaces among its interacting physical components (Urlich 1995: 420).   
Bayazit (2004: 16) argues that product identity is “concerned with the physical embodiment of  
man-made things, how these things perform their jobs, and how they work.”   
Recently, scholars have begun to investigate product design (for a review, see Ravasi    
Stigliani, 2012) and organizational identity (e.g., Ravasi  & Schultz, 2006; Tripsas, 2009).   
Although advocates claim that “design-inspired” products are more enduring and profitable, the  
concept of design and its integration with organization identity has received  little scholarly  
attention (Utterback et al., 2010: 3).  Ravasi and Canato (2010) posit that the technological  
features of a product become cognitive anchors that provide meaning and reinforce individual  
and organizational identities; thus, product identities are the physical manifestation of that which  
is core, distinctive, and enduring (Albert  & Whetten, 1985) to an organization or a wider  
collective. As the case of Polaroid described by Tripsas and Gavetti illustrates (2000), the  
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entrenchment of a product identity within an organization may inhibit the organization’s ability 
 
to envision a new identity devoid the core product (Ravasi  & Canato, 2010).    
In addition to design specifications, product identity serves as a filter on how external  
audiences, such as consumers and industry observers, perceive and evaluate a specific type of  
product class, technology, or innovation (Benner, 2010; Zuckerman, 1999).  Clark (1985: 245)  
posits that new product innovations require manufacturers to define the product identity using  
broad categorizations, and that consumer adoption decisions require a “conceptual evolution” as  
consumers become experienced with the product.  For example, the “horseless carriage”  
gradually became known as an “automobile” as consumers developed more experience and were  
able to define the car’s unique identity.  Benner and Tripsas (2012) show that the prior history of  
firms entering an emerging field influences their initial framing of product identity (e.g. a digital  
camera ranged from an analog camera substitute for photography firms, to a video system  
component for consumer electronics firms, to a PC peripheral for computing firms).  Eventually,  
they find the entire field converged on a common product identity.   
Product identity is also shaped by audience expectations of the product class.  Scholars  
have shown how industry analysts and investors often struggle to define new and existing  
product identities because they do not know how to categorize the product’s attributes within the  
context of institutional norms (Benner, 2010; Zuckerman, 2000) or by analogy, to other  
products’ attributes (Navis  & Glynn, 2010).  For example, Hargadon and Douglas (2001)  
examine how Thomas Edison attempted to define the attributes of electric lighting by exploiting  
prior representations of lighting established by the gas industry.   
Product identities, defined by attributes such as architecture, function, and form, are all  
affected and can change the boundaries around existing product classes or draw boundaries  
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around new ones.  While product identities are tied to functional aspects of the technology, they 
 
also serve as material and symbolic elements of identity for the organizations and individuals  
who produce and purchase them (Dittmar, 1992). As such, the re-emergence of market demand  
for a legacy technology may be possible if it continues to hold value or significance as an  
identity marker (Pratt  & Rafaeli, 1997) to actors in the field.  Following this line of thought, I  
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: Product identity redefinition is associated with the re-emergence of market  
demand for a legacy technology.       
  
Organization Identity  
Organizational identity is anchored to the categorical question of “What kind of  
organization is this?” (Albert  & Whetten, 1985) and claims to what is core, distinctive, and  
enduring about the organization.  Over the past twenty years, a common thread of debate among  
scholars has centered on where organizational identity resides (Ravasi  & Canato, 2010).   
Whetten and Mackey (2002: 395) suggest that scholars have developed two fundamentally  
different conceptions of organizational identity: ‘identity in organizations’ and ‘identity of  
organizations.’ They claim, “At the heart of these competing conceptions of organizational  
identity is the distinction between identity-as-shared perceptions among members versus identity- 
as-institutionalized claims available to members.”   
These conceptions of organizational identity are apportioned by a focus on identity as  
‘attribute-based’ versus ‘identity as a strategic resource’ (see Glynn, 2008: 416-417 for an  
overview).  The first conceptualization assumes certain attributes are essential to the organization  
and ask how they evolve over time (e.g., Gioia, Schultz,  & Corley, 2000; Meyer, Bartunek,    
Lacey, 2002; Ravasi  & Schultz, 2006). Several studies reveal the inherent tension organizations  
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face in maintaining a distinctive identity while also attempting to position themselves in larger 
 
classification schemes (Albert  & Whetten, 1985; Navis & Glynn, 2010); for example, Deephouse  
(1999: 147) argues that organizations should be “as different as legitimately possible.”  
Alternatively, organizational identity can also serve as a strategic resource, “being deployed to  
competitive advantage and functioning as a guide to firm-decision making and strategic choice”  
(Glynn, 2008: 416).    
Organizational identity becomes particularly salient during periods of instability and  
change (Gioia et al., 2000) and is a product of social construction (Corley et al., 2006).  It has  
been shown to present itself in the face of conflict (Dutton  & Dukerich, 1991), within shared  
interpretive schemes that provide meaning to individuals (Fiol, 1991; Gioia, 1998), amongst  
networks or relationships (Mehra, Kilduff,  & Brass, 1998), in a set of institutional claims  
(Whetten  & Mackey, 2002), within professional groups (Pratt & Foreman, 2000), across  
functional differentiations (Glynn, 2000), embedded in structures or symbols (Glynn  & Abzug,  
2002), and through rhetoric and language (Fiol, 2002).  As such, questions related to  
organizational identity become even more salient, for instance, when an organization faces an  
exogenous shock from the arrival of a discontinuous technology. One could suppose that changes  
in market demand will lead organizations to incorporate identity elements from the broader  
community that will allow for their survival.  Simultaneously, such changes might be facilitated  
by organizations reclaiming elements of their historical identity anchored within a specific  
temporal frame (Schultz  & Hernes, 2012; Walsh  & Glynn, 2008) and tied to a legacy  
technological order. Thus, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 2: Historical organizational identity reclamation is associated with the re- 
emergence of market demand for a legacy technology.  
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Community Identity   
 
Community identity10 refers to the collective identity (Snow, 2001) that characterizes the  
field as a whole, and is claimed by field members in an effort to align with others’ expectations   
(Mervis  & Rosch, 1981; Navis  & Glynn, 2010).  Cornelissen, Haslam, Balmerw (2007) argue  
that collective identities are distinct and fluid, organized around a common purpose and shared  
action, and serve as the basis for material outcomes and products.  Hoffman and Ocasio (2001:  
416) posit that collective identities within the same industry are defined by “the common rules,  
values, and systems of meaning by which industry participants establish rules of inclusion,  
competition, and social comparison among industry members; create distinctions within and  
between industries; and delimit industry boundaries.”    
Communities are largely defined by structural and cultural components that create the  
meanings of social systems and are exhibited as standard practices (e.g., Baron et al., 1986) and  
as the collective identity of the community (Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011).  In their study of  
Scottish knitwear manufacturers, for example, Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller (1989) show  
how actors who share a collective identity develop “cognitive communities” that help them  
determine the competitive boundaries of who sits within their competitive environment.  More  
recently, scholars have explored how community identity plays a critical role in category  
emergence and classification.  Navis and Glynn (2010) highlight the role of collective identity as  
a source of legitimacy in their study of the emergence of the satellite radio market category;  
                                                  
10 For the purpose of this paper, I use the terms ‘collective’ and ‘community’ identity interchangeably, suggesting  
that both refer to the shared sense of “we-ness” (Snow, 2001) inferred by both terms.  While collective identity has  
been shown to exist among individuals within an individual organization (e.g., Fiol  & Romanelli, 2012), I draw on  
work that explicates the relationship between collective identity and fields (e.g., Glynn, 2008). I use the term to  
describe a shared collective identity between actors who interact more “frequently and fatefully with one another  
than with actors outside of the field” (Scott 1994:207).    
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alternatively, Benner (2010) and Zuckerman (2000) find that firms that fall outside the definition 
 
of the community identity will suffer in terms of external evaluations.    
Collective and community identities also characterize fields and institutions, which  
themselves are made up of regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that  
provide stability and meaning (Marquis et al., 2007).  Regulative processes establish rules,  
ensure conformity, and define sanctions; established norms become an obligatory dimension of  
social life; and cultural-cognitive understandings constitute the nature of reality and the frames  
through which meaning is made (Scott, 2008: 33).    
Reinforcing cultural-cognitive systems are structural systems of relationships, networks,  
coalitions, and coordination mechanisms.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) show how members of a  
community are defined by mutual awareness that they are involved in a common enterprise.   
Goffman (1974: 21) argued that communities form similar cultural frames that allow individuals  
to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” events and other stimuli as a way of establishing a sense  
of shared meaning (Scott: 2008: 187).  Greenwood and Hinings (1988: 293) posit that  
organizations and communities “operate with structural designs which are given meaning and  
coherence by underlying interpretive schemes.”  And Fligstein (1990) suggests that  
organizational communities are defined by shared relationships with similar organizations or by  
a common relationship with a particular institution.  Although relational and cultural-cognitive  
systems can define and stabilize identity, they can also be challenged by technological change  
that redefines fields.  In this regard, several scholars have explored how communities react to a  
discontinuous technology (e.g., Kaplan, 2008; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Tushman & Anderson,  
1986).  Thus, the role of collective identity in the process of technology re-emergence appears  
particularly salient, especially since the collective identity associated with a legacy technology  
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may not completely go away (Walsh  & Glynn, 2008).  One could imagine that the activation of a  
dormant collective identity associated with a latent technological order might be associated with  
the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology.  Consequently, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 3: Changes in community identity that reshape systems of meaning are  
associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology.  
  
Mechanisms of Field Level Identity Change   
Davis and Marquis (2005) suggest that the utility of a mechanism-based approach is that  
it describes a set of interacting parts that produce an effect not inherent in any one of them.   
Ironically, they (2005: 336) offer an analogy well suited to this study: “If a regression tells us  
about a relation between two variables—for instance, if you wind a watch it will keep running— 
mechanisms pry the back off the watch and show how.”  My analysis explores three unique  
mechanisms that underlie how product, organization, and community identities interact during  
periods of field evolution and technological re-emergence.   
First, research has highlighted the importance of temporal frames, especially ones that  
help actors re-interpret the past in light of the future, during periods of category development,  
evolution, or expansion (Navis & Glynn, 2010).  One could suppose that temporal frames might  
serve as an important mechanism of technology re-emergence, especially if notions of the past  
must be reestablished in order to create a bridge to the future.    
Second, metaphors have been shown to serve as a mechanism that helps actors create  
new labels and meanings during periods of change and evolution (e.g., Clark, 1985; Gioia et al.,  
2000; Powell & Colyvas, 2008).  As Cameron (1986: 540-541) points out, “the usefulness of  
metaphors lies in their possession of some degree of falsehood so that new images and  
associations emerge.” One could therefore imagine that metaphors would be an especially  
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relevant mechanism to facilitate new conceptions of product, organization and community 
 
identities during a period of market and technological ferment associated with re-emergence.    
Third, research has found that symbolic identity claims help organizations gain or  
maintain membership in specific communities (Albert  & Whetten, 1985), particularly when  
managing strategic change (Fiss  & Zajac, 2006).  For example, Albert and Whetten (1985: 270)  
posit that symbolic identity value claims  require the organization’s “choice and modification of  
symbols, such as logos and sales slogans, product packaging, and the location and appearance of  
the corporate headquarters.”  One could suppose, therefore, that symbolic and material value  
claims by organizations and communities during a period of technological re-emergence would  
be especially important for redefining how consumers and other actors assess the value of their  
products.  Thus, I investigate the following hypotheses:    
Hypotheses 4a-c: Identity change associated with the re-emergence of market demand for  
a legacy technology is facilitated by mechanisms of: a) temporal framing to anchor  
practices and activities in the past, present or future; b) linguistic framing to shape  
preferred meanings through metaphors; and, c) symbolic framing to reshape how value- 
claims are interpreted and evaluated by actors in the field.     
METHODS  
Empirical Setting   
The field of Swiss watchmaking, in the years between 1970 and 2008, provides fertile  
ground to explore the mechanisms of technology re-emergence.  The year 1970 was selected as  
the starting point of this study for three reasons.  First, 1970 marked the year after the first quartz  
timepiece was introduced on the market, providing a baseline to examine how quartz technology  
impacted the field of watchmaking from its inception.  Second, 1970 represents the height of the  
Swiss watchmaking industry’s dominance over world markets (in units sold and value) prior to  
the introduction of quartz technology.  Finally, starting in 1970 will allow me to track over a  
decade of performance data, events, critical decisions, and identity claims that occurred before  
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the Swiss watchmaking industry reached its lowest performing years in the early 1980s after the 
 
introduction of quartz technology.  It is not until 1983 that Swatch introduced its first line of  
quartz watches and, with it, a dramatic shift in watchmaking; thus, this functions as a potentially  
important inflection point in the evolution of the field and affords a window on identity shifts  
that led to its re-emergence.    
The year 2008 was chosen as the ending point of the study because it marked the  
beginning of a global financial system downturn, which many watch industry experts have now  
dubbed a “crisis” that affected previous growth patterns.  Thus, changes in industry performance  
trends and firm activities in response to the 2008 crisis suggest that several exogenous  
macroeconomic factors began to impact the industry in 2009 in ways that extend beyond the  
scope of this study.   
Between 1970 and 2008, I focus on the three distinct periods defined by different  
dominant attributes associated with the product, organizational, and community identities  
associated with the field of Swiss watchmaking.  These periods can be described in terms of the  
extent to which identities were focused on: 1) watches as Precision Craftsmanship (pre-1983); 2)  
watches as Fashion accessories (1983-89); and 3) watches as Luxury items (1990-2008).   The  
three time periods correspond to the analytical narrative outlined in Chapter II: prior to 1983,  
Swiss watchmaking focused primarily on the development of well-crafted and extremely  
accurate timepieces; from 1983 to 1989 watches were re-envisioned as fashion accessories (e.g.,  
Swatch); and from 1990 to 2008 the Swiss repositioned their watches as luxury goods.  I  
developed labels and timelines for each of the three periods (i.e., precision craftsmanship,  
fashion, luxury) based on extensive interviews and archival research.  Although there are no  
formal agreed upon labels or dates to demarcate each of the periods within the industry, I relied  
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on critical events, regional sales and employment data, and industry reports to help create the 
 
labels and their associated dates.  My interviews with watch executives and industry experts  
provided verification and affirmation of these period labels and timeframes.  
Data Sources   
I collected data from multiple sources, following what Creswell (2003) termed a  
concurrent triangulation strategy, whereby multiple methods, data sources, and units of analysis  
are used to evaluate a set of theorized relationships within a single study (e.g., Navis and Glynn,  
2010).   I did this for two reasons: first, to construct a narrative history of the focal period to  
observe the trends and, second, to suggest potential markers for the variables that I use to  
empirically examine my hypotheses.  Below, I describe each of my data sources.    
My primary data source consists of advertisements from the three most prominent watch  
industry trade journals between 1970 and 2008.  My original sample consisted of 845  
advertisements, which I collected from horological archives and libraries located in the United  
States and Switzerland.  I found that 700 were for Swiss watch companies, which make up my  
final sample for this paper.  I examine product, organization, and community identity claims that  
the companies made before, during, and after the introduction of the quartz watch. See Appendix  
IV for illustrative examples of advertisements.  The main data source for the advertisements is  
the Journal Suisse D’Horlogerie (JSH), published in Switzerland for both French and English  
speaking audiences, in both languages.  From its inception in 1876, JSH had been the foremost  
authority for reporting industry trends, field configuring events (Lampel & Meyer, 2008) and  
new innovations related to the watchmaking industry.  The journal’s readership consisted of all  
members of the watchmaking industry, including: watchmakers, watch and jewelry dealers, parts  
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suppliers, consumers, and watch enthusiasts.  I also used the journal to examine industry 
 
announcements, trends, and innovations.  The journal suspended publication in 2000.    
Since no one journal ran the entire length during the period of my study, I relied on two  
additional leading watch journals, Chronos and International Watch (iW) for the remaining years  
of analysis.  Chronos was first published in 1993 and iW began in 1989.  I chose these two  
journals after interviewing numerous industry experts, historians, and company CEOs about  
which journals played a similar role in the watch industry as JSH after its end of publication.   
Also, to ensure the composition of advertisements in my sample remained consistent across all  
three journals, I began my analysis of Chronos and iW in 1996 so that I could verify that no  
significant differences existed among the three journals during the four years they overlapped in  
publication.   
I also collected archival data from online annual reports issued by the Federation of the  
Swiss Watch Industry which provided information regarding sales and broad demographic trends  
for the watch industry.  The Federation, dating back to 1876, is a private, professional, and non- 
profit association, with over 500 members representing more than 90% of all Swiss watch  
manufacturers.  Additionally, I relied on press releases, annual reports, and Swiss Parliamentary  
testimony from the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, the federal agency for matters  
concerning intellectual property in Switzerland.  Founded in 1888, the Institute is responsible for  
the “Swissness Project,” aimed at sustaining the identity of all Swiss products, but especially  
watches.  Finally, I reviewed 27 archival interviews with Swiss watch CEOs from TimeZone, a  
leading industry news source, and was given access to 145 interview transcripts of CEOs who  
experienced the quartz crisis, conducted by the industry’s leading watch reporter.    
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To supplement my archival data, I collected a significant amount of primary data to serve  
as a check on the validity of my archival evidence and to provide additional context for  
understanding the emerging trends in my data.  I conducted 115 informational interviews with  
watch senior executives, distributors, retailers, industry analysts, vintage collectors, historians,  
auction house representatives, and museum curators associated with the watch industry.  I led 4  
focus groups with watchmakers and watch collectors in both Switzerland and the United States  
(n=50 people), visited multiple watch factories, and attended BaselWorld 2012, the industry’s  
largest annual field-configuring event with over 104,000 visitors, 1,815 exhibitors from 45  
countries, and 3,300 journalists.  I also observed a course in watchmaking at the National  
Association of Watch and Clock Collectors’ School of Horology in order to converse more  
fluently with watchmakers in Switzerland.   
Together, these multiple sources allowed me to iterate back and forth between theory and  
data, while continually updating my codebook codes and interview protocol questions (see Table  
3 for Codebook).  The variety of data sources also allowed me to examine how field level  
identity change was influenced, if at all, by processes of coupling and decoupling between  
product, organizational, and community identity during a period of technological change and  
upheaval in the Swiss watch industry.  
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Table 3: Codebook  
Article  Code  Description Examples  
Identifier   ID  Individual identifier for each advertisement in the sample.  Examples from Advertisements  
Product Identity   
  
  
  
Watch  
Technology   
0= Indistinguishable  
1= Mechanical  
2= Quartz   
Mechanical: “Kelek and the professionals. Automatic mechanical diving  
watch intended for professionals.”   
  
Quartz: “The spell of a new concept Hublot, the perfection of Swiss  
technology with an exclusive natural rubber strap. Quartz movement,  
waterproof 5 ATM. 18 K gold.”  
  
Organizational  
Identity  
  
Company  
Heritage   
0= no mention of company founding  
1= mention of company founding   
Founding Year: “Perrelett 1777. Inventor of the Automatic Watch.”  
Community Identity   
  
  
  
  
  
  
“Swissness”  
Identity Claims  
0= Does not make explicit reference to Swiss nature of the  
watch or product.    
1= Makes explicit reference to the Swiss brand, either in  
the text or by prominently displaying “Swiss made” in the  
ad photo or graphic.  May include references to the  
collective identity of the Swiss watchmaking community,  
highlighting what makes them distinctive or unique from  
other global watchmakers.  
  
Swissness: “Elegant masterpieces of contemporary art. Designed and hand- 
crafted to perfection by traditional Swiss goldsmiths and expert Swiss  
watchmakers.”  
Mechanisms  Temporal  
Framing   
Linguistic  
Framing   
Symbolic  
Framing  
-utility/function   
-fashionable  
-status/eliteness   
  
0= None  
1= Attempts to bridge the past (e.g., history, traditions) and  
the future (e.g., what lies ahead, upcoming, forward  
thinking).   
  
0= Does not use a metaphor to describe the watch.  
1= Uses a metaphor to describe the watch.   
  
0= Does not make specific value claim   
1= Makes value claim.   
-  Utility: functionality or use value  
-  Fashionable: makes a fashion statement or is  
associated with a fad.  
-  Status: incorporates an element of ‘scarcity’  
(e.g., high price, entrance into elite social group)  
Past: “Timeless fascination. Collection 1856. From the year of its birth,  
Eterna has followed a simple, unchanging rule: making the finest watches  
imaginable.”  
  
Future: “This is a movement that helps write today a page of tomorrow’s  
horological history.”  
  
Bridges Past   Future: “The past inspiring the future.”  
  
Metaphor: “Chris Evert-Lloyd and her Lady-Datejust. They may be very,  
very tough, but both of them are every inch a lady.”  
Utility/Function: “Ultra-tough. Ultra-Waterproof.”  
  
Fashionable: “Can a Timepiece be a Fashion Piece? Yes”    
  
Status/Eliteness: “Men who guide the destinies of the world wear Rolex  
watches.”   
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Analysis  
 
I analyzed the watch advertisements in the journals over time and categorized them into  
the three identity periods: precision craftsmanship (1970-1982), fashion (1983-1989), and luxury  
(1990-2008).  I manually pulled and hand-scanned every other watch advertisement for every  
even year between 1970 and 2008.  Next, I developed codes to analyze product identity,  
organization identity, and community identity, along with several mechanisms of change.  To  
test H1, on product identity, I coded each watch advertisement by the technology of the featured  
watch (0= indistinguishable, 1= explicit mention of mechanical, 2= explicit mention of quartz).   
To test H2, on organizational identity, I coded each advertisement for company name and  
whether it mentioned company founding, as a measure of the importance it placed on its legacy  
heritage (0=no mention of founding, 1=mention of founding). To test H3, on community  
identity, I analyzed each ad for references to “Swissness” identity claims.  For example, I coded  
ads that made reference to the brand being Swiss either in the text or by prominently displaying  
“Swiss Made” in the ad photo or graphic (0=no reference to Swiss, 1= reference to Swiss).    
Finally, to test H4a-c, I developed codes to examine the mechanisms of identity change,  
i.e., temporal, linguistic, and symbolic framing.  First, to examine the use of temporal framing  
(H4a), I coded each ad for references that attempted to link the past with the future (0= none, 1=  
attempts to bridge the past with the future).  Second, to examine the use of linguistic framing  
(H4b), I coded for the frequency and type of metaphors that described the watch.  Third, to  
evaluate instances of symbolic framing (H4c), I coded for value claims that the ads made about  
the watch (0=no, 1=yes), including: utility or functionality, status or eliteness, and fashionable.   
For example, “utility” claims mentioned or displayed the some from functionality or use value  
associated with the watch, “fashionable” claims mentioned the watch made a fashion statement  
106  
  
 
 
or was associated with a fad, and “status” claims incorporated an element of ‘scarcity’ (e.g., high  
price, entrance into elite social group).  
To conduct the analyses, I developed a database that included all the written text of each  
ad.  I initially collaborated with a management professor familiar with the research project and a  
trained research assistant to conduct a series of pilot coding sessions.  We used 100 ads not  
included in the final sample to assess the validity of the codes and reliability of the codebook.   
We independently assigned codes to approximately 30 ads at a time and then met to compare  
scores, resolve discrepancies, and come to consensus; we repeated this process two more times  
until we achieved roughly 95% consistency, with the remaining 5% due to human error such as  
mistyping the intended code in the spreadsheet.  I then coded the entire sample and hired a  
trained RA to independently code 10% to verify continued consistency. During the coding  
process, both the RA and I had access to a copy of the printed ads and the database with the  
written text from the ad.  I used STATA 12 to conduct analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each  
advertisement feature over the three periods (Precision Craftsmanship: 1970-1982; Fashion:  
1983-1988; Luxury: 1990-2008). For those models that reported significant results, I conducted  
Tukey HSD post hoc analyses to find a posteriori differences among the sample means.   
FINDINGS  
Tests of Hypotheses  
To determine if there was statistical support for the observed patterns found in my  
historical analysis of the re-emergence of the Swiss mechanical watch industry, I formally tested  
the four hypotheses advanced earlier.    
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Product Identity (H1)  
Overall, my findings support hypothesis 1, proposing that product identity redefinition is  
associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology.  The frequency of  
the appearance of mechanical watches in the journal ads followed a U-shaped curve over the  
three historical periods, and a re-emergence during the luxury period.  An analysis of variance  
test (ANOVA) confirmed a significant difference in mechanical watch mentions across the three  
time periods [F(2, 697) = 33.76, p<0.001]; post hoc analyses using the Tukey HSD test indicated  
that the means were significant among all the pair-wise comparisons.  See Table 4 for results,  
thus indicating that each period was distinctive from the others.   
During the period dominated by precision craftsmanship (pre-1983), Swiss companies  
explicitly mentioned mechanical (44%) and quartz (43%) technologies in their ads at roughly  
comparable levels between 1970 and 1982.  The year 1982 represented the peak of the quartz  
crisis for Swiss watchmakers, suggesting that the Swiss were advertising both types of  
technologies as they attempted to respond to the threat from Japanese quartz watches.  However,  
in 1984, a year after the launch of Swatch and the beginning of the fashion period, the Swiss  
almost completely abandoned advertising the mechanical watch; only 8% of all Swiss  
advertisements in the journal were quoted as mechanical compared to 75% quoted as quartz.    
Following this, there seemed to be a re-emergence in ads that explicitly mentioned  
mechanical technology during the 1990s.  The surge paralleled the identity shift toward luxury;  
by 1996 mechanical watches made up 63% of all watch advertisements and by 2006 this  
increased to 78%.  Conversely, during the luxury period, the appearance of quartz watch ads fell  
substantially (averaging only 7% between 1990-2008); in 2006 and 2008 I did not find a single  
Swiss watch advertised as quartz.  For a depiction of these trends, see Figure 11. 
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Table 4: Results of analysis of variance of advertisement features across time periods  
H: 
1 
Construct 
Advertisement Feature 
Product Identity: 
Mechanical Mean 
S.D 
T1:  
Precision  
Craft ship 
(1970-1982)  
n=148 
T2:  
Fashion  
(1984-1988)  
n=68 
T3:  
Luxury  
(1990-2008)  
n=484 
All  
Time  
Periods  
n=700 
T ime Period 
0.44 0.16 0.63 0.55 
0.50 0.37 0.48 0.50 
(% of advertisements depicting feature) 
F-test 
33.76*** 
T1  
vs. 
T2  
T1  
vs.  
T3 
T2  
vs.  
T3 
Post Hoc Analyses 
6.58* 4.58* 11.15* 
2 
3 
4a 
Quartz 
Organizational Identity: 
Year Company Founded 
Community Identity: 
Swissness 
Mechanisms: 
Temporal Frames: 
 Past & Future 
Mean 
S.D 
Mean 
S.D 
Mean 
S.D 
Mean 
S.D 
0.43 
0.50 
0.05 
0.23 
0.27 
0.45 
0.09 
0.29 
0.52 
0.50 
0.21 
0.41 
0.22 
0.42 
0.16 
0.37 
0.07 
0.25 
0.28 
0.45 
0.48 
0.50 
0.31 
0.46 
0.19 
0.39 
0.23 
0.42 
0.41 
0.49 
0.25 
0.43 
95.69*** 
17.82*** 
16.50*** 
15.67*** 
2.91 
4.19* 
1.16 
1.79 
11.76* 
6.31* 
4.90* 
5.64* 
14.67* 
2.13 
6.07* 
3.84* 
4b Linguistic Frames: Metaphors 
Metaphors 
Mean 
S.D 
0.24 
0.43 
0.49 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.44 
0.50 
15.56*** 5.61* 5.86* 0.25 
4c Symbolic Frames:  
Utility Value Claims 
Mean 
S.D 
0.71 
0.46 
0.59 
0.50 
0.64 
0.48 
0.65 
0.48 
1.78 2.87 1.59 1.29 
4c Symbolic Frames:  
Status & Exclusivity Value Claims 
Mean 
S.D 
0.18 
0.38 
0.29 
0.46 
0.57 
0.50 
0.46 
0.50 
43.51*** 2.84 9.37* 6.52* 
4c Symbolic Value Claims:  Mean 0.18 0.49 0.24 0.25 12.65*** 8.19* 1.75 
Fashionable Value Claims S.D 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.43 
*  p  < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001.  
Comparisons of mean ins t anc es  of c odes in  ads  ac ros s  periods .  Analys es bas ed on one-way analy s is of varianc e.  Pos t hoc analy s es based on Tukey HSD tests.  
6.43* 
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Figure 11: Product Identity- Watch Technology Claims  
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Organizational Identity (H2)  
I found support for hypothesis 2, proposing that historical organizational identity  
reclamation is associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology.   
Analysis of variance tests were significant [F(2, 697) = 17.82, p<0.001].  Post hoc analyses  
showed significant differences between time periods 1 and 3 and 2 and 3, highlighting the role of  
heritage as an identity attribute claimed by organizations during the re-emergence of the  
mechanical watch, but not important during the earlier fashion period.  These findings allude to  
the salience of company heritage in re-claiming organizational identity during re-emergence.   
Legacy organizational identity claims were rare during the precision craftsmanship  
period, averaging 5% pre-1983.  Between 1974 and 1978, not a single ad mentioned company  
founding, suggesting that companies had little interest in making claims to their past identity or  
historical heritage while quartz technology was on the rise.  During the fashion period, mentions  
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of founding dates fluctuated between 6% (1982), 29% (1986), and 15% ( 1988), hinting at the  
uncertainty that watch companies confronted in claiming their identity and a potential return to  
their historical roots during technological upheaval.  In the luxury period, Swiss companies  
mentioned their heritage more often; over one-fourth of all ads (28%) mentioned company  
founding in the ads across the period.  See Figure 12 for a graphical depiction of these trends.   
Figure 12: Organizational Identity – Claims of Legacy Heritage  
Ave. References to Company Founding 
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Community Identity (H3)  
Hypothesis 3, positing that changes in community identity that reshape systems of  
meaning are associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology, was  
also supported.  Analysis of variance tests were significant [F(2, 697) = 16.50, p<0.001].  Post  
hoc analyses showed significant differences between time periods 1 and 3 and 2 and 3, signifying  
that Swiss national and community identity played an important role in redefining the  
mechanical watch during the luxury period.    
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Identity claims for “Swissness” during the initial precision craftsmanship period (pre- 
1983) fluctuated significantly: in 1974, only 18% mentioned any connection to Switzerland, but  
by 1982, 40% made mention. The Swiss were at their most vulnerable in the mid-1970s, prior to  
the introduction of Swatch, with its shift toward fashion.  During the fashion period, “Swissness”  
claims oscillated between 10% and 37%, possibly suggesting that mechanical watchmakers  
struggled to determine whether they should associate with a Swiss identity.  However, starting in  
1990, as the field shifted toward luxury, identity claims for Swiss climbed year-by-year, reaching  
a peak of 52% in 2006 and averaging 48% over the period.    
These findings suggest that the watchmaking community in Switzerland only made  
claims for “Swissness” when they were able to align themselves with the broader field level  
identity.  For example, when quartz technology was at its peak during the fashion period, the  
watchmaking community de-coupled product and community claims to a Swiss identity.   
However, as the field shifted toward luxury, watchmakers re-coupled their community identity  
with “Swissness” identity claims. Figure 13 depicts these shifts over time.  
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Figure 13: Community Identity – “Swissness” Claims  
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Mechanisms of Field Identity Change (H4a-c)  
Overall, I found evidence that changes in product, organizational, and community  
identities were associated with the re-emergence of a legacy technology in Swiss watchmaking,  
as predicted in hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.  Next, I tried to uncover the specific mechanisms by  
which such changes occurred, as proposed in hypotheses 4a (temporal references), 4b (linguistic  
frames and metaphors), and 4c (symbolic claims).   
  Temporal Framing: Bridging the Past and Future (H4a).   I found support for  
hypothesis 4a, predicting that the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology  
involves using temporal frames to anchor the past and future; [F(2, 697) = 15.67, p<0.001].  Post  
hoc analyses showed significant differences between time periods 1 and 3 and 2 and 3,  
highlighting the salience of temporal framing in period 3 (luxury) during the re-emergence of the  
mechanical watch.    
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The watch ads made scant reference to bridging the past with the future in the period  
prior to 1983 (9%); in 1976, at the peak of the quartz crisis, not a single ad made a temporal  
reference to the past. Such few mentions suggest that the ads mirrored industry concerns  
regarding the future of mechanical watch technology (e.g., Landes, 1983).  During the fashion  
period, mechanical watch ads increased in their temporal bridging, fluctuating between 8% and  
26%; this highlighted the extent to which watch companies felt continued uncertainty about the  
viability of the mechanical watch market.  However, as the luxury period emerged, companies  
increased their bridging references, averaging almost one-third of all ads (31%) and even  
escalating to 42% in 1996.  My findings suggest that as the mechanical watch re-emerged within  
the context of a new field identity; the industry was able to reclaim its past and more clearly  
articulate how it bridged to the future.  See Figure 14 for a diagram of these patterns.   
Figure 14: Temporal Framing Mechanisms – References that Bridge Past  & Future  
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  Linguistic Framing: Metaphors & Labels (H4b).  My findings suggest that the use of 
 
metaphors was an important mechanism for field level identity change, allowing the mechanical  
watch’s identity to be re-shaped within the context of the broader identity change of the field.  I  
find support for hypothesis 4b, that product, organizational, and community identity change  
involves using metaphors to create desired meanings. Analysis of variance tests were significant  
[F(2, 697) = 15.56, p<0.001]. Post hoc analyses showed significant differences between time  
periods 1 and 2 and 1 and 3, highlighting the importance of metaphors during the initial  
introduction of quartz technology in period 1, and again during the re-introduction of the  
mechanical watch during the luxury period.   
During the precision period (pre-1983), the use of metaphors in Swiss watch ads  
averaged 24%.  Mechanical (29%) and quartz (20%) watch ads used metaphors to nearly the  
same extent in 1976, suggesting that both technologies were attempting to re-define the category.   
During the fashion period, metaphor use averaged 49%.  However, by 1980, mechanical watch  
manufacturers made no use of metaphors, harkening to Powell and Colyvas’ (2008: 294) “reefs  
of dead metaphors” that result when metaphors no longer help actors interpret that which was  
“novel.”    
Finally, when the field identity shifted towards luxury, there was a re-emergence of  
metaphors (50%, 1990-2008).  Metaphors were especially associated with mechanical watches;  
between 1996 and 2000, no less than 57%, of all the mechanical watch ads used metaphors,  
suggesting the potency of this linguistic mechanism in facilitating the mechanical watch’s re- 
emergence.  For example, Frank Muller, a Geneva company, released a series of ads in the 1990s  
with the slogan “Master of Complications,” making reference to their sophisticated mechanical  
watch functions while also alluding to the type of person who might purchase their watch.   
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Conversely, the use of metaphors for quartz watch ads was high in 1984 (75%) after the  
release of Swatch and the beginning of the fashion period. However, as the field moved toward  
luxury, the use of metaphors associated with Swiss quartz ads fluctuated a great deal; in 1994 no  
quartz ads used metaphors, but 75% used them in 1996. These fluctuations allude to the  
challenges faced by Swiss companies who decided to continue to produce quartz watches in the  
1990s while the mechanical watch was re-emerging. See Figure 15.    
Figure 15: Linguistic Framing Mechanisms – Use of Metaphors  
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Symbolic Framing: Use of Value Claims (H4c). I found support for hypothesis 4c, that  
mechanisms of symbolic framing are associated with the re-emergence of market demand for a  
legacy technology.  Analysis of variance tests showed significant differences between the  
periods for claims of status [F(2, 697) = 43.51, p<0.001] and fashion [F(2, 697) = 12.65,  
p<0.001].  Post hoc analysis for status found differences between periods 1 and 3 and 2 and 3;  
and fashionable claims experienced differences between periods 1 and 2 and 2 and 3.  These  
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differences affirm that fashionable value claims were indeed important during period 2 (fashion), 
 
and similarly, that status or elite value claims were salient during period 3 (luxury).  
In the precision craftsmanship period (pre-1983), I found value claims related to the  
utility and functionality of the watch averaged 71%; conversely, claims for status or exclusivity,  
as well as fashion, averaged 18%.  These findings suggest that during this initial period, Swiss  
firms continued to rely on a centuries-old assumption that precision and functionality were the  
qualities that made watches superior and appealing.  During the fashion period, however, average  
claims for utility dropped to 59%, but claims associating watches with both fashion and status  
climbed to 49% and 29%, respectively. The significant increase in fashion value claims during  
this period was likely influenced by the launch of Swatch, whose ads encouraged customers to  
treat their colorful watches as fashion accessories.  Finally, during the luxury period, fashion  
claims subsided to only 24%; alternatively, 57% of all ads made claims for status or exclusivity.   
Interestingly, utility claims continued to remain salient during this period, averaging 64% of all  
the ads during the period.  Such findings suggest that the mechanical watch producers relied on  
both status and utility as value claims in the luxury period.    
Notably, I did not find significant differences across the periods for value claims related  
to utility and functionality.  Swiss watchmakers may have been unwilling to completely  
relinquish the functionality claims that had made them so successful in the past, but rather,  
complemented utility with status.  These dual value claims appear to have allowed the Swiss to  
redefine their competitive set (Porac et al., 1989) within the high-end luxury segment.  Unlike  
the quartz revolution of the 1970s and early 1980s, Swiss watchmakers in the 1990s and 2000s  
appeared more comfortable making claims for utility once they were not competing against  
(more precise and cheaper) quartz watches.  See Figure 16.    
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Figure 16: Symbolic Framing Mechanisms – Use of Value Claims  
Ave. Use of Value Claims 
(1970-2008) 
90% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
%
 o
f 
ad
ve
rt
is
em
en
ts
 
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
 
Average of Utility Average of Status or Exclusivity Average of Fashionable 
  
To summarize, I found support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3; changes in product,  
organizational, and community identities are associated with the re-emergence of market demand  
for a legacy technology.  In addition, temporal framing, linguistic framing, and symbolic framing  
all served as significant mechanisms of identity change.  Interestingly, my post hoc analyses  
revealed that not all the mechanisms or elements of identity were consistently salient within the  
field of Swiss watchmaking across all the time periods between 1970 and 2008.  This is a topic I  
discuss more fully in the following section.   
DISCUSSION  
I began my inquiry with a question: Can market demand for “dying” technologies in a  
mature field re-emerge and re-shape it?  I sought answers in my study of Swiss watchmaking,  
during the period 1970-2008, in an historical analysis of the field and the ways in which product,  
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organizational, and community identity shifted with the introduction of a discontinuous  
technology (quartz watches) and the reclamation of a legacy technology (mechanical watches).   
Using content analysis of watch advertisements appearing in leading industry journals and  
interview data, I found evidence not only for the decline of legacy identities (i.e., Swiss  
mechanical watches) but also their subsequent re-emergence.  I unearth several mechanisms that  
potentially facilitated these changes in the field: temporal bridging, from a past legacy to a  
desired future; linguistic framing, particularly with metaphors; and symbolic framing, with  
respect to value claims.  This evidence suggests an intriguing counter-intuitive: although new or  
discontinuous technologies tend to displace older ones (e.g., Anderson  & Tushman, 1990),  these  
legacy technologies can  re-emerge, co-exist with, and even come to dominate newer  
technologies.  Core to this process seems to be the creation – and re-creation – of product,  
organization, and community identities that resonate with the re-emergence of markets for legacy  
technologies.       
I summarize my key findings in a conceptual framework (Figure 17) depicting the  
relationships between product identity, organizational identity, and community identity. The  
framework focuses on the interaction of each component during periods of field change and re- 
emergence.  My findings suggest that technology re-emergence is related to processes of identity  
“coupling” and “de-coupling.”  These processes highlight the interplay among community,  
organization, and product identities and suggest that substantial economic change may not be   
contained only within organizational or industry boundaries (Davis  & Marquis, 2005), but extend  
outward to include broader forces related to field level change.  Below, I discuss how processes  
of identity coupling and de-coupling are salient to technological re-emergence.   
  
  
119 
 
& 
 
Figure 17: Conceptual Model of Identity Change Associated with the Re-Emergence of a Market for  
a Legacy Technology in a Mature Field  
  
  
Product  
Identity  
Organization  
Identity   
Mechanisms of  
Coupling    
De-coupling  
  
Community   
Identity   
A Mature Field 
Defining community identity as the shared sense of “we-ness” (Snow, 2001) among Swiss  
watchmakers, organizational identity as that which is core, distinctive and enduring about a  
company (Albert  & Whetten, 1985), and product identity as the key attributes, design, and  
architecture (Ulrich, 1995) of the watch, I revealed that all three components were important to  
the field level identity change, but their inter-relationships differed in accord with field shifts –  
coupling, de-coupling, and then re-coupling over time.    
In the case of watchmaking, before the rise of quartz technology, the dominant design of  
the watch was based on precision and the creation of highly intricate mechanical products.   
These design attributes were particularly well-suited for the snow-locked Jura farmers who could  
build watches in the winters without the need to import considerable raw materials from outside  
the region.  They excelled at this and by the early 19th century, particularly within the Jura  
community, began to identify with the highly complicated watches they made, rather than the  
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farms they maintained during the summer.  Over time, the Jura community’s connection to the 
 
mechanical watch led them to develop some of the first standardized tests for accuracy, global  
competitions, regulations, and schools devoted to watch innovation.    
By the early 20th century, the region’s success in the mechanical watch industry led the  
Jura to label itself “the land of precision.” Annual competitions allowed companies to claim they  
were distinct and produced uniquely superior watches; yet, for many decades following World  
War I, the Swiss government imposed a highly effective cartel system that demanded close  
familial-like relationships and cooperative research programs between all organizations involved  
in watchmaking (Uttinger & Papera, 1965).  As one social scientist noted, “More important to  
the development of Swiss skill levels was the cultural organization of the Jura region”  
(Glasmeier, 2000: 99).  During this period, the product identity (of the mechanical watch), the  
organizational identity (of the firms), and the community identity (of the Jura region  
watchmakers) were tightly coupled.    
However, as the field of Swiss watchmaking moved away from precision craftsmanship  
and toward fashion, product, organizational, and community identity decoupled.  Many credit  
SMH CEO, Nicolas Hayek, whose vision restructured (and possibly saved) the entire Swiss  
watchmaking industry (Glasmeier, 2000; Moon, 2004; Taylor, 1993).  Under his leadership,  
novel products like Swatch were launched during this period. An early Swatch ad boasted:   
Swatch.  On one hand it’s very Swiss, Water-resistant, shock-resistant.  With precise  
Swiss quartz technology.  On the other hand, it rocks the boat.  With outrageous colors,  
up-to-the minute styles, and prices under $35.  So why not get two or three?  [Company  
archival document, 1983]  
  
The advertisement offers a clear contrast to the tightly coupled identities that linked the master  
craftsmen and mechanical watches a decade before.  The Swiss watchmaking industry, when  
faced with adapting to a new dominant design, was forced to de-couple product identity (low  
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cost, few parts, quartz), their organizational identity (anchored in a historical tradition of 
 
mechanical watchmaking) and community identity (“land of precision”).      
   Finally, as the field moved toward a focus on luxury, a re-coupling of product,  
organizational, and community identity occurred that allowed the master craftsmen to continue  
to build their works of art.  One industry expert (Pasquier, 2008: 314) noted how the shift  
facilitated a re-coupling of “who we are” and “what we do”:   
Companies began making mechanical watches that they instilled with a large dose of  
emotion as compared to the quartz models, considered merely functional. Mechanical  
timekeepers became objects of luxury consumption and social distinction. In producing  
mechanical watches, watchmaking companies cast themselves in the role of guarantors of  
a centuries-old regional tradition. Several industrial groups active in the luxury sector  
(LVMH, Richemont, Bulgari) were sensitive to this factor.   
  
With this study, I contribute to theory in several ways.  First, I explore the relationship  
among field dynamics, identities, and technological change.  By treating fields and identity as  
dynamic and mutable, I was able to explore their association with technology cycles that affected  
products, organizations, and communities.  Although I identified technological change as an  
impetus for field change, in reality, the relationship is likely more contemporaneous than causal;  
after all, the Swiss were the first to develop the quartz movement.  However, its disruptive  
potential to the extant identity coupling between product, organization, and community tended to  
dampen the Swiss enthusiasm for developing it further.  Thus, it was not technology per se that  
precipitated field change, but rather, what Orlikowski (2000: 407) termed  “technologies-in- 
practice,” i.e., “the sets of rules and resources that are (re)constituted in people’s recurrent  
engagement with the technologies at hand” which function as a ‘‘behavioral and interpretive  
template’’ (Barley, 1988: 49).  Such a view suggests the viability of using a practice lens with  
which to view technology, as well as fields.  
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Second, I extend the theorization of identity to products, organizations, and communities 
 
and embed these within technological cycles of change.  I have already observed the tight  
identity coupling and subsequent re-coupling – between product (mechanical watch),  
organization (firms), and community (Swiss watchmakers) – in watchmaking.  I can speculate  
that the potency of this link may have been reinforced by a number of factors external to the  
industry.  In this case, for instance, “community” connoted both the historical heritage associated  
with skilled industry producers (Jura-based farmers and Geneva-based jewelers) and the  
geographic region in which they lived and worked; as such, they were simultaneously embedded  
in geographic and industry communities which tended to reinforce each other (Marquis &  
Battilana, 2009) and encourage the kind of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009)  
that could redirect the field of watchmaking.  Thus, “who we are” (as a community) and “what  
we do” (as watch producers) were mutually constitutive for Swiss watchmakers and may have  
been a potent force that sought re-coupling in the face of the de-coupling precipitated by  
technological change.    
Finally, I offer an important empirical setting to revisit assumptions about Schumpeter’s  
notion of Creative Destruction and technology cycles.  Certainly, technological shifts can create  
waves of creative destruction, but these are likely bound in time and place and better seen as  
provisional rather than permanent; in Swiss watchmaking, I saw how market demand for legacy  
technologies can re-emerge and allow them to thrive.  Thus, treating field level change as  
tentative and time-bound may allow deeper insights into the mechanisms that propel emergence,  
and even re-emergence.    
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CHAPTER V.  STRATEGIC AND IDENTITY AMBIDEXTERITY IN  
ORGANIZATIONS DURING FIELD RE-EMERGENCE  
ABSTRACT  
This study moves beyond the field as the primary level of analysis and focuses instead on  
the organizations within the field. I conducted a comparative case analysis of eight exemplar  
watchmaking firms to examine how each managed the tension between preservation and change  
during the re-emergence of the Swiss watch industry.  I focus on firms’ management of  
technology uncertainty, instability, embedded competencies, entrenched cultures, routinized  
processes, and especially, their identities.  I find that while successful firms adopted a variety of  
different identity management strategies, they exploited elements associated with their old  
identity (e.g., heritage, craftsmanship) while paradoxically appending new identity elements  
(e.g., status, fashion, luxury) to redefine their identity.  Building on recent work by Tushman and  
colleagues that explores ambidexterity as a dynamic capability, I extend this line of research to  
the processes of managing organizational identity change during periods of environmental  
change.  I introduce the notion of identity ambidexterity, i.e., an organization’s ability to exploit  
past and present identities while simultaneously integrating elements of a new organizational  
identity, by delving into the strategic positioning and re-positioning of firms in the face of  
technology re-emergence.     
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INTRODUCTION  
 
When faced with institutional and technological change, organizations must manage  
multiple components of their identity (Tripsas, 2009; Zilber, 2011), attending to both the   
symbolic and strategic nature of identity, as well as its relevance to internal and external  
audiences.  Organizational identity can focus a firm’s attention, promote action, and drive  
decision making that can promote stability or initiate change (Albert  & Whetten, 1985; Glynn,  
2008).  Conversely, ignoring or overlooking identity can pose a risk to an organization’s survival  
(Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 2013; Petriglieri, 2011), particularly in the wake of  
environmental change.     
In late 1970s, the field of Swiss watchmaking experienced the kind of major upheaval  
(Landes, 1983) that threatened the survival of incumbent firms and prompted significant identity  
ambiguity (Gioia et al., 2000).  Most Swiss watch companies had failed to adopt or accept quartz  
technology (Donze, 2011), a discontinuous innovation (Anderson  & Tushman, 1990) that would  
eventually dismantle 200 years of Swiss watchmaking supremacy.   Additionally, the firms did  
not expect that the Japanese would be able to produce more accurate quartz timepieces at prices  
equal to or far below mechanical watches.  Within seven years of inventing the first quartz  
movement, Swiss watch producers witnessed two-thirds of their industry jobs disappear (Perret,  
2008a) and some of the most venerable companies become insolvent because of their  
unwillingness to mass produce quartz timepieces.    
Surprisingly, however, by 2008 many of the previously endangered Swiss watch  
companies were reporting record profits, led by none other than sales of the mechanical watch.   
This unexpected re-emergence of market demand for a “dying” technology appears to have been  
facilitated by a group of companies that re-defined the core components of their organizational  
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identity, transforming how internal and external audiences defined “who they were” and “what 
 
they did” (Navis  & Glynn, 2011).  Not only did these companies survive the threat of a  
competency-destroying technology (Tushman  & Anderson, 1986), but they redefined the Swiss  
mechanical watch industry.  Thus, in this study I investigate, “How do incumbent organizations  
manage identity and institutional change associated with the re-emergence of a legacy  
technology?”   
In this study, I use multiple organizational cases to analyze the various strategies that  
firms employed during field re-emergence, between 1983 and 2008, shedding light on how they  
managed their identities.  To foreshadow some of my results, I find that successful firms adopted  
a variety of different strategies, but they had one key factor in common: they all exploited  
elements associated with their old identity (e.g., heritage, craftsmanship), while paradoxically  
allowing new identity elements (e.g., fashion, luxury) – that could have been considered a threat  
to the old technological and institutional order – to permeate their organizations.  Thus, I  
advance the notion of identity ambidexterity, i.e., an organization’s ability to exploit past and  
present identities while simultaneously integrating elements into a new organizational identity.    
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature.  First, I build on work by  
Tushman and colleagues (O' Reilly  & Tushman, 2007; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst,  & Tushman,  
2009; Tushman & O’Reilly III, 2006) that explores ambidexterity as a dynamic organizational  
capability and extend this line of research to the processes of managing organizational identity  
change.  The strategies employed by the firms in this study point to identity ambidexterity as a  
dynamic capability that is particularly salient for managing a complex and changing institutional  
environment (Greenwood, Díaz, Li,  & Lorente, 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta,  
 Lounsbury, 2011).    
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Second, I reveal micro-macro linkages (DiMaggio, 1991) between the levels of the  
 
organization and that of the broader field, thereby answering calls for research that explores the  
micro-mechanisms of organizational behavior that drive field-level change (Powell  & Colyvas,  
2008).  Using a rich set of interview and archival data, I explore the specific activities, decisions,  
and responses of firms.  More specifically, I explore the ways in which firms use identity as a  
symbolic and strategic resource that they target for both internal and external audiences, and to  
guide strategic decision making.  I find that identity ambidexterity is an important dynamic  
capability that allows firms to resolve tensions that sit between isomorphic pressures for  
homogeneity at the field level and the heterogeneous response at the organizational level.  
Third, I consider the actions that organizational leaders took to manage the political  
instability and the threatened competencies, cultures, structures, and processes of incumbent  
firms when faced with a competency destroying innovation (Abernathy  & Clark, 1985; Tushman  
& Anderson, 1997: 6).  I also explore the notion of institutional leadership (Raffaelli  & Glynn,  
Forthcoming; Washington et al., 2008) by tracking how these individuals infused values  
(Selznick, 1957) that supported the sustainability of their organizations in the years that followed  
the “quartz crisis” in Switzerland.    
I begin with an overview of the organizational identity literature, focusing on various  
elements that play an important role in managing change.  I then provide a brief overview of the  
literature on ambidexterity, which I believe is useful in explaining how successful firms manage  
conflicting elements of their identity during periods of field-level change and instability.  Using a  
multiple case study method, I analyze how eight Swiss watchmaking firms developed and  
implemented strategies to survive between 1983 and 2008.  These findings contribute to a more  
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general model of identity ambidexterity.  Finally, I discuss the theoretical and practical 
 
implications of my findings and offer suggestions for future research.    
THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY DURING  
PERIODS OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE11  
  
Defining Organizational Identity  
Defining an organization’s identity is critical to survival during periods of institutional  
and technological change (Dacin et al., 2002; Glynn & Abzug, 2002; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008).   
Broadly speaking, organizational identity can be defined in terms of “who we are” and “what we  
do” as an organization (Navis & Glynn, 2011: 479).  In their original formulation, Albert and  
Whetten (1985: 269) defined organizational identity as the answers to the questions of “What  
kind of organization is this?” and “Who are we?”  Although their answer to the first implied that  
identity involved organizational categorization (as a bank and not a school, for instance), Albert  
and Whetten (1985) directed attention instead to the second question and the distinctive  
organizational attributes that constitute the organizational identity, i.e., what is core, distinctive,  
and enduring. They conceptualized core as the “claimed central character” of the organization;  
distinctive as claims to those identity elements that make an organization seem different from  
others; and, enduring as a “degree of sameness or continuity over time” (Albert  & Whetten,  
1985: 265).   
Dimensions of Organizational Identity   
Two dimensions differentiate and organize the theoretical variants of organizational  
identity and are of particular interest in understanding organizational response to the threat of a  
                                                  
11 Portions of this section are adapted from the following working paper: Raffaelli, R., Glynn, M.A.,  & Tushman, M.  
2013. “Are we there yet? Towards the theoretical maturation of organizational identity: considering identity  
ambidexterity and the organizational life cycle.”   
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discontinuous technology: one concerns the primary function of organizational identity, as a  
symbolic meaning-maker or a strategic orientation, and the other, the focal audience for  
organizational identity, as internal (i.e. a set of attributes shared by organizational members) or  
external (i.e., expectations of audiences outside the firm, such as analysts, consumers or the  
public).  Here, I provide a brief overview of both dimensions.   
Function of Organizational Identity: Symbolic Meaning vs. Strategic Resource.    
Conceptualizations of organizational identity differ in their focus on identity as either an  
“attribute-based” configuration of meanings or as a strategic resource, orienting the  
organization’s action in the market (see Glynn, 2008: 416-417 for an overview).  The attribute- 
based view draws on the symbolic function of identity, tapping into the cognitive, institutional,  
and even emotional aspects of an organization’s character.  Focusing on identity as symbolic  
meaning draws primarily from Albert and Whetten (1985), conceptualizing identity as a  
symbolic representation of those attributes essential to the organization, but sometimes varying  
in the relative strength and visibility they place on each element (Corley et al., 2006).  For  
example, scholars have explored the inherent nature of an enduring identity, asking how  
attributes of identities evolve over time (Anteby & Molnár, 2012; Gioia et al., 2000; Meyer et al.,  
2002; Ravasi  & Schultz, 2006).    
Alternatively, the strategic function of identity draws attention to those resources  
(tangible and intangible) that advantage the competitive position of the firm.  As such, identity  
itself can serve as a strategic resource, “being deployed to competitive advantage and functioning  
as a guide to firm-decision making and strategic choice” (Glynn, 2008: 416).  In this case,  
organizational identity is similar to other resources the organization has on hand that can create  
or destroy a firm’s competitive advantages (Fiol, 2001).  For example, Glynn and colleagues  
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have examined how organizational identity serves as a source of legitimacy and resource 
 
allocation for entrepreneurs and new organizational forms (Lounsbury  & Glynn, 2001; Navis    
Glynn, 2011; Wry et al., 2011).  Gioia and colleagues explicate identity as a tool for managing  
strategic change (Gioia  & Thomas, 1996) and new venture creation (Gioia, Price, Hamilton,    
Thomas, 2010).  Therefore, the ‘functional’ dimension of organizational identity can vary in its  
orientation: to give meaning to the organization or to orient strategic action.   
Audience for Organizational Identity: Internal vs. External Orientation  
A common debate among organizational identity scholars has centered on where identity  
resides (Ravasi & Canato, 2010).  Whetten and Mackey (2002: 395) suggest that scholars have  
developed two fundamentally different conceptions: identity in organizations and identity of  
organizations. They argue, “At the heart of these competing conceptions of organizational identity  
is the distinction between identity-as-shared perceptions among members versus identity-as- 
institutionalized claims available to members.”  These claims focus primarily on the ways in  
which internal and external actors access and create meaning about the organization.     
Identity in the organization is most often associated with the core, distinctive, and  
enduring characteristics, as defined by Albert and Whetten (1985).  [See Gioia, Schultz & Corley  
2000 and Corley et al, 2006 for a discussion].  Gioia et al (2013: 13-14) articulate this “internally  
defined” identity orientation and differentiate it from an external orientation, which they claim is  
image:    
Identity theorists usually view outside perceptions as images—which affect identity, but  
are not identity, per se. Recognizing this, some authors (Tripsas, 2009) use the term  
“external identity” to refer to what ecological scholars refer to as “identity” (or code or  
category) and organizational behavior scholars refer to as “image.” Our stance is  
consistent with the original definition of organizational identity as an internally defined  
phenomenon.  
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An organization’s identity consists of a claim (Albert  & Whetten, 1985) to membership 
 
in an institutional field or category that helps to align the organization with others’ expectations  
for what is considered legitimate (Mervis  & Rosch, 1981; Navis  & Glynn, 2011), making it more  
attractive or real (Glynn  & Navis, Forthcoming; Kennedy, 2008).  For example, in the early days  
of satellite radio, Navis and Glynn (2010) highlight how the two competing firms welcomed  
positive reports from external analysts who tended to perceive their identities as similar based on  
their membership in the market category of “satellite radio;” it was only after the “legitimacy  
threshold” for the collective identity of the market category was crossed that firms differentiated  
their identities from each other.  Likewise, Zuckerman (2000) illustrates how firms de-diversified  
their stock portfolios to help analysts order them more easily, thereby avoiding an “illegitimacy  
discount.”      
Taking a perspective oriented more to the external audience, ecologists advance the  
notion of an “identity code,” which serves as a label to help outsiders classify the organization’s  
identity (Hannan, Polos, & Carroll, 2007; McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll,  & Khessina, 2003).   
Identity codes are used as cognitive signposts to help evaluate the firm in comparison to others;  
those who fall outside these boundaries are vulnerable to sanctions if the organization violates  
perceived classificatory norms.  The population ecologist conceptualization (e.g., Pólos, Hannan,  
& Carroll, 2002) “takes an ‘external’ view and casts identity inevitably as socially determined,”  
claiming that “an organization’s identity to be essentially assigned by external observers; identity  
is, therefore, imposed by category (industry) membership and thus overdetermined” (Gioia, et al,  
2013: 50).  Thus, organizations face an inherent tension in claiming a distinctive identity that has  
special meaning for its internal membership and claiming a less distinctive identity that positions  
them as members of categories in a larger classification scheme.  Deephouse (1999: 147) argues  
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that organizations should be “as different as legitimately possible.”  Therefore, the ‘audience’ 
 
dimension of organizational identity encompasses both the meaning claimed internally by  
organizational members and externally by various audiences.    
In sum, the organizational identity literature highlights how several elements of identity,  
including function (symbolic and strategic) and audience orientation (internal and external), are  
important factors organizations must address, particularly when facing disruptive field-level  
change.  One could imagine, for instance, that a firm facing the threat of a new technology may  
need to manage several identity elements simultaneously; while an incumbent’s identity and  
competitive position may be preserved and protected by an old technological order, the firm  
might also need to consider adopting somewhat conflicting identity elements that allow it to  
transform and change.    
Identity, Ambidexterity, and Congruence   
Balancing multiple, and sometimes conflicting, elements of an organization’s identity has  
been an important research topic for organizational identity scholars (Albert  & Whetten, 1985);  
finding congruence across the strategic and symbolic dimensions of identity is also important  
(Deephouse, 1999; Gioia et al., 2013).  Relatedly, Nadler and Tushman (1980: 45) define  
congruence as a measure of “how well pairs of components fit together,” hypothesizing that  
higher degrees of congruence between strategy, structures, and contingencies will lead to greater  
organizational performance (Nadler  & Tushman, 1997).  Whetten and Mackey (2002) posit that  
organizations will aim to develop “an acceptable level of congruence between organizational  
activities and organizational identity claims.” Santos and Eisenhardt (2005: 501) advance the  
notion that organizations continually manage vertical and horizontal identity boundaries that  
determine “how members perceive what is appropriate for the organization…[and] guides  
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decisions regarding the value-chain activities to incorporate or product/market domains to enter.”  
 
Nonetheless, empirical examples of congruence across multiple aspects of an organization’s  
identity are relative sparse (Raffaelli, Glynn, & Tushman, 2013) and do not fully address how  
organizations manage seemingly conflicting elements of identity simultaneously during periods  
of field-level change (for a noteable exception, see Tripsas, 2009).    
Organizational Ambidexterity   
In addition to being aware that the facets of the organization’s identity may in fact be  
congruent, managers may choose to adopt strategies that require dimensions of the  
organization’s identity to remain fundamentally at odds with each other.  For instance, Gioia,  
Schultz and Corley (2000) posit that organizations struggle to align the enduring internal  
perceptions of identity while adapting to conflicting external audience views.  Paradoxically,  
they (2000: 74) argue that organizations may benefit from identity conflict because it allows the  
organization to “better [adapt] to the demands of the environment that is itself going through  
change.”    
Tushman and O’Reilly (O'Reilly  & Tushman, 2011; 2008; Tushman  & O’Reilly, 2006)  
advance a related paradoxical construct, organizational ambidexterity, which they define as an  
organization’s ability to balance the routines, processes, and skills required for exploitation with  
a set of fundamentally different capabilities that are required for exploration.  They (2008: 22)  
locate this dynamic capability within the organization’s existing operations, structure, cultures,  
and mindset of leadership, arguing:   
[Ambidexterity] entails not only separate structural subunits for exploration and  
exploitation but also different competencies, systems, incentives, processes, and cultures  
– each internally aligned.  These separate units are held together by a common strategic  
intent, an overarching set of values, and targets structural linking mechanisms to leverage  
shared assets.  
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Maintaining a balance between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991) is critical to 
 
ambidexterity.  Raisch and Birkinshow posit (2008: 375), “To be ambidextrous, organizations  
have to reconcile internal tensions and conflicting demands in their task environments.”  To date,  
however, most research has focused primarily on resolving “structural” ambidexterity tensions  
(e.g., developing separate units for exploitation and exploration), while little work as focused on  
address ambidexterity’s “contextual” conflicts (e.g., forms of cognitive dissonance that may  
permeate the organization beyond its structure; (Raisch  & Birkinshaw, 2008)).  In this vein, one  
important tension that has yet to be addressed in the management literature is how organizations  
explore and exploit multiple dimensions of their identity.     
In this study, I attempt to bridge theories of organizational identity and ambidexterity.  
My goal is to explore how organizations rely on ambidexterity to manage multiple dimensions  
(identity functions and audience orientation) of their identity during periods of radical  
technological and institutional change (e.g., Romanelli  & Tushman, 1994).   
METHODS  
This study aims to achieve a “theoretical extension” (Snow et al., 2003) that bridges  
literatures related to organizational identity and ambidexterity.  Because the relationship between  
these two constructs is not well understood, I chose to conduct an inductive qualitative study that  
employed multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt  & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1989).  Multiple  
case studies serve to confirm or disconfirm patterns, key factors, and inferences drawn from  
others and are “typically more generalizable and better grounded than those of single-case  
studies” (Graebner  & Eisenhardt, 2004: 367-368).  The Swiss mechanical watch industry from  
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1983 to 2008 offers a unique setting to illustrate how organizations weigh the specific 
 
dimensions of identity over time in a mature industry.12    
I selected 1983 as the starting point for this study because it marked a major transition  
period in Swiss watchmaking after a decade of serious losses that followed the introduction of  
quartz technology in the late 1960s; the period is often referred to in Switzerland as the “Quartz  
Crisis.”  The launch of the Swatch watch in 1983 provided hope and confidence that Swiss  
watchmaking could survive and paved a path for the field’s re-emergence (see Chapter III).  I  
chose 2008 to conclude the study because it marked the 19th consecutive quarter of record  
growth for the Swiss watch industry, led primarily by unprecedented sales for mechanical  
watches.  This 25-year period of field level change and re-emergence provides a rich context to  
study conditions where organizational identity and ambidexterity were salient for organizational  
survival.  
Data Sources   
I used several data sources, including: (1) semi-structured interviews with 25 CEOs and   
16 senior executives, (2) archival interviews with an additional 27 CEOs, conducted by a  
prominent online watch collector’s association, (3) company-specific archival data, such as   
organizational history books (written by company historians, outside collector groups, and watch  
enthusiasts, archival documents), press releases, advertisements, industry certifications, and  
annual reports13; and, (4) participant observation, including attendance at an industry-wide field  
configuring event (Lampel  & Meyer, 2008), and multiple factory tours of watch companies in  
Switzerland.    
                                                  
12 See Chapters II and III for a comprehensive overview and history of the Swiss watch industry.  
13 These data were collected by the author in industry and company museum archives in Switzerland, Germany,  
France, and the United States  
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These data were supplemented by additional sources, including another 81 semi-
 
structured interviews with industry actors (e.g., watchmakers, retailers, government officials,  
trade associations, horological academies, horological societies, company historians, academics,  
collectors, auction house executives, and journalists) about non-company specific trends, as well  
as archival data related to industry production and the macroeconomic factors that influenced the  
field’s re-emergence.  
Data Analysis   
The analytic approach I used can be described as analytic abduction (Peirce, 1955),  
which iterates between empirical data and preexisting theoretical constructs (Weber et al., 2008:  
537).  The process I followed included three separate but interrelated steps.   
Step 1: understanding industry dynamics and key actors.  To begin, I conducted  
interviews to become familiar with the important events, actors, and organizations in the Swiss  
watchmaking industry.  These individuals included industry representatives, government  
officials, museum curators, prominent collectors, historians, and academics.  Concurrently, I  
gathered and reviewed a significant amount of archival data, including every monthly issue of  
the leading industry trade magazines (Journal Suisse D’Horlogerie, Chronos and International  
Watch) that were published between 1966 and 2008.  I also read and catalogued multiple  
historical accounts of the period written by academic historians (e.g., Donze, 2011; Landes,  
1983), regional studies experts (e.g., Glasmeier, 2000), and Swiss watch industry authorities  
(e.g., Blanchard, 2008; Breiding, 2013; Pasquier, 2008; Perret, 2008a, b; Trueb, 2005).  I  
grouped these interview and archival data into chronological time periods to see how perceptions  
of re-emergence, identity, and strategy evolved over time (Gilbert, 2005).  From this review, I  
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compiled a 50-page single-spaced historical narrative about the industry that helped me clarify 
 
the most salient actors, events, and organizations.  
Step 2: selection of sample cases.  Since the primary goal of this study is to understand  
the strategies and identity management behaviors of individual firms, I selected firms that would  
serve as exemplars of the various strategies employed by a larger category of Swiss companies  
after the quartz crisis.  To ensure variance across the sample of firms, I selected cases based on  
two dimensions that most respondents identified were important differentiators of firm-level  
strategy between 1983 and 2008.  As one CEO described, “Many Swiss watch companies  
experienced a ‘marketing and identity revolution’ and an ‘ownership revolution’” [Interview:  
Swiss watch CEO, 2012].  Thus, the first dimension focused on the level of identity change and  
re-framing the firm experienced during the period (i.e., how much the function of identity and the  
audience orientation changed).  The second dimension focused on the level of change in  
ownership structure the firm experienced during the period (i.e., whether it had been acquired by  
another company (=high) or maintained its independence (=low)).    
The two dimensions formed a 2x2 chart that helped me group firms into four different  
categories.  I measured “identity reframing” by examining company advertisements for changes  
in identity claims over the period.  I also compared interview responses from executives and  
employees to my questions about overall firm-level changes and examined the degree of relative  
importance they placed on organizational identity elements.  Next, I measured “changes in  
ownership structure” by reading company annual reports and press releases to determine if the  
firm had been purchased by another company during the period.  Finally, once I selected and  
grouped firms on my 2x2, I validated it with several industry experts and company executives.   
In total, my sample consisted of 8 firms, two in each of the four cells of Figure 18.    
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Figure 18: Case Sampling Dimensions 
 
  
The firms in my sample served as “extreme cases” (Miles  & Huberman, 1994: 28).   
Additionally, all the firms I selected successfully reflected a re-emergence within the broader  
field of Swiss watchmaking during this period.  I did not include unsuccessful cases in the  
sample because there is already a wealth of research related to the challenges firms face when  
presented with radical change in a technological or institutional order (e.g., Benner, 2010;  
Christensen  & Rosenbloom, 1995; Tripsas, 1997; Tushman  & Anderson, 1997).  Here I focused  
on selecting different types of firm-level strategies that were successful and were an important  
part of field-level re-emergence.    
I labeled the four categories: Stalwarts, Rebirths, Adaptors, and Newcomers.  Stalwarts  
experienced relatively little change, and in effect, served as a base case for the rest of the field  
because most firms eventually modeled themselves after the Stalwart’s strategy.  Rebirths  
maintained their old identity as classical mechanical watchmaking firms, but were re-born when  
they were purchased by larger “watch groups,” a type of holding company comprised of multiple  
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watch brands (or other luxury goods) that required them to adopt several group-wide standards,  
common production patterns, or revenue performance targets.  Adaptors experienced the greatest  
amount of change, and made the most significant adjustments to their identity and ownership in  
order to stay in business.  Newcomer firms entered the market during the period of re-emergence  
and were responsible for introducing “rule-breaking” practices that did not conform to the  
identity of traditional Swiss watchmaking.  In this study, the Stalwart firms were Patek Philippe  
and Rolex, the Rebirth firms were Zenith and Blancpain, the Adaptor firms were Tag Heuer and  
Longines, and the Newcomer firms were Swatch and Christophe Claret.  
Step 3: analysis of data. As is typical for multiple case analysis studies (e.g., Graebner,  
2004, 2009), I first analyzed each case separately, searching for key factors that I believed could  
be associated with the identity challenges over the period.  I attempted to triangulate common  
themes and patterns across the multiple data sources (Creswell, 2003).  For each case, I compiled  
my interview notes, historical accounts, advertisements, annual reports, press releases, and  
archival materials collected in company or horological archives into a comprehensive summary  
sheet.  Using NVivo 10, I then coded the data for all instances where identity was mentioned in  
regards to the organization.  In addition, I coded for the actions of important organizational  
leaders (Washington et al., 2008), values (Selznick, 1957), and changes in functional, political,  
and social norms (Scott, 2008) that influenced the taken-for-granted norms and strategies that  
previously existed in each organization.  Beyond these predetermined codes, I allowed other  
codes to emerge from the data so I could explore new relationships and possibilities.  I organized  
these provisional first-order codes into broader emerging themes.  During this step, I evaluated  
which categories came together to form theoretical themes.  I then moved from analyzing  
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specific data to developing more abstract and theoretical concepts.  Finally, I created tables, 
 
timelines and summary sheets that helped me summarize my findings for each case.    
The second stage of analysis involved integrating the findings across the eight cases,  
using cross-case analysis methods suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) to search for replicability and  
differentiation.  The goal of this step was to settle on the theoretical concepts, variables, and  
relationships that advanced a model of identity ambidexterity.  In this stage, I decided on which  
themes from each case, related to other cases, were most germane to a broader conceptual  
framework. Throughout this iterative process, I continually shared my emerging findings with  
respondents in order to seek confirmation and clarification of data and to get reactions to my  
more general models.    
FINDINGS   
As I looked at the data from each firm over time, I found that two types of ambidexterity  
emerged.  The first type, which I label strategic ambidexterity, explained how the firms explored  
and exploited elements related to ownership and structure that allowed them to maintain a  
competitive position in the market.  The second type, which I label identity ambidexterity,  
focused specifically on how firms explored and exploited different elements of their  
organizational identity during the period of re-emergence.  I explain each in more detail below.  
Organizational Responses to Environmental Change  
Management of Strategic Ambidexterity  
After nearly a decade of continuous losses and significant downsizing, by 1983 the fate  
of the remaining Swiss watch companies was highly uncertain (Landes, 1983).  Having struggled  
to adapt to a competency destroying technology (i.e., quartz timepieces), most firms relied on  
their existing know-how in mechanical watchmaking to employ a “racing strategy” – which  
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attempts to “fight off the rise of a new technology by extending the performance of the old  
technology” (Adner & Snow, 2010; Snow, 2008: 1655) – to complete with quartz technology.   
However, some firms also considered exploration strategies.  Several funded R&D projects in  
quartz technology that they believed could help them regain control of the low-end of the market,  
now dominated by cheaper Japanese quartz alternatives.   
Although I found elements of exploration of exploitation to be evident in each firm, they  
posed unique management tensions.  Using a method common in multiple case study analyses to  
illustrate variance across cases (e.g., Graebner, 2004; Graebner  & Eisenhardt, 2004), I created a  
scoring rubric to help distinguish differences in the relative amount of exploration  
(transformation of strategies) and exploitation (preservation of strategies) each firm employed  
between 1983 and 2008.  I based my rankings on the following strategic elements: 1)  
organizational structure and autonomy (for exploitation: if they maintained components of their  
management structure and ownership autonomy; for exploration: if they were purchased by  
another company or increased their reliance on strategic alliances), 2) primary target market (for  
exploitation: if they maintained their primary customer segment [e.g., collectors, luxury buyers,  
sporting, fashion, etc.];  for exploration: if they searched for new primary customer segments);  
and, 3) production processes (for exploitation: if they maintained their existing core watch  
movement production processes and manufacturing facilities; for exploration: if they outsourced  
production and manufacturing).  For each item, I assigned the firm a score of 0= very little,  
1=somewhat, 2=very much, and then summed all three dimensions.  Firms with total score of 0- 
2=low, 3-4=medium, and 5-6=high. I created separate scores for exploration and exploitation  
strategies. See Table 5 for a summary of findings, which I discuss below, by cell.     
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Table 5: Firm Exploitation and Exploration Strategies Associated with the Re-Emergence of the Swiss Watch Industry  
Case   Transformation of Strategy  Level of  Preservation of Strategy   Level of  Illustrative Data 
Exploration  Exploitation  
R
e
b
i
r
t
h
s
 
 
S
t
a
l
w
a
r
t
s
 
 
 
Patek  Continued emphasis on tradition of  Low   Continued to produce mechanical  High  “It has always been the same  
Philippe  mechanical watch craftsmanship.   movements for high the high end of the  brand.  We thought we would  
  Targeted toward knowledgeable watch  market.  Did not attempt to compete with  be making the right decision in  
connoisseurs, collectors, and elites.  quartz technology. Committed to  continuing to invest in the  
Remained family-owned.  Few changes in  preserving the Geneva-based traditions of  traditional mechanical  
organizational values.  craftsmanship.  Invited collectors and  industry.” – interview   
  reporters into the workshops to show how    
the pieces were made.  Hired many of the  
expert watchmakers who had been fired  
from other firms during the crisis.    
  
Rolex & Continued emphasis on status and  Low   Continued to produce mechanical in- High  “Rolex [is] around despite the  
prestige. Targeted toward the masses  house movements for mid-range of the  crisis. They are immensely  
interested in purchasing a Swiss watch.   market. Continued to advertise their  successful yet intensely private  
Remained independently owned.  Few  watches as status symbols.  Never  and closed.  Whatever success  
changes in organizational values.  stopped having movements certified as  Rolex has, it is as a partner  
  accurate COSC chronometers, even when  with their dealers.” –archival  
quartz watches were significantly more  interview (Paige, 1998)  
accurate.  Maintain secrecy and privacy to    
protect their mechanical watchmaking  
techniques and dealer relationships.   
  
Zenith  & Re-introduced brand as luxury product,  
using marketing techniques from LVMH  
group.  Maintain Swiss craftsmanship  
values, but also introduce elements  
associated with luxury.    
  
Blancpain & Use of marketing to create demand for  
high-end watches with a tradition tied to  
the origins of Swiss watchmaking.   
Developed high-end watches associated  
with elite watchmaking tradition.  Gained  
efficiencies from sitting within Swatch  
Group. Maintain values anchored in Swiss  
handmade watchmaking.  
  
Medium  & Re-introduced mechanical movements  Medium   “For a brand like Zenith, with its  
(e.g., El Primero) that had been discarded  history, product was really key.  
during quartz crisis. Supplied movements  We belong to the first luxury  
to other watchmaking companies that had  group in the world, and being  
disbanded some historical mechanical  part of that group means we  
watchmaking techniques. Returned to old  need to be performing.”   
values of hand-made mechanical  (Sandler, 2011) – archival  
watchmaking.  Purchased by LVMH group  interview   
and adopted practices associated with  
luxury brands.   
  
Medium  & Marketing campaign ignored the  Medium  “We constantly have to reflect,  
challenges it faced during the crisis.  New  weigh, and make choices  
campaign exploited that they had only  among traditional and modern  
never made a quartz watch. Re- choices.” – archival materials,   
committed to historical and watchmaking  2001  
techniques from early days of Swiss    
watch industry.  “The Watchmakers Art since  
  1735.” –company archival  
materials, 1985  
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Case   
Longines   
Tag Heuer   
Transformation of Strategy  
Merged with Swatch Group, ending its  
history as a family owned company.  
Repositioned as a status symbol for entry  
to mid-level consumers.  One of the  
largest earning brands within group, re- 
issues many of its classic models. Values  
shift from family-owned to mid-range  
luxury brand.  
  
Acquired by LVMH luxury group.  No  
longer a family owned company.  
Repositioned as a status symbol for entry  
to mid-level consumers.  Re-issues many  
of its classic models as well as creating  
new models. Values shift from family- 
owned to luxury brand.   
  
Level of  
Exploration  
High  
High  
Preservation of Strategy   
Mostly discontinued making in-house  
movements after being purchased by  
Swatch Group.  Used Swatch Group ETA  
movements and positioned itself as a mid- 
range luxury watch brand with a focus on  
“elegance.”  Determined not to compete  
with higher-end brands within group (e.g.,  
Omega).    
  
Mostly discontinued making in-house  
movements after being purchased by  
LVMH.  Used Swatch Group ETA  
movements.  Positioned itself as a mid- 
range luxury watch brand with a focus on  
sporting.  Repositioned the brand as a  
status symbol for active individuals.    
  
Level of  
Exploitation  
Low   
Low  
Illustrative Data 
“The mission is based on price  
segment and the culture of  
each brand – its DNA. For me,  
my mission is very clear. I have  
to be number one in my price  
segment.”                 – interview   
“So we are really in a niche  
and nobody realizes how lucky  
we are, but that s why we re at  
the high end the industry.”   
– interview   
Swatch  
Christophe  
Claret  
Redefined Swiss watchmaking tradition,  
by introducing Swiss quartz low-price  
watch for mass consumption.  Broke rules  
of mechanical watchmaking production by  
introducing automated quartz production  
systems to the region.   
  
Independent watch brand pushed the  
limits of Swiss mechanical watchmaking  
by introducing innovative complications  
and movements for high-end consumers.   
Independent company, although often  
asked to subcontract to other brands that  
do not want to invest the R&D required to  
produce such unique mechanical  
complications. Maintains independent  
values that attempt to break the rules of  
traditional mechanical watchmaking.    
  
High  
High  
Response to Japanese quartz  
movements.  Re-introduced “emotion,”  
fashion and beauty back into the Swiss  
watch industry, but in the form of quartz  
technology.  Helped revolutionize Swiss  
automated manufacturing for quartz  
movements. Success of Swatch provided  
liquidity to Swatch Group and injected  
confidence back into industry.    
  
Benefactor of increased demand for  
mechanical watches. Symbol of  
mechanical watch innovation on the  
periphery of the mainstream Swiss watch  
groups.    
  
Low  
Low  
“Swatch has given us volume,  
the group volume, and has  
proven that can produce Swiss  
matches to compete with the  
Far East.”   
– interview   
“We' re doing the mechanical  
watchmaking of the 21st  
century. But everybody else is  
in the 19th century and  
claiming to be from the 19th  
century.”                   – interview   
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Stalwarts.  Stalwarts continued to exploit many of the same strategies that had made  
them successful prior to the quartz crisis. Both Patek Philippe (a family-owned company) and  
Rolex (managed by a foundation) maintained their independence as privately-held companies.   
They advertised to similar customer segments and did little to transform their watchmaking  
production systems.  Although each occupied a different price segment of the market (e.g., an  
entry level Patek sells for about four times more than an entry level Rolex), they both continued  
to market themselves as status symbols and makers of high quality mechanical watches.  During  
the crisis, each firm was “stubbornly insistent” (Passell, 1995) that it should preserve its tradition  
of mechanical watchmaking, betting that continued demand from higher-end consumers would  
sustain them.  In the long run, the stalwarts they may have even benefitted from the downturn.   
For instance, Patek hired many of the expert watchmakers who had been fired from other  
bankrupt companies.    
Rolex also sustained an exploitation strategy associated mostly with mechanical  
watchmaking.  Ironically, during the crisis, the firm increased the number of watches it sent out  
to be certified as chronometers (one of the highest marks of accuracy in mechanical  
watchmaking), even though a high-end mechanical Rolex was now far less precise than most of  
the very affordable quartz timepieces.  See Appendix III.  They also continued to pursue a  
similar marketing campaign.  For several decades, the hallmark of Rolex’s brand strategy had  
been to position its products as status symbols.  Historically, Rolex invested far more in  
advertising than any other Swiss brand; as early as 1972 its advertising included slogans such as,  
“Men who guide the destinies of the world wear Rolex watches.”  Through the 1990s and 2000s,  
they continued to exploit this strategy, running advertisements with taglines such as, “The  
essence of success” and “The world is yours, from top to bottom.”  They believed their  
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customers would continue to buy their watches for the status value attached to them, making the 
 
brand less susceptible to competition based solely on accuracy or precision.    
Although the stalwarts focused primarily on exploitation, they nonetheless also made  
some attempt at exploration.  For example, Patek decided to break with its centuries-old  
convention of remaining highly secretive about its manufacturing processes and started to allow  
outside groups (and potential new customers) to witness its hand-made production methods.  As  
one senior executive explained, “We were the first ones to open our workshops to press visits. If  
you see inside quality traditional watch making production you have to appreciate it. Because it' s  
human work, it' s real.” [Interview: Swiss watch executive, 2012].  Allowing outsiders to see how  
its watches were made was an atypical strategic decision, especially for a firm that had been so  
careful to protect intellectual property for over 100 years.  But to help sustain sales during the  
quartz crisis, Patek realized it would have to explore new methods to educate potential customers  
to appreciate the craft of mechanical watchmaking associated with Patek watchmaking.    
Together, the two stalwart firms I studied – Patek Philippe and Rolex – represented a  
strategy that ultimately became the model for the entire Swiss industry during the re-emergence  
period.  Mechanical watchmaking moved further into a luxury goods niche—and the Stalwarts’  
focus on both ‘status’ and ‘craftsmanship’ proved to be a successful combination that created  
and sustained demand for high end Swiss mechanical watches.  And relative to the other firms,  
the Stalwarts benefitted from the new emphasis on luxury (in that they already fit the  
environment) and so they stayed the course.  But nonetheless, they just as easily could have  
decided to abandon their traditional watchmaking process and invest all their energy in quartz  
technology.  Instead, they realized the importance of exploiting both elements of status and  
craftsmanship that were already associated with their brand, and found new ways to integrate the  
145 
 
 
 
two (e.g. Patek opened up its workshops to visitors while substantially increasing its advertising 
 
in mainline outlets; Rolex continued to certify its mechanical watches for accuracy but also  
produced ads that focused primarily on status).    
Rebirths.  Rebirths focused mainly on preserving the tradition of Swiss watchmaking by  
exploiting their historical past, but unlike the Stalwarts, did not maintain ownership autonomy.   
Blancpain is perhaps the foremost example of a firm that exploited its past while simultaneously  
exploring opportunities to reach new customer segments.  Jean-Claude Biver, a charismatic  
Swiss watch executive, purchased the struggling company in the 1980s and re-launched it as a  
high-end watchmaker specializing in handmade watches.  His famous advertising slogan read:  
“Since 1735 there has never been a Blancpain quartz watch, and never will be."  Rather than  
admitting that the company had failed to adapt to quartz technology, he attempted to reframe the  
conversation, suggesting the firm’s tie to traditional watchmaking was its value proposition.  The  
strategy worked and Blancpain achieved record sales in the 1990s.  Biver sold the company to  
Swatch Group for over 1,000 times what he initially paid for it.  The former CEO stated:   
We wanted to establish the old name as a reference in the art of traditional watchmaking,  
at a time when the whole Swiss watch industry, luxury segment included, was switching  
to the quartz technology. Entire workshops and tooling for mechanical movements were  
destroyed during these dark years.  Our idea was to save, or more precisely to rescue and  
to redevelop the traditional watchmaking, in dedicating a manufacture entirely to the  
mechanical watch and only to this. [Archival interview: CEO, (Friedberg, 1999)]   
  
Likewise, the Zenith watch company had also fallen on very hard times during the crisis.   
It had been purchased by the Zenith Radio Corporation in 1971 and in 1975 the US- 
headquartered company ordered all mechanical watchmaking to cease and its manufacturing  
tools to be scrapped.  Charles Vermot, a long-time employee defied the order and at nights hid  
the components of the famous “El Primero” chronograph movement within an abandoned  
factory.  He did not tell anyone for risk of being fired.  Nonetheless, he could not imagine seeing  
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the tools and machinery that had defined his entire life’s work being thrown out.  A decade later,  
the company changed hands.  The new owners were interested in producing mechanical watches.   
Assuming they would have to reinvest in rebuilding all the lost machinery and knowledge, they  
were surprised when Vermot resurrected the tools he had saved in the old factory building.  As  
one of the few watchmakers in Switzerland that had access to the old dies and moulds in 1984,  
Zenith started producing its “El Primero” chronographs again and started supplying movements  
to other companies. One executive stated, “It may be fair to say that the El Primero saved Zenith,  
but in a way it' s true because this movement is unique and for a very long time it was the only  
one like it on the market.” [Interview: company executive, 2012]  Thus, by exploiting their past  
achievements and know-how, the Rebirths were able to claim an authentic link to the past of  
mechanical watchmaking, which later proved to be an important value claim for consumers.  
Unlike the Stalwarts, however, the Rebirths gave up ownership autonomy because they were  
purchased by companies that helped them market their products and streamline production costs.    
Adaptors.  Relative to the Stalwarts and Rebirths, Adaptors relied less on exploitation  
strategies but far more on exploration strategies.  Longines and Tag Heuer were both purchased  
by larger watch “groups,” which were composed of multiple watch brands under on larger  
holding company.  The Groups who bought the Adaptors ordered them cease the production of  
movements (i.e., the main component that sits inside the watch) and source the movements from  
other suppliers in order to defray rising costs of manufacturing and R&D.  Some groups owned  
their own movement production factories and directly supplied the movements to their brands  
(e.g., Swatch Group supplied movements to Longines).  The other groups that originated from  
the luxury industry purchased movements from similar sources (e.g., LVMH bought Tag Heuer  
and also sourced its movements from the Swatch Group).  ETA, the mechanical and quartz  
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movement owned by Swatch Group, supplied nearly 80% of all Swiss movements to other 
 
brands in the 1990s and 2000s.  Thus, the exploitation strategy employed by Adaptor firms  
focused primarily on preserving the old history and legacy of the brands through marketing, but  
they no longer manufactured the watch movements themselves and therefore could not claim that  
they were a “complete” manufacturer.  Therefore, it was harder for the survivors to focus their  
marketing on craftsmanship, like the Stalwarts and Rebirths.  Instead, the Groups assigned  
executives familiar with the luxury goods market to help the watch brands market their products  
like other luxury goods, but also made sure to communicate the brand’s old history.     
Seizing on their past successes and heritage, both of the Adaptors re-issued several of  
their most popular models from before the quartz crisis.  As one former CEO stated, “So we are  
really in a niche and nobody realizes how lucky we are, but that' s why we' re at the high end of  
the industry” [interview with former CEO, April 2012].  Another noted the challenge of  
exploiting the norms of traditional watchmaking while adhering to the demands of being a part  
of the luxury group.  “An important element during this period is that ‘groups’ started coming in  
from luxury to buy watch brands.  You had companies from perfumes, from the bags and  
luggage industry that expected different things” [Interview: former CEO, 2012].  In short, the  
Adaptors exploited their past heritage, but were forced to explore novel production and  
marketing strategies.  
  Newcomers. The final category, Newcomers, focused primarily on exploration strategies,  
setting out to explicitly break the rules of traditional Swiss mechanical watchmaking.  Swatch, a  
low cost quartz alternative to Japanese quartz timepieces, was launched in 1983 with great  
fanfare.  According to one of the inventors of the Swatch watch, “The main [goal] of this watch  
was to prove it was possible to produce watches in Switzerland without our old technology.  We  
148 
 
 
 
had to become more industrial. We had to adopt the electronic system. We needed a presence in  
the low segment of the market” [Interview: former Swatch engineer, 2012].  The colorful watch  
designs placed an emphasis on beauty, emotion, and fantasy (Moon, 2004), positioning it as a  
fashion product rather than simply as a cheap but accurate timepiece like its Japanese competitor.   
Nicolas Hayek, founder of the Swatch Group, and Ernst Thomke, who oversaw the development  
of the Swatch, believed that its success would allow them to resurrect many of the mechanical  
watch brands in the Group by exploring more efficient and automated production systems.  As  
one former brand CEO within the Swatch Group stated: “Swatch gave back to the Swiss the base  
of the industry. It gave back [production] numbers. It enabled us to rebuild an industry, because  
an industry can only be built on numbers. If you produce 1 million watches, now you can build  
an industry” [interview with former CEO, March 2012].  
  An unlikely group of newcomers also emerged on the Swiss watchmaking scene during  
the 1990s and 2000s.  Unlike the quartz-driven Swatch watch, these firms aimed to break the  
rules of mechanical watchmaking.  Due to the successful growth in demand for mechanical  
watches in the 1990s, Christophe Claret founded an independent watchmaking company with the  
goal of crafting mechanical watches that “united the full range of professions linked to the  
design, development, and production of movements” [Company archival document, 2009].  His  
techniques were so innovative that he had to architect new production machinery in order to  
manufacture his designs.  The company’s novel techniques represented a group of independent  
mechanical watchmakers that bourgeoned in Switzerland at the turn of the millennium.  Because  
they invested heavily in R&D, they often served as subcontractors to the major watch brands.  As  
one executive explained, “We' re doing the mechanical watchmaking of the 21st century.  
Everybody else is in the 19th century and claiming to be from the 19th century.” [Interview:  
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company executive, 2012].  These firms purposefully chose to maintain their independence, 
 
allowing them to freely explore new methods of mechanical watchmaking; their innovative  
techniques were responsible for introducing some of the most influential mechanical  
watchmaking changes to the industry throughout the 2000s.    
In sum, I find that all firms engaged in some form of exploration and exploitation during  
this period of field-level environmental change and re-emergence.  What differentiated them was  
the degree to which they emphasized each of these strategies. This finding is consistent with  
earlier work demonstrating that ambidexterity is an important dynamic capability required for  
firm survival and performance (O’Reilly  & Tushman, 2008); however, my study extends this  
line of research to periods of re-emergence. Thus, ambidextrous strategies of balancing  
exploration against exploitation seem to enable organizational performance throughout the  
technology life cycle.  Drawing from my empirical findings, I propose that:     
Proposition 1: During periods of field re-emergence, successful organizations will  
engage in strategic ambidexterity, linking the past to the future, by exploiting competitive  
advantages associated with their past successes and conjoining these to explore new  
competitive positions that they believe will be advantageous to their future success.  
  
Management of Organizational Identity   
My initial analysis highlighted that many of the strategic exploitation and exploration  
decisions the firms made also had significant implications for how they managed their identities  
(e.g., Glynn, 2000), and, in particular, the often conflicting internal and external views of “who  
they were” and “what they did” (Navis  & Glynn, 2011).  This insight led me to go back to my  
data and further explore the relationship between organizational identity and ambidexterity.   
More specifically, I focused on how firms explored and exploited various elements of their  
organizational identity during this period of institutional and technological change.      
150 
 
 
 
Function of OID: Strategic and Symbolic  
All firms had to manage both the strategic and symbolic elements of their identity.  The  
symbolic elements provided meaning (Glynn, 2000; Glynn & Abzug, 2002), and were focused  
largely on answering the question of “who we are,” while the strategic elements linked identities  
to firm resources and sources of competitive advantage (e.g, Fiol, 2001; Glynn, 2008; Lounsbury  
& Glynn, 2001).  I found that the firms in my sample managed both the strategic and symbolic  
elements; however, not all identity elements consistently aligned with their re-emergence  
strategy.  Here I report how these tensions in organizational identity were managed, creating  
opportunities and challenges for organizational leaders and managers. See Table 6 for a summary  
of findings.  
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Table 6: Organizational Identity Management Associated with Re-Emergence of the Swiss Watch Industry: Strategic  & Symbolic Identity  
Elements  
Case    Management of Symbolic OID elements  Management of Strategic OID elements  Illustrative Data 
Identity as a resource to attract individuals who   “We were starting to unveil what is behind  
want a distinctive Swiss made watch.  Their  traditional mechanical watch of quality.  And  
identity largely defines the broader market  a lot of communication work was done to  
S
t
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w
a
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s
 
Patek Philippe  
Rolex  
Identity as a symbolic representation of  
craftsmanship and elite status.    
category of Swiss watchmaking for most  
consumers.  Watches seen as luxury and status  
objects that represent mechanical craft and  
explain what is watch manufacture, what is  
mechanical movement.”               – interview  
  
precision.      
  
“The key message was that Zenith, with the  
El Primero, was the inventor of the high  
frequency self-winding chronograph. This  
Identity as a resource to preserve Swiss  means everything. It means knowledge. It  
s
 mechanical watchmaking, but repackaged as a  means creativity. It means manufacture. It  
R
e
b
i
r
t
h Zenith   
Blancpain  
Identity as a symbolic representation of Swiss  
watch history and tradition.   
scarce luxury good that should be valued like any  
other highly valued art form or type of skilled  
means collections with a future.” – archival  
interview (Sandler, 2011)  
craftsmanship.       
  “A mechanical watch inherits a know-how, a  
tradition, and a culture that will never die.”   
– company archival document (2001)  
  
A
d
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Longines   
Tag Heuer  
  
Identity as a symbolic representation of  
competitiveness, high-activity and survival.   
Identity as a resource to attract active individuals  
who seek a status-oriented Swiss watch brand at  
an affordable price.  Rely on a tradition of timing  
elite sporting events (e.g., Formula 1 racing, golf,  
tennis) to support these claims.    
“’Success. It’s a mind game.’ What happens  
in an athlete’s mind before performing?  
Images of men and women at the limits of  
their physical prowess are incredibly  
powerful.  They make it possible to  
understand what happens in a champion’s  
head.  And in the head’s of TAG Heuer’s  
directors!”    
–company archival document (1997).  
  
“The Swiss Watch industry was not saved  
by mechanical watches. It was saved by  
quartz watches:  The Swatch. We told  
people that the watch is the joy of life, that  
N
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Swatch  
Christophe  
Claret  
Identity as a symbolic representation of innovation  
and rule-breaking.   
Identity as a resource to attract consumers who  
want to make a statement about their creative  
side by wearing a watch that does not conform to  
typical standards of Swiss watchmaking.   
the watch can have multi-colors, that you  
can even wear two or three watches on the  
same wrist.” – interview, 2012  
  
“Many people buy expensive watches as a  
status symbol or an investment to show off  
they have money.  And then there are some  
genuine lovers of fine mechanicals. And  
that's what we re here for.             – interview  
152 
 
 
 
Stalwarts. The Stalwarts relied on organizational identity to reaffirm that mechanical 
 
watches were a form of craftsmanship but also to associate them with high-quality luxury goods,  
which were now in vogue.   For example, beginning in 1886 many of the most prestigious and  
skilled companies based in Geneva stamped their watches with the “Geneva Seal” when they  
passed specific craftsmanship and accuracy standards.  The seal helped the Geneva-based firms  
like Patek differentiate themselves from the “inferior” firms that were emerging in Swiss Jura  
mountains, as well as the quartz watchmakers.  However, when Patek started producing many of  
its watches outside the Geneva region it could no longer use the mark. In response, it created its  
own “Patek Philippe Seal,” which aimed to preserve the symbolic identity associated with a  
centuries-old tradition of Geneva watchmaking and had always been a mark of high-end (“haute  
horlogerie”) luxury watch craftsmanship for the firm.  An archival marketing brochure stated:  
“[The Patek Philippe Seal] is a symbol of a world in which the exceptional becomes the rule.”  
Symbolic identity claims like these had particular strategic importance for the Stalwarts because  
they communicated a form of exclusivity and status to consumers that justified their higher  
prices.    
  Rebirths.  The Rebirths relied heavily on several symbolic elements of identity to convey  
new meanings associated with mechanical technology.  Prior to the quartz crisis, their identity  
was tied to their ability to design and build some of the most accurate timepieces in the world.   
However, after the introduction of quartz technology, their know-how and organizational skills  
were largely obsolete, as the quartz watches were superior in accuracy (Tushman  & Anderson,  
1997).  Thus, during the re-emergence period, they used symbolic identity claims associated with  
craftsmanship and artistry, as well as new definitions of innovation, to redefine themselves:  they  
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claimed identities that were both traditional and modern.  This underlying tension between old 
 
traditions and new innovations is illustrated in the following two quotes from the same CEO:   
We wanted to be out of the trends and in the center of the trend. This is why we never  
had a conventional factory, but an old farmhouse converted into workshops instead.  
[Interview: former CEO, 2012].   
  
There is no contradiction in using the words tradition and innovation together to describe  
us.  Both are woven together to form the fabric of our philosophy. The watchmaking  
complications that so delight connoisseurs are, themselves, innovations from the past.”  
[Company archival document, 2005]  
  
In this case, the CEO renovated an old farmhouse to symbolize how the firm’s identity claim of  
“who we are” was linked to a longer history of Swiss farming (farmers were some of the first  
people to take up the craft of watchmaking in the Swiss Jura region).  The CEO redefines “what  
we do” by focusing on their creation of “delightful” mechanisms, rather than relying solely on  
the old identity that focused on making accurate watches.  In effect, the CEO redefines the  
organization’s identity to selectively dis-associate its identity with past failure to adapt to quartz  
technology but, instead, to associate it with a more distant and successful past, that of the  
industrious Jura farmers.  Such symbolic identity claims also communicated values that aligned  
with a new strategic identity focused on tradition and craftsmanship, but also purposefully  
ignored the fact that mechanical watches could never be as precise as quartz timekeepers.    
Adaptors.  Adaptors had to manage the most significant changes in both symbolic and  
strategic identity elements.  Like the Rebirths, they needed to change their identity to convey the  
new attributes that would be essential to the organization’s survival as a luxury goods specialty  
product.  This was particularly challenging since the Adaptors I studied were bought by larger  
“groups” that outsourced most watch movement production to other companies, thus making  
them more similar to their competitors.  Changes in the watch technology production seemed to  
also precipitate organizational identity changes (Tripsas, 2009).  According to one company  
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archival document, the fact that the company no longer made its own watches had a major 
 
impact on the company’s identity:   
Everything to do with manufacturing disappeared. In addition, the office where the work  
was prepared, the mechno-technical office and the technical director’s office all  
disappeared.  The senior management then had to find an answer to the difficult problem  
of replacing staff, a task that was particularly hard in view of the fact that the company’s  
philosophy until then had been based on long service and paternalism.  [Company  
archival document: (Marti, 2007: 311)]  
  
Nonetheless, while the Adaptors were closing their watchmaking movement factories, they were  
increasing their marketing budgets so they could make strategic claims to attract high-end  
consumers, enticing them with the possibility of owning a Swiss mechanical watch from a  
company that had a longstanding and proud heritage.  Two of the companies’ archival  
documents illustrate how firms managed this tension:   
Regarding its products, Longines’ position in the top-range of the market contributed to  
the fact that the emphasis is no longer on regularly renewing its models and technology.   
Maintaining a certain stability in the general conception, which ensures the brand’s  
identity in the long term, is the company’s main preoccupation, while movements and  
components are designed to be produced in large series.  [Company archival document,   
(Marti, 2007: 321)]  
  
The same resources given to technology and design were dedicated to Tag Heuer’s  
communications. In 1995, 90 million dollars were devoted to marketing, of which 15  
million covered sponsoring. Heuer was the first trademark in the world to sponsor a race  
car driver.  [Company archival document, 1997).   
  
Adaptors recognized that their identity was tied to a history that was no longer as valued as it had  
been; moreover, because they were no longer making watch movements in-house, identity  
challenges surfaced that threatened their craftsmanship identity.   As a result, the identity tied to  
history became even over more important as a strategic resource for marketing and selling  
watches.  
  Newcomers.  The Newcomers had to balance a separate set of identity tensions.  Their  
identity was tied to being innovators, breaking with the traditional Swiss watchmakers, but they  
155 
 
 
 
also relied on relationships with these same established firms for resources and revenues.  For 
 
example, Swatch developed separate manufacturing facilities to produce its initial quartz  
movements, but the “Group” eventually used the technology to produce movements for other  
brands not in the Group (i.e., Longines).  Thus, while Swatch differentiated itself from the rest of  
the field by emphasizing its identity as a fashion accessory, it nonetheless was fully integrated  
with the rest of the larger Swatch Group; this allowed for the exchange of innovative new  
techniques between brands.  Alternatively, at Christophe Claret, their identity was associated  
with being an independent mechanical watchmaking manufacturer, but also associated with  
serving as “backstage craftsmen” who subcontracted with brands to produce sophisticated  
movements which accounted for a significant portion of their revenues.  An archival document  
explained the potential identity tension for the “independent” company:   
Each of our clients comes with its own heritage, namely brand history, with existing  
collections, as well as specific needs and specifications. Merely inventing a highly  
complicated calibre is not enough to meet demand; the movement must also be consistent  
with the existing collection and the with the overall brand universe.” [Claret company  
book: (2009: 22-24)]  
  
Christophe Claret managed this identity tension by structural partitioning, i.e., creating two  
separate subunits within the organization: one devoted to producing movements for other  
companies and one for producing movements for the Claret brand itself.  However, to assuage  
possible identity tensions, the CEO created many opportunities for overlap and cross-pollination  
between these two subunits.  Each year, for example, he sponsored an annual innovation contest  
for all employees to develop a mechanical watch complication that encouraged the types of  
innovations the founder wanted to pursue in the coming year.    
Thus, across all eight organizations – Stalwarts, Rebirths, Adaptors, Newcomers – I  
found that leaders had to manage multiple components of the firm’s core identity attributes (i.e.,  
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symbolic identity element), while also drawing attention to elements that allowed their firm to  
acquire resources needed to survive (i.e., strategic identity element).  In several cases, these  
elements were not always aligned, but nonetheless the different elements were necessary for firm  
survival and needed to be managed.  Drawing from my findings, I propose that:    
Proposition 2: During periods of field re-emergence, successful organizations will  
engage in identity ambidexterity, linking the past to the future, in symbolic and strategic  
identity elements by: exploiting attractive elements from their past and conjoining these  
to explore new identity elements that they believe will be meaningful and strategic to  
their future success.     
  
Audience Orientation in Organization Identity Management: External and Internal  
In addition to managing symbolic and strategic elements of organizational identity, each  
organization also highlighted the salience of managing the firm’s internal and external audiences.  
Internal identity was located within the firm, especially among its employees, and associated  
with what they perceived or claimed to be the shared core, distinctive, and enduring  
characteristics of the firm (Albert  & Whetten, 1985).  External identity was that perceived or  
granted by various outsider stakeholders, such as consumers, analysts, professionals, regulators  
or other groups that located or sorted organizations into categories of classifications (e.g., in- 
house manufacturers of watches, assemblers of watches who bought their movements from  
another source, fashion brands).  Although the identities claimed internally by firm members  
were sometimes congruent with those granted externally by outside audiences, at times they were  
not; such incongruences created identity challenges for the firms.  See Table 7 for summary of  
findings.  
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Table 7: Organizational Identity Management Associated with Re-Emergence of the Swiss Watch Industry: Internal  & External Audience  
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Case   Management of Internal Audiences  
for Organizational Identity  
Management of External Audiences  
for Organizational Identity  
Illustrative Data 
“In the watch industry, everybody watches  
Patek Philippe  
Rolex  
Internal identity associated with independence  
and privacy.   
External identity particularly  influenced by vintage  
collector community, watch expert community,  
Swiss watchmaking community, and luxury goods  
community  
Patek.”  – interview   
  
“Rolex has no interest in what any other  
watch company is doing.”  – archival  
interview (Paige, 1998)  
  
Internal identity associated with the employee’s  External identity particularly influenced by the  Zenith   role in preserving Swiss traditions of  Swiss watchmaking community and luxury goods  Blancpain  watchmaking.   community.   
“I really want to push Zenith in the direction  
where we become a company for a buyer  
who knows. Who knows watches.” – archival  
interview (Sandler, 2011).   
  
“Someone who buys a Blancpain is both  
simple and cultivated.”  – company archival  
document (2001)  
  
“I tell my watchmakers that every time you  
tighten a screw, put your whole heart into it.  
Make it a gesture of love every time. Think  
about the person who will wear this watch;  
that’s the person you’re doing this all for!”   
– company archival document (2001)  
  
“Maximum rationalization of production  
methods has resulted in the company’s not  
being involved in the production of its own  
Longines   
Tag Heuer   
Internal identity associated with adaptability and  
continued competitiveness.    
External identity particularly influenced by elite  
sporting community and luxury goods community.  
watches for some time now, which leaves it  
free to concentrate on its sales activities [as  
a luxury good] and in developing a large  
after-sales service network.” –company  
archival document (Marti, 2007: 321)  
  
“Everyone thought we were crazy.  A plastic  
watch – a plastic shit, a watch which you  
Swatch  
Christophe  
Claret  
Internal identity associated with rule breaking,  
pushing the limits of typical standards, and the  
infusion of emotion and creativity into the  
watchmaking process.  
External identity particularly influenced by  
collector community, style and high fashion  
community, luxury goods community.  
cannot repair. Are you crazy?  [But we  
believed] fashion would be our target, not  
low cost. "– interview   
  
“Christophe Claret views his work as a  
pioneer unfettered by any creative limits.  
‘You have to blaze certain trails.’” –company  
archival document   
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Stalwarts.  The Stalwarts seldom released any information to external audiences about  
internal operations or performance.  In fact, they purposefully remained somewhat elusive and  
secretive about internal matters, which appeared to foster even greater intrigue and mystique for  
their brands.  Because they were the most profitable and venerable Swiss watch companies, they  
were less concerned about defining themselves as Swiss watchmakers, but were quite disciplined  
about communicating an identity that made very specific claims about who they were.    
For instance, with respect to their identities, Stalwarts were especially sensitive to  
perceptions from the collector and watch expert communities.  These communities were highly  
knowledgeable and involved with promoting the brand; many individuals from these  
communities wrote unauthorized books on the companies.  As well, the collectors were quite  
influential in communicating their view of the companies.  In fact, auction prices for Stalwarts’  
vintage watches were some of the first to sell at record prices.  The brands took notice of the  
auction behavior and realized there was still demand for high-end mechanical watches, even in  
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This attention also attracted individuals with new money who  
were looking for status-oriented symbols and saw high-end watches as potential investments that  
also appealed to their luxury sensibilities.    
Patek found ways to communicate their identity to potential customers by creating  
opportunities and events aimed at educating past and future customers about the company  
philosophy and the watchmaking tradition.  These events served as ways to share some elements  
of the firm’s identity with external audiences.  For example, one executive reported:   
I mean, new rich people are working in a world that is not always concrete, something  
that' s not material. But when [the new rich] discover us, when they learn about this very  
technical-mechanical world, they catch interest and buy our watches.   [Interview: senior  
executive, 2012]  
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Additionally, the organizations’ projected identity to external audiences also attracted  
potential watchmakers and executives who hoped to work for one of the firms.  A former  
executive who worked at numerous Swiss watch brands noted that employees envied the identity  
of the Stalwarts:   
Rolex has its own market. Rolex is unique. Everybody wants to work for Rolex.  You get  
to the top when you get to Rolex. You' ll get to the top in all sense of the word. You get  
better pay, you get more respect, you get the image of being a Rolex guy.  It was really  
something you wanted.  It is a bit different for Patek. Patek is a totally family-owned  
business. Patek is even more exclusive. This is the ultimate dream when you are in the  
watch industry.  [Interview: Former watch executive and industry representative, 2012]  
  
Rebirths.  The Rebirths had a different identity challenge, that of managing multiple  
audiences.  Since they still manufactured their own movements, internally it was important to  
convey an identity linked to the brand’s heritage of traditional Swiss watchmaking.  Externally,  
they made identity claims that communicated the company’s watchmaking heritage, but also  
hinted that its handmade watches were to be considered forms of beauty and technical artistry.  
Compare how a former CEO conveyed the same message about the firm’s identity to internal  
audiences (e.g., employees) and external audiences (e.g., customers).  To employees he wrote:   
“We constantly have to reflect, weigh, and make choices among traditional and modern  
choices.” [Company archival document: 2001]  
  
To potential customers he explained:   
  
“A machine can transfer excellence. A machine can transfer accuracy. A machine can  
transfer quality. A machine can transfer reliability. But the only thing a machine cannot  
do is ‘soul’, and human beings are the only ones that can give birth to soul so we are  
going to create watches with a soul.” [Interview: former CEO, 2012].  
  
Adaptors.  Adaptors had significant identity hurdles to overcome when managing  
multiple audiences.  When their factories shut down, they had to reframe the company’s external  
identity as a luxury goods product sold in the high end of the market.  External audiences needed  
to be reminded of the brands’ past history, but not their most recent struggles during the quartz  
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crisis.  To accomplish this goal, Adaptors focused on communicating how their brand was linked 
 
to other activities, such as sporting events and celebrity endorsements.  The firms hired many  
new sales and marketing executives to promote the brands.  Since many of the employees who  
had worked as watchmakers had been fired during the crisis, much of the organizational history  
had also been lost.  Thus, extensive efforts were put in place to build company museums and to  
hire company historians who wrote commemorative books that retold company histories.  These  
efforts also aimed to reinforce central, distinctive, and enduring identity attributes to new  
employees, many of whom had joined the company from the luxury industry rather than from  
traditional Swiss watchmaking.   
Newcomers.  Newcomers needed to espouse quite different identity claims to both  
internal and external audiences.  For example, at the beginning of the Swatch development  
project, the lead executive communicated attributes that he hoped would represent the team’s  
nascent identity:  “Forget all that has been done up until now, but retain a sense of the classical”  
[Archival document: Auction house auction catalogue, (Carrera, 1991: 15)].  One member of the  
original Swatch development noted:     
We had fights with all the internal people. And they considered the project absolute  
nonsense.  All the [early] marketing research gave us nonsense for an answer. All the  
marketing research was negative. [Interview: Swatch engineer, 2012]  
  
The organization’s identity as a rule-breaker and insignificant player (i.e., “nonsense”  
became less so when Swatch became a profitable world-wide fashion sensation.  But those early  
days helped define the core attributes.  Due to the success of the Swatch, Hayek, the CEO who  
oversaw the entire holding group, decided to rename it “The Swatch Group.”  Ironically, almost  
all the other brands in the group were mechanical, but the Swatch’s identity signified external  
identity elements he hoped would extend beyond the technology itself.  The move was further  
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supported by the fact that even high-end watch collectors started purchasing the $35 watches.  As 
 
reported in an auction brochure:   
The Swatch has managed to enthuse [sic] a clientele by tradition attracted almost  
exclusively to the prestigious brands.  Such catch phrases as “Men who preside over the  
world’s destiny wear a [Rolex]” certainty still apply, but the extraordinary fact is that  
they wear Swatches, too!  [Archival document: Auction house auction catalogue,  
(Carrera, 1991: 15)]  
  
In sum, managing the organizational identity for those inside the firm proved to be just as  
important as understanding how identity was perceived by actors outside the organization.  
Internal actors (i.e., organizational members) needed to understand and appreciate the core  
attributes that defined who they were after the quartz crisis.  Simultaneously, external actors  
(e.g., consumers, collectors, analysts, etc.) had to reconceptualize how to categorize and evaluate  
Swiss watchmaking under a new set of criteria once the brands had become more closely aligned  
with the luxury goods industry.  These findings suggest:  
Proposition 3: During periods of field re-emergence, successful organizations will  
engage in identity ambidexterity, linking the past to the future, with both internal and  
external audiences by:  exploiting attractive identity elements from the past and  
conjoining these to explore new identity elements that they believe will appeal to relevant  
audiences.  
  
Towards a Theory of Identity Ambidexterity in Response to Environmental Change   
  To conclude, I advance a model of identity ambidexterity that summarizes my findings  
across the eight cases and aims to provide a more generalized model.  It bridges the relationship  
between identity management and organizational ambidexterity during periods of environmental  
change.  See Figure 19.  
The horizontal box in the model represents the fundamental strategic tension between  
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991).  Scholars have argued that organizations must be  
capable of managing both concepts simultaneously in order to survive and thrive (Gibson    
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Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman  & O’Reilly III, 2006; Zi-Lin  & Poh-Kam, 2004).  During a period 
 
of re-emergence, I found that firms attempt to preserve elements of their existing strategies  
which were anchored in the new old technological and institutional order, as well as their own  
histories.  However, firms also needed to adopt new strategies that transformed the organization  
and allowed it to adapt to the new order.   The ability to manage both of these somewhat  
conflicting behaviors is what scholars have referred to as ‘ambidexterity’ (O’Reilly  & Tushman,  
2008).   
  The vertical box in the model represents the organizational identity management  
challenges that emerged when firms attempted to adopt exploitation and exploration strategies.   
As strategies, practices, and behaviors were re-evaluated and changed, so too did fundamental  
questions about the organization’s identity, including “who we are” and “what we do” (Navis    
Glynn, 2011).  I observe that firms managed organizational identity by focusing on multiple  
elements of its elements, functions, and audiences.  The management of the functional aspects of  
identity was related to the key attributes that defined the organization (e.g., symbolic elements of  
identity), as well as its ability to attract resources that differentiated the organization from  
competitors (e.g., strategic elements of identity).  Concurrently, organizations also managed how  
symbolic and strategic elements of their identity were perceived by different audiences, both  
internal and external to the firm.    
The cross-section in the middle of the model illustrates the notion of identity  
ambidexterity, which sits at a point between a firm’s exploration and exploitation activities and  
indicates how these activities impact the organization’s identity.  The relationships between the  
horizontal (exploration and exploitation strategies) and vertical (identity management) combined  
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to illustrate identity ambidexterity.  I offer an example from my data to illustrate the notion of  
identity ambidexterity as advanced in the model.    
Blancpain, a Rebirth case, re-emerged because it focused on preserving its commitment  
to the family-owned watchmaking tradition rooted in the 18th century.  The CEO’s decision to  
house its watchmaking facilities in an old Swiss farmhouse supported this historical identity,  
along with the millions of dollars spent in marketing dollars to communicate it to external  
audiences.  However, in the early 2000s the CEO agreed to sell the company to the Swatch  
Group.  During the acquisition, many employees and outsiders questioned how the new  
ownership structure would impact the firm’s unique culture and commitment to the family- 
owned Swiss watchmaking tradition.  In response, the CEO released a company document that  
explained Blancpain’s new relationship with the Swatch Group:  
The Swatch Group stands for exceptional production facilities, terrific cutting-edge  
technology, powerful marketing strength, and a rock-solid financial presence.  No  
mechanical watch can be made without the Swatch Group. I would say being part of this  
industrial and commercial universe gives Blancpain total independence in terms of its art  
and distribution.  And independence is key to the future.  – The Ethic of Blancpain, 2001:  
59, 61 (published shortly after being purchased by Swatch Group).    
  
The statement provides a colorful example of identity ambidexterity.  The CEO suggests  
that the acquisition by the Swatch Group provided his company with greater independence.  He  
justified this statement by underscoring that Swatch Group was the most important actor in Swiss  
watchmaking, and because of its financial strength, Blancpain would gain additional resources to  
innovate and continue their mission to develop mechanical watchmaking movements. Thus, the  
CEOs actions illustrate how the organization had the ability to exploit its past and present  
identities while simultaneously allowing additional identity elements to permeate the  
organization: identity ambidexterity.    
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Figure 19: Towards a Model of Identity Ambidexterity  
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DISCUSSION  
“In watchmaking,  
 
Everything has been done,  
 
Everything has yet to be invented.”  
 
      - CEO of a Swiss watch manufacturer (Nardin, 2009)  
The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between organizational identity and  
ambidexterity during periods of significant environment change.  Using a multiple case method, I  
found that firms engage in both exploitation strategies that leverage their reputation in the old  
technological and institutional order, while paradoxically attempting to position themselves in the  
new order.  In addition to managing strategic decisions, I found this process also exposed multiple  
challenges related to the organization’s identity.  And while these strategic and organizational  
identity management challenges varied across different categories of firms, it was evident that  
they were nonetheless salient across all cases.    
I advance a model of identity ambidexterity that illustrates how firms balance the need to  
exploit existing components of their identity, but in order to survive periods of environmental  
change, must also allow novel and transformative identity elements to permeate their  
organization.  Thus, I extend previous work that has conceptualized organizational ambidexterity  
as a dynamic capability (O’Reilly  & Tushman, 2008) and propose similar dynamics are possible  
when a firm is forced to manage multiple elements, both traditional and modern, of its identity  
simultaneously.    
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, I extend prior work  
that has explored the nature of identity conflict.  For instance, Glynn (2000) and Battilana and  
Dorado (2010)  highlight several challenges that organizations face when managing identity  
conflicts.  Similarly, Voss, Cable and Voss (2006) report a performance decrease when  
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organizational leaders in nonprofit professional theaters disagreed about the organization’s  
identity.  Pratt and Foreman (2000) suggest that multiple organizational identities can be managed  
by making decisions to either delete, compartmentalize, aggregate, or integrate components of the  
organization’s identity.  Albert and Whetten’s (1985) early theorizing addressed how firms  
manage multiple identities by creating ideographic structures (i.e., each unit exhibits only one  
identity) or holographic structures (i.e., each unit exhibits multiple identities), but they did not  
offer guidance on how the organization should manage these opposing structures simultaneously.   
I addressed this gap by introducing several core concepts from the ambidexterity literature into  
the field of organizational identity and showed how these constructs were salient to several  
organizations that managed identity ambidexterity in the Swiss watch industry.   
  Second, my findings highlight how managing organizational identity requires different  
skills and capabilities over time.  I build on previous work that has highlighted the challenges and  
importance of organizational identity management throughout the technology life cycle (Tushman  
& Rosenkopf, 1992) and as a firm evolves (Albert  & Whetten, 1985; Cameron  & Whetten, 1981;  
Navis  & Glynn, 2010; Quinn  & Cameron, 1983).  Previously, identity has been shown to play a  
an important role for an organization during the emergence of an industry (e.g., Navis  & Glynn,  
2010), during eras of technological ferment (e.g., Tripsas, 2009), when organizations are  
attempting to reposition themselves in an established industry (e.g., Fiol, 2001), and during a  
prolonged period of incremental change and adaptation (e.g., Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).  This  
study illustrates that identity management is also critical during periods of field re-emergence.   
And while every stage of an organization’s evolution provides its own set of management  
challenges, identity ambidexterity proves to be particularly important during re-emergence  
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because it is a period where so many of the firm’s core attributes are questioned and need to be  
realigned.    
Third, I observe that leaders play a critical role in developing the necessary conditions to  
foster identity ambidexterity.  While certain functions (i.e., symbolic or strategic) and audiences  
(i.e., internal or external) of organizational identity may become more or less salient over time,  
leaders espouse and diffuse values that sustain and persist (Selznick, 1957).  According to  
Selznick, promoting values is core to developing an organizational identity.  He (1949: 40) argued  
that when organizations are infused with value, they are “prized not as tools alone but as sources  
of direct personal gratification and vehicles of group integrity. This infusion produces a distinct  
identity for the organization.”  I, too, find that successful leaders infuse values that support  
identity ambidexterity, whereby promoting identity elements that alleviate uncertainty and  
instability during an environmental change.    
To conclude, identity ambidexterity provides a novel approach to resolving some of the  
longstanding debates in the organizational identity literature about how firms manage identity  
conflict and ambiguity (Corley  & Gioia, 2004; Gioia et al., 2013; Gioia et al., 2000; Glynn, 2008).   
The cases presented here from the Swiss watch industry offer evidence that when faced with the  
threat of displacement, they were able to employ multiple strategies that allowed them to  
simultaneously manage multiple (and sometimes conflicting) views of their identity.  As the quote  
in the beginning of this section alludes, their ability to hold on the past may have been the key to  
their future.   
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CHAPTER VI.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation set out to explore how legacy technologies, and the related organizations  
and communities that support them, survive periods of technological ferment and eventually re- 
emerge.  Drawing from prior work on organizational identity, institutions, innovation, and  
ambidexterity, I asked “How, when, and why does market demand for a legacy technology re- 
emerge?” Using the Swiss watch industry as my empirical setting, I examined the conditions and  
mechanisms that marked the decline of the mechanical watch in the 1970s and early 1980s, and  
surprisingly, its rebirth in the 1990s and 2000s.  My analysis consisted of three empirical chapters  
that employed both qualitative and quantitative methods: Chapter III revealed the phenomenon of  
field and technology re-emergence, Chapter IV introduced mechanisms that enable field-level  
change, and finally, Chapter V examined the processes, decisions, and activities of individual  
organizations managing identity and institutional change.  In this chapter, I offer a recapitulation  
of my findings and contributions from each of the empirical chapters and then discuss more  
broadly how they relate to each other.  I conclude with a summary of the theoretical and  
managerial implications of this dissertation.   
SUMMARY OF RESULTS  
  Chapter III introduced the setting and context of my dissertation (i.e., the field of Swiss  
watchmaking) and asked “What factors influence the re-emergence of market demand for a  
legacy technology in a mature institutional field?”  By extending previous work related to field  
emergence and institutions (e.g., Glynn & Navis, 2010; Hargadon  & Douglas, 2001; Holm, 1995;  
Leblebici et al., 1991), I offer empirical support for a theoretical model of field re-emergence and  
169  
 
 
 
 
 
 
how it enabled the rebirth of a legacy technology. Using qualitative methods and multiple data  
sources, I recognized the possibility of field-level change that comes from the residues (Kaghan    
Lounsbury, 2006) of previous institutional and technological orders, as well as from field  
members who rediscovered the value of the past.   
  I found that field re-emergence requires components that, paradoxically, facilitate both  
field transformation and field preservation.  Although these processes appear to be at odds with  
one another, during a period of re-emergence they serve as necessary counterweights,  
encouraging the preservation of some valued elements of the old institutional order field and new  
elements that allow for change and survival.    
I also showed how these processes were supported by a diverse set of actors and activities,  
one set serving as institutional entrepreneurs who encouraged change and transformation, and a  
second set serving as institutional guardians who encouraged stasis and preservation.  I show that  
during field re-emergence both types of actors and activities are important because they diffuse a  
mix of counterbalancing values (e.g. innovation and conformity) that enable change and  
preservation.  Finally, I identified several mechanisms that are critical during field re-emergence,  
including: the role of identity construction, interpretation and translation, and the reproduction of  
patterns.  The findings in Chapter III were especially important for laying the groundwork for the  
following studies of the dissertation.    
  Chapter IV emphasized several of the key mechanisms I found to be significant in field re- 
emergence in Chapter III.  I asked “How are mechanisms of identity change associated with the  
re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology?” Using qualitative and quantitative  
analysis, I found general support for the following hypotheses which proposed that re-emergence  
was associated with: 1) product identity redefinition; 2) historical organizational identity  
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reclamation; 3) changes in community identity that reshape systems of meaning; and 4) identity  
change facilitated by mechanisms temporal framing, linguistic framing, and symbolic framing.  I  
then offered a conceptual framework that depicts the relationships between product identity,  
organizational identity, and community identity (Figure 17).  The framework illustrates how re- 
emergence is related to processes of identity “coupling” and “de-coupling,” pointing to an  
interplay among community, organization, and product identities as important factors in field- 
level change and, particularly, re-emergence.    
Chapter V moved beyond the field as the primary level of analysis and focused instead on  
the organizations within the field.  I asked, “How do incumbent organizations manage change  
when faced with the re-emergence of market demand for a legacy technology?” I conducted a  
comparative case analysis of eight exemplar watchmaking firms to examine how each developed  
unique strategies to manage the tension between preservation and change during the re-emergence  
of the Swiss watch industry.  I found that firms engage in both exploitation and exploration:   
exploitation strategies leveraged organizational resources and capabilities anchored in the old  
technological and institutional order, while exploration strategies facilitated the development of  
new ways of competitive positioning that could enable survival under new environmental and  
market conditions.    
In addition to managing strategic decisions, I found this process exposed multiple  
challenges related to the organization’s identity.  More specifically, I found that while successful  
firms adopted a variety of different identity management strategies, they all exploited elements  
associated with their old identity (e.g., heritage, craftsmanship) while paradoxically appending   
new identity elements (e.g., fashion, luxury) to redefine their identity.  My findings led me to  
advance the notion of identity ambidexterity, which I define as an organization’s ability to exploit  
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past and present identities while simultaneously integrating elements of a new organizational  
identity.  I found that firms balanced the need to exploit existing components of their identity, but  
also explored novel and transformative identity elements in order to survive the changes  
precipitated by re-emergence.   
Observations across the Empirical Studies  
When I began this dissertation, I was motived to understand the theoretical and  
phenomenological factors associated with the concept of re-emergence.  Admittedly, at first I  
struggled to define the construct. Was re-emergence tied to a specific technology (e.g.,  
mechanical watches)?  Or possibly a community of actors within an institutional field (i.e., Swiss  
watchmakers)?  Or was it a construct that should be defined by the actions of an organization  
(e.g., the Swiss watch companies)?    
Over time, my analyses led me to believe that the answers to my research questions  
necessitated a multi-level, multi-case, multi-theoretical perspective.  And so I sought   
convergence and triangulation (Creswell  & Clark, 2007; Jick, 1979) across multiple theories,  
methods, and types of data.  Although I designed each of the three empirical studies to explore the  
notion of re-emergence from the vantage point of a specific level of analysis (e.g., the field, the  
organization), I believe many of my most important discoveries came from understanding their  
interconnectedness.  This is also why I employed a problem-driven and mechanisms-based  
approach (Davis  & Marquis, 2005), examining how my core construct of re-emergence could  
involve multiple levels of analysis (Hedstrom  & Swedberg, 1998).  So, in the spirit of my initial  
questions related to re-emergence, I now take a step back and highlight several connections that I  
feel link my three empirical studies.      
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First, I believe that one of the most exciting findings from this dissertation is that re- 
emergence occurred at multiple levels of analysis:  community, organization, and individuals.  I  
found that some of my most promising findings came from the convergence of data, rather than  
the isolation of it.  For example, many of the individuals I interviewed credited Nicolas Hayek,  
the former CEO of the Swatch Group, as the “savior” of the Swiss watch industry (one person I  
interviewed preferred to address him as “Daddy” because he believed Hayek was the father of the  
current Swiss watch industry).  However, it was clear that while he may have been an  
instrumental institutional leader who infused new values and orchestrated a transformative vision  
for the industry, many other individuals and factors also played important roles.    
For instance, companies such as Patek Philippe and Rolex had already proven that they  
could continue to thrive by focusing on status and craftsmanship.  Record breaking prices for  
vintage mechanical watches offered at auction provided evidence that the market for the “dying  
technology” had not completely dried up.  Passionate Swiss watchmakers, such as the employee  
at Zenith who believed so much in mechanical technology that he risked his job and livelihood to  
hide the old dies and moulds in abandoned warehouses in order to preserve the technical know- 
how for future generations.  The introduction of the organizational “group” model brought in new  
expertise from the luxury industry that helped many defunct watch brands redefine themselves as  
luxury goods well suited for high-end consumption.  Finally, demand-side factors, especially  
increased discretionary household incomes, the rise of upper-class populations in Asia and the  
Middle East, and “luxury fever” (Frank, 2001) certainly helped drive up demand for high-end  
goods like Swiss watches.  While these elements are not meant to serve as an exhaustive list of  
the factors that allowed for the re-emergence, they hint at the complex web of relationships that  
facilitated such an unexpected outcome.    
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Nonetheless, a mechanisms-based approach provides some clarity to help organize and  
build relationships among such a diverse set of findings.  Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998: 23)  
posit that social mechanisms can be divided into three categories: situational, action-formation,  
and transformational.  In the case of the Swiss watchmaking industry, situational mechanisms  
help explain how field-level conditions affected organizational level actors in a particular way,  
action-formation mechanisms explain how action opportunities generated specific organizational  
level outcomes, and finally, transformational mechanisms explain how organizational actors  
influence the field-level environment.  I discuss each below.    
In Chapters III and IV, I exposed several field-level situational mechanisms and  
demonstrated how they affected organizational level behaviors.  In the late 1970s, the community  
of Swiss watchmaking generally rejected quartz technology, and found they were ill-suited to  
transition to the automated mass production systems required to compete with Japanese quartz  
timepieces.  As a result, situational mechanisms, such as imprinting and isomorphism, left many  
organizations extremely susceptible to the same traps  that incumbent firms often face when a  
competency-destroying innovation enters the market (e.g., Schumpeter, 1947; Tushman &  
Anderson, 1986).    
Conversely, in Chapters III and V, I illustrate how transformational mechanisms, such as  
innovation diffusion, leadership, and entrepreneurship, enabled organizations like the Swatch  
Group and others to affect field-level outcomes.  For example, the actions Hayek took in the early  
1980s to restructure his organization’s production systems ultimately created new standards and  
supply chain relationships that later impacted the entire watch industry; by 2000, over 80% of all  
Swiss industry watch movements were produced by Swatch Group.  Similarly, in Chapter V, I  
showed how identity ambidexterity was an important dynamic capability that enabled firms to  
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resolve tensions between isomorphic pressures for homogeneity and competitive differentiation or  
heterogeneity. For instance, Jean-Claude Biver, the former CEO of Blancpain, initiated a novel  
advertising campaign that touted his brand had never made a quartz watch, and never would. The  
ads aimed to redefine the mechanical watch as an object of artisanship and beauty whose Swiss  
heritage made it valuable, re-directing attention from critiques of mechanical technology as a less  
accurate alternative to cheaper Japanese quartz timepieces.  Such firm-level decisions helped  
market Blancpain watches, but also helped redefine the broader field of Swiss watchmaking.  As  
one executive who worked for another Swiss brand at the time recounted:   
People started to quote [the Blancpain advertising slogan] in Switzerland.  They were  
really well-amazed by the statement. You have to imagine little bits of work from  
everyone going the same direction, plus this ad, contributed to the revival and to the press  
talking and writing again about traditional mechanical watches. [interview with a Swiss  
watch Chief Marketing Officer, March 2012].  
  
The quote highlights how the actions of a specific organization (and its organizational  
identity construction) served as a transformation mechanism for field-level change.  More  
generally, across all three chapters, I found that the decisions of organizational leaders such as  
Biver and Hayek provided a renewed sense of “confidence” (c.f., Kanter, 2006) throughout the  
field of Swiss watchmaking that contributed to an industry-wide turnaround and re-emergence.    
From these observations, I hope to have conveyed how the re-emergence of market  
demand for a legacy technology was tied to several interconnected factors and mechanisms that  
were embedded within the norms, values and practices of an institutional field, the residue left  
behind from an old technological order, the strategies and behaviors of organizations, and the role  
of individual actors (e.g., leaders and guardians) who infused values that simultaneously induced  
change and preservation.    
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CONTRIBUTIONS   
Summary of Theoretical Contributions     
Together, all three studies in my dissertation make several contributions.  First, they  
expose the conditions and processes of field re-emergence, which I see as interwoven with  
corresponding institutional, technological, and identity re-emergence.  Thus, my dissertation  
complements prior research that has focused on field emergence and death and extends it to re- 
emergence. I find that the fate of legacy technologies may not be displacement.  Rather, they can  
persist, perhaps in non-obvious ways, to eventually re-emerge and re-configure a field.  Second,  
my mechanisms-based approach revealed the processes of coupling and decoupling among  
product, organizational and community identities that can accompany or undergird field-level  
identity change.  I highlight identity tensions that sit between the isomorphic pressures for  
homogeneity at the field level and heterogeneous strategic responses at the organizational level. I  
expose several core mechanisms of field re-formation, including: institutional leadership and  
guardianship, identity construction, interpretation and translation, the reproduction of patterns,  
and temporal, linguistic, and symbolic framing.  Finally, I explore how individual organizations  
manage processes of identity change while attempting to preserve a legacy identity, introducing  
the notion of ‘identity ambidexterity’ as a dynamic capability necessary for organizations to  
navigate re-emergence.      
Summary of Managerial Implications   
Here, I highlight three of the most salient managerial implications of my dissertation  
research.  First, I illustrate that it may be possible to protect some “dying” technologies from  
displacement by re-evaluating the factors that shape market demand for the product.  As the rate  
of technology innovation and diffusion continues to increase (Utterback, 1996), organizations are  
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constantly faced with the threat of new technologies capturing their existing market share.   
However, as witnessed in the Swiss watch industry, I find that some technologies may have  
intrinsic worth that can extend beyond their utility value.14  For the Swiss watch, consumer  
demand for mechanical watches re-emerged when the brands reoriented their organizational  
identities to amplify the “emotional” and “self-expressive” benefits of their products (Aaker &  
Joachimsthaler, 2000).  The lesson here for managers is to consider how one might go beyond the  
functionality of products to embrace non-functional aspects (e.g., aesthetics, status, etc.) that can  
influence consumer buying behaviors.  Although it is unlikely that such emotional or self- 
expressive benefits will completely trump functionality, developing these may provide  
organizations with valuable extra time to develop possible adaptation strategies.    
Second, there is an important implication of my dissertation about how to manage  
organizational, community, and product identities during periods of radical environmental change  
and disruption.  I find that firm and industry preservation are predicated on the ability to re- 
conceptualize “who you are” and “what you do.”  However, knowing when to align these  
concepts may be just as important as knowing how.  For instance, during periods of disruption,  
the mantra heard around boardrooms is often “circle the wagons” and hold tight to one’s  
organizational values.  But, as illustrated in my dissertation research, in the 1970s and early  
1980s, the Swiss’ insistence to hold firm to the core principles, values, and culture of traditional  
watchmaking likely led to their downfall.  While these identity elements were important factors in  
their past success, loosening their grasp on these earlier might have led to more effective  
                                                  
14 I should note that it is unclear from this single case study which types of technologies may be more or less suited to  
benefit from similar re-emergence dynamics as the Swiss mechanical watch.  Nonetheless, sustained or renewed  
consumer demand for products such as the Apple iPhone, French organic wines, and even vinyl records, suggests that  
organizations may be able to bolster consumer demand for their products by positioning them as self-expressive  
identity makers representing communal, organizational, regional, or historical values that the consumer may wish to  
claim as part of his or her own identity.   
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organizational responses.  Thus, the Swiss watch industry provides a cautionary tale for  
managers:  reinforcing the importance of exploiting key elements of an organization’s past  
identity and values, but also exploring new identity elements that might be incorporated to adjust  
to a changing environment.   
Finally, my findings make very clear that leadership is an important mechanism by which  
values are transmitted to internal and external audiences who can rekindle market demand for old  
technologies.  Not only are leaders themselves important carriers of values that sustain  
organizations during periods of radical change, they must also seek out individuals or groups who  
can serve as “guardians” of the organization’s core values.  Like the mechanical watch collector  
community, some consumer groups may hold valuable insights about where to seek unclaimed  
market share or can serve as bellwethers who can indicate when the re-emergence of market  
demand for a legacy technology is possible.    
CONCLUSION  
George Herbert Mead asserted (1932: 31): “The novelty of every future demands a novel  
past.”  The unexpected re-emergence of the Swiss watch industry is a story of perseverance, hope,  
and rebirth. Although certain elements of the technological and institutional orders associated  
with mechanical watchmaking will forever be lost to history, my findings suggest that industries,  
organizations, and individuals have the ability to preserve their past, recreate their present, and  
imagine a future.  Similarly, this dissertation has been a source of personal discovery and  
motivation.  While I believe it makes several contributions to the management literature, I am  
most excited about the broader research program that it has inspired.  Like the Swiss peasant cow  
farmers who were introduced to the craft of mechanical watchmaking in the 16th century, the  
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process of writing this dissertation introduced me to many of the tools and concepts that I will  
undoubtedly take with me as I embark on a my own path of academic exploration.    
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Appendix I: Supplemental Watch Industry Data 
 
  
Swiss Share of Global Watch Production, 1945-1983  
  
  
Source: Tushman, M.L.,  & Radov, D. 2000. Rebirth of the Swiss Watch Industry.  HBS Case 9-400-087  
  
Swiss and Swatch Group Share of Worldwide Watch Export Value   
  
Source: Tushman, M.L.,  & Radov, D. 2000. Rebirth of the Swiss Watch Industry.  HBS Case 9-400-087  
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Appendix II: Interview Protocol 
 
  
Interviewer:  __________________________  Location:  ____________________________  
    
Identifier #:  ______________________  Date / Time: __________________________  
  
General introduction and interview rationale:  
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. I am a doctoral student at the Carroll School of  
Management at Boston College. I am conducting research that focuses on understanding the  
evolution of the watch industry, and especially the role of the Swiss community of watchmaking.   
To do this, I am interviewing people who have industry knowledge, through their own work  
experience in watchmaking or as a part of the field more generally.    
  
I want to assure you that your responses will be confidential.  Your name, any other names you  
mention [and, if relevant, your current or former employer’s name(s)] will not be disclosed to  
anyone; there will not be any information reported that will identify you.  I will report the  
findings anonymously and as an aggregate.  Your participation is voluntary and if you wish, you  
can withdraw at any point. You can also choose not to respond to any question. The duration of  
the interview will be approximately 45 minutes to one hour.   
  
Please read through the IRB consent form. If you agree to participate, we can proceed with the  
interview. [Pause; give the interviewee the consent form.  Proceed when signed].   
  
Participant Background Information   
1.  What roles and responsibilities have you had over the course of your career related to the  
watch industry? [ Probes:  In what organizations?  For how long?  What kinds of watches  
were in your realm of experience?  Ask for some specifics.]  
  
2.  How would you describe your knowledge or understanding about the watchmaking industry  
in general from 1970-present day?  [Probes:  Would you describe yourself as current and up- 
to-date?  If not, how recent is your knowledge?  In particular, how familiar are you with  
Swiss watchmaking?]  
  
Historical and Contextual Information   
3.  In your experience, what were the most significant changes to occur in Swiss watchmaking  
before 1980?  [Probe: Why do you think they happened?  Ask for examples.  Note: dates will  
be amended based on respondent’s experience].  
  
4.  In your experience, what have been the most significant changes to occur in Swiss  
watchmaking since 1980?  [Probe: Why do you think they happened?  Ask for examples.  
Note: dates will be amended based on respondent’s experience].  
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Industry and Field Level Dynamics   
5.  How would you describe the nature of the Swiss watchmaking industry in 1970 vs. 2008?  
[Probe: ask about any widespread norms and values, perceived identity of the industry, any  
regulations that significantly affected the industry].   
  
6.  How would you describe the characteristics that made the Swiss watchmaking industry  
unique and distinctive in 1970, if any?  In 2008?  [Probe: ask about any widespread norms  
and values, perceived identity of the industry, or regulations that affected the industry].  
  
Product Characteristics  
7.  How would you describe the various technologies used in the production of Swiss watches in  
the early 1970s?  1980s? [Probe: how would you compare quartz watch technology to that of  
the mechanical watch?]  
  
8. & How would you describe the architecture, design, and common functions of Swiss watches in  
the early 1970s?  1980s? In 2008?  [Probe: if they perceive differences between the periods,  
ask how and why the differences may exist.]  
  
9.  What do you think were the most significant actions that the Swiss watchmaking community  
took to preserve the technology of the mechanical watch over the past 35 years?   
  
Swiss Watchmaking Community and Organizations  
10. How would you describe the community of Swiss watchmakers in the early 1970s?  1980s?  
[Probe: ask for examples of how the Swiss watchmaking community managed to survive  
during this period.  Ask for examples from specific organizations].  
  
11. How would you describe the shared norms and values, if any, that characterized the  
community of Swiss watchmakers in the early 1970’s.  In 2008?  [Probe: ask about specific  
organizations as well].  
  
12. How would you describe the coalitions and coordination mechanisms, if any, within the  
Swiss watchmaking community during the 1970’s?  [Probe: How have these evolved over  
the past 35 years?]  
  
13. In your perception, who were the power brokers within the Swiss watchmaking industry in  
the early 1970s? 1980s?  [Probe: has this locus of power changed or remained the same?]  
  
14. In your perception, what were the most significant actions that the Swiss watchmaking  
community took to preserve itself over the past 35 years? [Probe: ask about specific  
organizational actions].  
  
15. Can you point to a specific event(s) and people that were vital to the survival of Swiss  
watchmaking during the past 35 years?  [Probe: ask about specific organization-sponsored  
events or organizational members].  
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Conclusion  
  
Those are all the questions that I have.  Is there anything else you would like to tell me about  
watchmaking?          
  
In closing, I’d like to ask you some questions about yourself …   
  
Age:     __________________________________  
  
Nationality:  __________________________________  
  
Education:   __________________________________  
  
Gender (Note):  __________________________________   
  
  
Do you have any questions for me?   
  
Can I follow up if I have any additional questions?  
  
Thank you for your time and participation in my study.  
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Appendix III: Mechanical Watch Chronometer Certifications (COSC) 
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Source: Contrôle Officiel Suisse des Chronomètres (COSC), analysis by author.  
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Appendix IV: Illustrative Watch Journal Advertisements 
 
a)  Precision Craftsmanship Period  (pre-1983) 
 
  
  
b)  Fashion Period (1983-1989)  
  
  
c)  Luxury Peirod (1990-2008)  
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